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INTRODUCTION 
When Scott Pegg introduced de facto states to the academic literature, these 
entities had already existed for some time. However, this existence had more 
often than not been short-lived and usually ended through violent means. Biafra 
was overrun by Nigerian forces in 1970 after just a few years of factual 
independence. Around a decade earlier, another secessionist attempt in Africa, 
Katanga, also enjoyed non-recognised independence for a brief period. This 
adventure, if we may put it that way, was also ended using military means, in 
this case also with the involvement of United Nations. And there have been 
several puppet states created during major conflicts like Croatia and Slovakia 
during World War II by the Nazis or Manchukuo by Japan. Elsewhere, South 
Africa created Bantustans for the indigenous population and these entities did 
not enjoy international recognition either, though they were supposed to exist as 
independent states. 
The end of the Cold War created a relatively substantial number of new de 
facto states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia 
and, in a single case, Somalia. Some of these new states managed to consolidate 
their existence and although they experienced war in their early years, managed 
to survive for a longer period of time. Although some, like Chechnya, 
Republika Srpska and Srpska Krajina, were finally defeated, the number of 
remaining de facto states was substantial. Adding to these the earlier surviving 
cases of Taiwan and Northern Cyprus, there is sufficient material for academic 
research. 
Still, in international relations scholarship the subject is on the periphery. 
Most of the literature is devoted to confirmed states, and places whose legal 
existence is arguable, to say the least, have been very much neglected. Usually 
they are treated as anomalies that cannot be explained by state-centric theories 
and viewed as something temporary. Recent developments, however, show that 
they can be more viable in practice and that there is growing interest within the 
academy in researching these entities. Several articles and books have been 
published on the subject covering different cases and approaches. 
This thesis tries to fill a gap in the literature which focuses more on the 
particular than on the general. We want to establish the position of de facto 
states in the international system, not by focusing on particular cases but on 
conditions across the cases. A substantial amount of literature is devoted to the 
motives of de facto states – what they want and how they would achieve their 
goals. Little attention has been given how their accomplishments actually reflect 
their position. And when it has been done, it is done in a context of a particular 
case. Hence we do have substantial knowledge why some particular de facto 
states could be in a position they are. The term ‘some particular’ is used because 
the literature on de facto states is uneven when considering how much coverage 
each entity gets. Some are very thoroughly analysed, some very little.  
3
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Therefore, the main aim of this thesis is to give a comparative view of all de 
facto states and to find out what conditions matter in establishing the position of 
de facto states in the international system over the cases rather than within 
them. This being the main idea behind the dissertation, there are several 
important aspects that we try to address. All in all, there are several goals and 
sub-goals to focus on.  
First is the concept of de facto state itself. With different authors con-
tributing to the definition, it has evolved somewhat during the past fifteen years. 
Although there are overlaps in different definitions, there are also differences. 
Most authors have accepted Pegg’s core but complemented it with additional 
conditions. In this thesis, the different concepts of the de facto state are 
systematised. We will specify the similarities between different approaches and 
use them to create the working definition used in the analysis. What is more, 
different authors have used different terms to denote the entities that we label de 
facto states. 
Secondly, we will try to examine the position of de facto states in the 
international system. Even though the international system, international society 
and the international community are mentioned extensively in the literature, 
they have been under-conceptualised and used interchangeably. While the 
concept of international society is associated with the English School, there are 
several ideas of what an international system should be. Additionally, the 
international community seems to have even more meanings, but these are 
usually not discussed. They are used somewhat as umbrella terms to show how 
de facto states manage in the contemporary world. Hence, this thesis tries to 
offer the first thorough systemic approach to de facto states; we try to position 
them in the system using different elements of the latter.  
The concept of the international system we are using is derived from Buzan 
and Little, who take into account the following elements: processes, structure 
and capacities. We bind the elements together and fill them with data. We use 
four types of data for the conditions (causes) – economic, patronage, secession 
and human rights – and three types for outcome (consequences) – represen-
tations, involvement in international organisations and formal recognition. 
These two concepts – the de facto state and the international system – are 
then put together and used in data analysis. This third goal of the thesis involves 
several sub-goals. First, we want to show that a consequence can come about 
because of several different causes, not just one. A technical term for this 
phenomenon is equifinality. As for de facto states, different entities can enjoy a 
similar position in the international system for different reasons.  
The second idea is that single causes might not be sufficient to create 
consequences on their own: the combination of these causes is needed. This is 
called conjunctural causality. Different aspects of de facto states are covered in 
the literature but analysed mostly in isolation. Our aim is to find combinations 
of these aspects. Although no combinations are explicitly given, there are hints 
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that several variables are in play when the dynamics of de facto states are 
analysed.  
The third sub-goal would be to show the asymmetry between different 
consequences. Some position in the international system can be the result of 
some causes, but the absence of this position is not the result of the absence of 
these particular causes. Although some de facto states enjoy relative acceptance 
in the world for certain reasons, others do not. But to explain the latter, we 
cannot simply negate the aforementioned reasons. There could be other factors 
that contribute to the non-acceptance. 
These goals are to be achieved using two notions – necessity and sufficiency. 
With the emphasis on the latter, the aforementioned combinations are sufficient 
conditions for different positions in the international system. Based on theo-
retical knowledge about de facto states and the international system, we can 
create three hypotheses that are connected to each other. 
H1: There are several paths to how de facto states are positioned in the 
international system. These paths are sufficient conditions for our outcomes: 
whether the de facto state has foreign representations on its soil; whether 
they are involved in international organisations; and whether they have some 
formal recognition. 
The first hypothesis is about equifinality. The second hypothesis consists of two 
sub-hypotheses and is derived from the first: 
H2-1: These paths, the sufficient conditions, are combinations of individual 
conditions; 
H2-2: These single conditions contribute to the outcome in different 
manners: 
 The economic conditions have positive impact; 
 Patronage has positive impact; 
 The human rights record has positive impact; 
 Secessionism has negative impact. 
 
The impact each condition has is derived from existing knowledge. Positive 
impact means that this particular condition contributes to the de facto state 
being accepted in the system, while negative impact means the opposite. The 
third hypothesis is about asymmetry: 
H3: The negations of sufficient conditions that lead to the particular position 
of the de facto state in the international system do not lead to the negation of 
that position. 
To achieve the set goals, we use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). This 
is an infrequently used method and its application in international relations 
research in general and research on de facto states in particular has been limited, 
to say the least. QCA can be considered, in addition to a method, as a research 
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design. It is applicable where we can assume that combinations of conditions 
contribute to the outcome or where there are different paths to some result. In 
this sense, the thesis is designed as QCA because, as mentioned earlier and as 
will be clearly visible below, its application to de facto states is justified. We 
cannot simply say that a particular condition is a cause of some aspect of de 
facto states; there are several conditions that affect the end result, which is 
integration into the international system. Furthermore, different cases have 
reached the same position in different ways. Therefore, it is valid to say that 
QCA as an approach is very suitable to the analysis of de facto states.  
As a method, there are several versions of QCA that fit the aforementioned 
approach. There is a crisp set version (csQCA) of dichotomies and a fuzzy set 
version (fsQCA) for more fine-grained data. The exact method is described and 
explained in a later chapter. There are different reasons why QCA has been 
underused in the field. Arguably, the main reason is that it is relatively new. 
Additionally, its roots in set-theory, formal logic and Boolean algebra may scare 
off some researchers. 
The thesis is divided into three major parts, each consisting of chapters and 
sections. Altogether, there are five levels of partition in the text. As suggested 
above, the two main concepts are the international system and the de facto state, 
and the first part of the thesis is about them. We will start with the international 
system followed by the de facto state. In conceptualising the de facto state, we 
use four distinct sections and start with international law. We use declarative 
and constitutive theory to establish whether these entities can be considered 
states at all. Moving on from there, we locate the main difference between 
recognised states and de facto states in the concept of sovereignty. The third 
section deals with the current understanding of de facto states; it constitutes a 
descriptive overview of the literature. The fourth section is the most important 
in this part, as it combines our concepts of state, sovereignty and the existing 
literature to create the working definition that is used in this thesis. The part 
ends with an overview of the cases analysed later, with special emphasis on 
how they fit our definition.  
The second part of the thesis is dedicated to method. Since our method is 
not, perhaps yet, widely used, it is described and explained in detail. The main 
concepts, like the aforementioned notions of necessity and sufficiency, along 
with the main ideas of the approach – equifinality, conjunctural causation and 
asymmetry – are discussed. We are going to use the fuzzy set version of QCA, 
where calibration involves data conversion into set-membership scores.  
The final part of the dissertation tests the three outcome conditions. We will 
see how the selected conditions influence the number of foreign representations 
in the de facto state, how involved the de facto state is in international 
organisations and to what degree it has received formal recognition. The choice 
of these outcomes was inspired by possible types of interactions among states. 
These are, respectively, bilateral, multilateral and unilateral relations. Each 
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outcome condition tests one of these possibilities. The results are discussed at 
the end of each section and the dissertation will end with a concluding chapter. 
Tables and figures for the analysis part are created using the fsQCA 2.5 
programme. The tables are created using the results obtained by the programme 
and the figures are given by the programme itself. Tables and figures from the 
earlier parts of the dissertation are created using MS Office. 
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1. CONCEPTUALISATION AND  
CASE SELECTION 
1.1. Understanding the world of political units 
Three concepts have been used quite extensively in the literature on de facto 
states when considering their status and relations in the world: the international 
community, society and system. Examples start with Pegg and his book Inter-
national society and the de facto state. Caspersen’s book is titled Unrecognized 
States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System with 
emphasis on sovereignty rather than the system. Both Pegg and Caspersen do 
not elaborate on what the society or system is all about. Another very often used 
phrase is ‘international community’. Examples include ‘the international com-
munity did not recognize their statehood’ (Isachenko, 2012, p. 1); ‘the state as 
such is not accepted by the international community as legitimate’ (Kolstø P., 
2006, p. 724); ‘the de facto state is not recognized by other states or the 
international community’ (King, 2001, p. 834); ‘liberal democracies always 
receive more recognition from the international community than authoritarian 
regimes’ (Berg & Toomla, 2009, p. 43). Kolstø even entitles a section The Role 
of International Community (2006, p. 734). However, these three concepts have 
been used without much clarification as to what they actually mean. One might 
argue that all three could simply mean states. In this approach they would all be 
the same thing, meaning the set of all of the World’s states. There is no 
elaboration of structure or interaction, the emphasis is on the unit – the state. 
The following section tries to establish the differences between the three 
concepts and to provide a thorough analysis of the international system. We 
show that the three concepts can be separate, even though they overlap 
occasionally. The concept of the international system is the approach devised by 
Buzan and Little (2000). It elaborates the notions of the system’s structure, units 
and interaction between units. Therefore, this would be the first attempt to offer a 
thorough systemic approach to de facto states. Using the working definition given 
in Chapter 1.2.4 and the ‘permission’ given by the declaratory theory to treat de 
facto states in similar fashion to confirmed states, we offer an approach where 
different aspects of the system affect de facto states’ position in the system.  
 
 
1.1.1. The international community 
Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (2005, p. 31) state that “it is clear that 
‘international community” means different things to different people’. Inter-
national community has been used for a rather long period of time but its 
meaning has been somewhat different. Additionally, there has been no clear 
distinction between international community, international society and world 
community or world society.  
15 
Earlier in the 20th century there was no common term to use; the terms 
seemed to mean the same thing – some level of central authority. International 
law is the foundation on which an International Community as an organisation 
should be built. It would be ‘an assembly, furnished with executive powers, 
would possess sovereignty, but its sphere of authority would be confined to 
those areas only which affect the mutual common interests of all states’ 
(Heggstad, 1935, p. 268). He also cites (p. 267) the creation of the USA as an 
example of a ‘lasting organisation of states’. Overall, his account is that 
‘international community’ is an organisation of states that has some judicial and 
executive powers.  
Elsewhere, (Martin, 1943, p. 194) argues that a worldwide super-state might 
not be on the agenda but ‘the time does seem ripe for some kind of world 
organization that bears resemblances to a super-state’. Building on analogies 
between civil society and international society, Martin hypothesises that states 
as units in the latter would gradually start to solve their disputes through 
negotiations and third party arbitration, as in civil society where this kind of 
behaviour led to the state. The excessive use of force that the League of Nations 
was unable to prevent and the lack of security thereof is the main driving force 
behind the idea of an international community. There is no international law 
including the norms that should promote security unless there is an executive 
organ that enforces the law. The international community as an international 
organisation would be just that and, according to Martin, a judicial rather than 
political organ should be at its centre.  
In the 21st century, the concept has become vaguer and un-associated with 
world government. As Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez show, there are two general 
meanings to the term. Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez take this stance after 
analysing opinions of mainly practitioners from a forum in Foreign Policy 
(2002). There are those ‘who see the international community as some form of 
moral collectivity of humankind which exists as an ethical referent even if not 
organized in any way, and those who see it as some kind of agent possessing the 
capacity for action’ (Buzan & Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2005, p. 32). They argue that 
the former can be associated with universality and natural law, the latter with 
particularity, especially with the liberal West. Among the proponents of the first 
there is, for example, former Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan, who in 
the very same issue sees the international community as ‘a shared vision of a 
better world for all people’ (Annan, 2002, p. 30). The second opinion echoes 
that of Samuel Huntington, who claimed that ‘international community’ is just a 
replacement for ‘the Free World’ ‘to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting 
the interests of the United States and other Western powers’ (Huntington, 1993, 
p. 39).  
There are also two approaches to how the international community could 
realise itself in practice. One would be through cooperation and the other 
through international organisation, with the latter option also divided into two – 
mere codification of international law, where it would be a tool for states, or as 
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an independent actor autonomously representing the international community 
(Ellis, 2009). Either way, the international community is seen as something 
more than a system or society, mainly because of the level of interaction and 
shared norms. It is also an ‘upgrade’ on international society; as David Ellis 
puts it, ‘the most basic requirement for any putative international community is 
a unified society of states adhering to generally the same norms, rules, 
identities, and views of moral conduct’ and ‘an international society is an 
ontological precursor for the eventual development of an international 
community’ (2009, pp. 4–5).  
 
 
1.1.2. International society 
International society is the central concept of the English School of international 
relations. Hedley Bull (1977) distinguishes three traditions of thought about the 
state system and labels them after well-known thinkers of the past – the 
Hobbesian, the Kantian and the Grotian traditions. The first can be associated 
with realist thinking and the state of war, the second with liberalism and the 
community of mankind and the third one with international society. This kind of 
reference to classical philosophers is by no means Bull’s invention, but as an 
illustration it might be quite useful. These labels have acquired conceptual 
meanings within the English School as the international system, international 
society and world society respectively (Little, 2000). 
Bull takes Grotius as ‘role-model’ to build his concept of international 
society. The Grotian approach, as Bull puts it (p. 27), ‘is that all states, in their 
dealings with one another, are bound by the rules and institutions they form’. 
Unlike Hobbesians, there are both legal and moral rules that bind states and, 
unlike Kantians, there are states. These three possible worlds can exist at the 
same time with elements from each being present in the contemporary world, 
though usually one of them is predominant. And even though the realist 
Hobbesian logic has dominated the history of the modern international system, 
the element of international society has always had some role to play because 
‘at no stage can it be said that conception of the common interests of states, of 
common rules accepted and common institutions worked by them, has ceased to 
exert an influence’ (Bull, 1977, p. 42).  
What are the characteristics of international society? First of all one has to 
answer the question: who constitutes this society? A common answer is: states. 
While in domestic societies and in the world society approach the unit is 
individual, the international society consists of states. The second issue is that it 
is an anarchical society (Bull, 1977). Anarchy means the non-existence of world 
government and Bull argues that it is not an impossibility to form a society in 
these circumstances. The third characteristic is common identity. Barry Buzan 
(1993, p. 335) argues that ‘societies have to contain an element of common 
identity, a sense of ‘we-ness’, that comprises more than mere shared goals’. 
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Building on the approach created by Ferdinand Tönnies, the 19th century 
German sociologist, Buzan differentiates gemeinschaft and gesellschaft 
conceptions of society with the former implying natural or cultural connections 
within a group and the latter implying contractual connections. International 
society has no kinship ties between states, therefore being of the latter type. 
According to Buzan, the common identity in this society is sovereignty and the 
acceptance of it. He argues that ‘when units not only recognize each other as 
being the same type of entity but also are prepared to accord each other equal 
legal status on that basis’ (Buzan, 1993, p. 345), we can speak of international 
society rather than the system of states. 
Bull holds a slightly different opinion on this matter. For him, the 
characteristics that differentiate international society from the international 
system are common interests, rules and institutions (Bull, 1977, pp. 65–74). He 
approaches this through to concept of order and how it is maintained in 
international society. For order to exist in international society, states must first 
establish some common interests in ‘elementary goals of social life’. The rules 
are there to guide the behaviour of states so that they are consistent with the 
common interests. And finally, the institutions should enforce these rules. 
Institutions could be formalised organisations but do not have to be; they could 
be ‘set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals’ 
(Bull, 1977, p. 74). Even though Bull needs sovereignty and sovereign states for 
international society, he does not consider the preservation of sovereignty 
explicitly to be the common interest nor sovereignty to be a source of identity. 
On the other hand, security and therefore protection of independence could be 
the common interests.  
 
 
1.1.3. The international system  
Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2000) approach the international system 
through a set of issues. The first is what can be described as the sector-based 
approach, the second is sources of explanation, and the third is criteria for 
international systems (concerning interaction and units). There is also the 
additional issue of levels of analysis where Buzan and Little distinguish five 
categories. There are two additional levels to those defined by Waltz (1959) as 
the international system, state and individual. These new levels are subsystem 
and subunit, with unit being the state level.  
However, to start with, we need to conceptualize what an international 
system is. Buzan and Little (2000, p. 90) are surprised ‘that IR has generated no 
universally accepted, orthodox definition of what constitutes an international 
system’. That does not mean that the matter is ignored; quite the opposite. 
Robert Jervis (1998, p. 92) claims that ‘to review all the literature on inter-
national systems could take a book in itself’. Some of the authors that have been 
trying to put together a systemic approach include Kaplan (1957), Singer and 
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Small (1966), Wallerstein (1974), Waltz (1979) and Wendt (1999), to name a 
few.  
Kaplan focuses on ‘six states of equilibrium of one ultra-stable international 
system’ (2005, p. 34) and analyses them through integrative activities. Singer 
and Small approach the system only as an interaction of its parts. Even though 
they research rank orders of states, a hierarchy of sort, they do not consider 
structure. Taking these theoretical constructions into the empirical world, Singer 
and Small create a rank order of states based on diplomatic representation using 
a quantitative method and data from 1815–1940. Wallerstein takes a different 
approach and puts economics in the centre of his analysis. According to this 
approach, states have structural positions in the world-system – core, periphery 
and semi-periphery – and these positions influence their behaviour. As we can 
see later in the chapter, Buzan and Little emphasise structure as well as process 
in their approach. The former is based on Waltz’s work while the latter draws 
from Wendt’s school. Therefore we will describe the approaches of these 
authors in more detail. 
Probably the most influential systemic approach to international relations is 
Neorealism as formulated by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of 
International Politics. He claims that ‘international-political outcomes cannot 
be explained reductively’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 79), with reductionist theories being 
those that explain international politics through elements in the lower levels, i.e. 
the state or sub-state.  
In Waltz’s opinion, then, the best theory to explain international politics is a 
systemic one. For Waltz, a ‘system is composed of a structure and of interacting 
units’ (1979, p. 79). Central to his analysis is structure. There are two aspects of 
structure that have special importance. Firstly, structure emerges when political 
units start to interact and the purpose of this interaction is not to create 
structures. Waltz builds his analysis on economics where markets are created in 
similar fashion. The important aspect is that ‘structures are formed by the 
coactions of their units’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 91) or, worded a bit differently, 
generated ‘by [units’] interaction’ (p. 93). Secondly, the ordering principle of 
the international structure is anarchy. The latter means that there is no 
government, the units within the system are not in hierarchical relations. The 
anarchical structure and constraints it poses to units’ behaviour are the first 
‘pillar’ of Waltz’s theory. 
The second one is an assumption about units. The units are functionally 
similar states; states because Waltz’s theory covers only what Buzan considers a 
political sector. Waltz does not deny the existence or importance of other actors, 
but in the political sphere they are the main ones. The structure of international 
politics is defined by major powers, not all states. And they are functionally 
similar because of the anarchical structure. Anarchy, being a self-help system, 
creates similar units which in the political system are concerned mainly with 
their survival. 
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The third ‘pillar’ is the distribution of capabilities. As mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, the major powers define the system. Whether it is bi-, 
multi- or unipolar depends on the number of major powers. It is important to 
note that the distribution of capabilities is a systemic rather than a unit level 
feature. Waltz (1979, p. 80) states that ‘the arrangement of units is a property of 
the system’. Building on that idea, Waltz (1979, p. 98) continues: ‘capabilities 
are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities across units is not’. Waltz 
considers this to be a system-wide concept.  
While states are considered the main units because of the political sphere 
that Waltz tries to explain, similar reasoning is behind including only 
capabilities rather than other characteristics that might have an influence on 
state behaviour. Waltz excludes the latter because of the concept of ‘power’ and 
it can be defined only through capabilities.  
Alexander Wendt (1992) is critical of Waltz’s approach in several aspects. 
His main point is that Waltz is wrong in saying that self-help is a logical 
condition of anarchy. Wendt (1992, p. 394) tries to ‘argue against the neorealist 
claim that self-help is given by anarchic structure exogenously to process’. He 
does this by claiming that self-help is an institution that is formed by process 
rather than the structure. Wendt does not deny the existence of anarchic 
structure; he just thinks that structure and process are mutually constitutive 
instead of the structure being logically constraining on the process. In Wendt’s 
approach the logic of anarchy is the ‘practices that create and instantiate one 
structure of identities and interest rather than another; structure has no existence 
or causal powers apart from process’ (Wendt, 1992, p. 395).  
Anarchy has a permissive function in Wendt’s theory. Process, or inter-
action, between units can create different institutions within anarchy. One of 
them could be self-help, but not necessarily so. As he puts elsewhere (Wendt, 
1999, p. 249): ‘anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; 
anarchies only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside 
them’ (emphasis original). The main difference with Waltz is that in the latter’s 
case the structure is completely independent of units, while in Wendt’s 
approach this is not so. The identities and interests of units constitute the 
structure through process. 
However, structure and process are just two components of the approach to 
the international system by Buzan and Little. Overall, the issues they 
conceptualised can be seen in three clusters – sectors, sources of explanation 
and interaction and units. The sectors are what Buzan and Little (and many 
others for that matter) call the ‘lenses’ (p. 73) as a metaphor from the natural 
sciences. This means that they divide international politics into sectors and try 
to find systems from each sector separately. This approach had been adopted 
previously by Buzan (1991)1, Buzan et al (1993), Buzan et al (1998) and 
                                                 
1This reference is to 2ndedition to the book which elaborates on the approach. The 1st 
edition was published in 1983 and the approach was introduced there. 
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Keohane and Nye (2001). These sectors are political-military, economic and 
socio-cultural. A fourth sector can also be added, though it has gained relative 
importance only recently: the environmental sector. All sectors are about some 
sort of relationships between units of the system: the economic system 
involving trade and finance; the cultural system involving culture. There are 
two aspects worth mentioning about these sectors. First, the political-military 
can be divided into two sectors, political and military. The difference between 
them is in the nature of relationships, the military one being of forceful coercion 
and the political being about ‘authority, governing status and recognition, and 
concerns the organisational stability of systems of government’ (Buzan & Little, 
2000, p. 73). As Buzan and Little note, some might differentiate the legal sector 
from the political as one concerning relations of contracts and conventions.  
Secondly, the three major sectors form systems that ‘can be seen as 
hierarchy /…/ and as a possible (but not inevitable) development sequence’ 
(Buzan & Little, 2000, p. 96). The hierarchy would start, top to bottom, from 
full international systems that involve the full range of sectors from political-
military through economic to socio-cultural. The second level would be 
economic systems which lack the military-political element but involve social 
and cultural connections, which on their own would constitute the third and 
least complex international system. The development sequence would operate 
vice versa, from a less to a more complex one, with the socio-cultural system 
being the first and the military-political the last. 
Buzan and Little’s second aspect of the international system involves the 
sources of explanation or ‘variables that explain behaviour’ (p. 77). They bring 
forward three sources of explanation that are most prevalent in the intellectual 
debate: interaction capacities, process and structure.  
Buzan and Little consider process to be the most easily understood of the 
three. Process is defined through interaction between units and the pattern of 
this interaction. According to Buzan and Little (2000, p. 79) ‘systems are 
identified by the patterns of interaction that take place among their constituent 
units’. Each pattern provides evidence of a process which collectively, in turn, 
give us information about ‘the patterns of action and interaction that can be 
observed among the units that make up the system’ (p. 79). Therefore, processes 
are made up of different patterns that are themselves made up of action and 
reaction between the units and their use of interaction capabilities. Processes in 
the military-political sphere include fighting and recognition; in the economic 
sphere, trade and investments; and in the socio-cultural sphere, identity 
formations. 
Recurrent patterns are labelled ‘process formations’ by Buzan and Little (p. 
79) and these include war, balance of power, diplomacy, alliance formations, 
regimes, international organisations, etc; basically, everything one can imagine 
that takes place in international politics. Processes are conditioned by structure, 
which in today’s international system is anarchic, and also by structures at unit 
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level. Some processes reflect the self-help system and others arrangements to 
overcome the effects of this system. 
Processes in the modern global international system are characterised by 
their speed and range. As the system is global, processes also had to become 
global. And developments in innovation and technology made the tempo of the 
interactions faster than ever before. Buzan and Little pay much attention to 
military and power relations in the military-political sphere where the 
developments led to European/Western supremacy and in the end to destructive 
wars. On the non-military side, probably the main feature of the modern 
international system was a proliferation of international organisations. 
Otherwise processes like diplomacy or alliances that were present in the older 
systems made the step up and became global. 
Globalisation in the economic sphere came before that in the military-
political sector. Buzan and Little emphasize two aspects of global economy that 
have grown in volume in the modern era – trade and finance. Trade has also 
created international political processes like GATT negotiations and the 
formation of the WTO. Similarly, international finance has become increasingly 
important, to the extent that it dominates production and trade. Additionally, 
international financial institutions have been created.  
Societal processes are ‘intertwined with the military-political story’ (Buzan 
& Little, 2000, p. 317) and Buzan and Little consider diplomacy and 
international law to be these processes. This raises a question: what are political 
processes if not diplomacy? As mentioned earlier, some authors want to 
separate the legal from the political sector, therefore should not the matters of 
international law be positioned in that analytical framework? If these processes 
are analysed as political, then Buzan and Little do not add anything to societal 
processes between states or on the international society level, as they put it. On 
the individual or world society level, these processes are about cross-cultural 
contact. To complement the approach by Buzan and Little, we add human rights 
advancement to the socio-cultural sector as a process. Human rights and, to a 
lesser extent, democracy are ideas that are at least rhetorically accepted by the 
majority of states. They are cultural concepts whose proliferation can also be 
seen as a process in the modern world. 
The second source of explanation is interaction capacity. This concept was 
first introduced by Buzan et al (1993) as the third level of analysis, next to unit 
and structure. The reason behind this addition is that interaction is not only a 
unit level phenomenon, but also present at the system level without being 
structural phenomenon. Buzan and Little (2000, p. 80) consider interaction 
capacity the least known of the sources and define it as ‘the amount of 
transportation, communication and organisational capability within the unit or 
system’. They distinguish two aspects of the concept, the technological 
capabilities and norms, rules and institutions. Interaction capacity defines the 
amount, the distance, the speed and the cost of transport, mostly of goods and 
information, but also people. In comparison with the process, Buzan and Little 
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differentiate interaction capacity as what states can do instead of what they 
actually do. Interaction is an important element of the system to many authors; 
some of them have been briefly reviewed above. Three elements are important 
(Buzan & Little, 2000, p. 81). First, geographical factors, which are the more 
important the more low-technology the environment is. In the modern 
international system, geography plays a minor role. Secondly, there are physical 
technologies for transport and communication which are quite straightforward 
to understand. Third, there are social technologies like languages, shared ideas 
and institutions. Again, Buzan and Little place the possibilities of diplomatic 
engagement into this sector, the rules and norms for political interaction 
facilitating this engagement. Differentiation among different sectors is more 
problematic in the case of interaction capacity than other sources because 
different sectors might need the same capacities. One needs ships to carry both 
the army in the military sector or cargo in the economic sector. The same 
applies to social technologies: a lingua franca could be important for cultural, 
economic and political processes to occur. 
The third source of explanation is the structure of the international system. 
Buzan and Little claim, and rightly so, that the discipline of international 
relations has a holistic approach to the structure. A system is understood to be 
more than just the sum of its parts and, in addition to processes inside units and 
between them, behaviour in the international arena is also shaped by the 
structure. As shown above, structure plays an extremely important role in the 
neorealist approach of Kenneth Waltz and Buzan and Little use the same 
concept very much. The modern anarchic political-military structure of inter-
national relations has introduced a dominant type of unit – the state. The 
anarchic structure pressures units to be structurally and functionally similar, but 
the units themselves underpin it by their ‘strict territoriality and fierce 
commitment to sovereignty’ (Buzan & Little, 2000, p. 333).  
It is important to note that Buzan and Little again build on the earlier 
differentiation of deep structure and distribution of capabilities by Buzan et al 
(1993). The former consists of the governing principle of the structure 
(hierarchy-anarchy in Waltz’s sense) and the functional differentiation of units. 
While Waltz (1979) considers these to be constants and the distribution of 
capabilities to vary, Buzan and Little lessen the latter’s importance and think 
that historically the deep structure plays a more significant role. 
The third issue of international systems relates to the problems of interaction 
and units, two fundamental components of any systemic approach. There are 
two aspects to interaction. Firstly, Buzan and Little use two of the previous 
issues – sectors and sources – to determine, respectively, what kind of and how 
much interaction is needed for a system to exist. On the one hand, the military-
political sector needs more interaction, as one needs to move armies or establish 
embassies, and, on the other hand, cultural interaction may need only one 
traveller to spread ideas. Therefore, interaction capacity is the key for a 
system’s existence. In the contemporary world, the levels of interaction capacity 
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are high enough to consider a global international system to exist in all sectors. 
As cited earlier, Buzan and Little (p. 97) adopt a somewhat hierarchical 
approach to different systems, with those involving military-political interaction 
being ‘full international systems’. Today’s world can quite easily be classified 
as such. 
The second aspect answers the question ‘what pattern does the interaction 
have?’ Buzan and Little (pp. 96–98) differentiate one-dimensional or linear 
from two-dimensional or multi-ordinate patterns. The former means that 
‘interaction occurred in chain-like formations, with each unit interacting with its 
neighbour, but not with those further afield’ (p. 97). The latter therefore stands 
for interaction where all units can directly interact with each other. It also needs 
higher interaction capacities and the contemporary world provides them. 
As we are interested in the political process concerning the recognition of 
states, the unit of this analysis is the state. The modern nation-state is the main 
actor in the contemporary international arena and while other actors also operate 
there, they are not of our interest. The major non-state actors that have gained 
prominence are international organisations, businesses (or transnational 
corporations) and non-governmental organisations. Even though they figure in 
the analysis, they are considered to be variables or conditions (as membership 
of international organisations for de facto states) or creators of variables (as 
companies exporting and investing). Our focus is on states. 
Units are also important in relation to structure. There are two approaches to 
structure, mechanical and social. The former is usually related to neo-realism, 
the latter to constructivist schools. Usage of mechanical structure parallels the 
social with the physical world. The actions of agents are governed by universal 
laws and there is nothing the former can do about this. In socially constructed 
structures, the agent has perceptions of other actors and regulates its behaviour 
accordingly. Common identities and sets of rules, as Buzan and Little put it, can 
condition the behaviour and set boundaries to social systems. This kind of 
argumentation is common to the English School of international relations and 
the international society concept discussed above. 
The different aspects of the international system and how they are used in 
this paper are charted in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: Components of the international system, their measures and impact to the 
position of de facto states. Created by author, based on Buzan and Little (2000) 
 
The figure shows how different aspects of the international system influence the 
political process. The direction of how they influence it is given as positive or 
negative. This means that higher values in the conditions increase the set-
membership in the outcome or decrease it respectively. Only secession is seen 
as having a negative impact; presence of a powerful patron, economic 
interaction and respect for basic rights should all make a de facto entity more 
involved in the system. The positive and negative impacts are also used as 
directional expectations, a notion that is explained in chapter 2.2, ‘Main 
concepts and language of QCA’. 
As stated above the literature on de facto state does not conceptualise system 
to a great length. Still, we can see some connections between the component 
parts of Buzan and Little’s system and themes developed in the analysis of de 
facto sates. Interaction seems to be the most used one. A lot of literature on de 
facto states deals with the entities’ relations with outside world. But the process 
of interaction is not put into a larger framework. As a subsection of this inter-
action, de facto state – patron relations are very much covered. Several authors 
do emphasise the importance of patron but again fall short of integrating it into 
more general systemic framework although the importance of the patron is very 
much emphasised. Literature also admits that patron is helpful, to say the least, 
in integrating the de facto state into the world. Structural features such as the 
opposition to secession and territorial integrity in general have also been 
touched quite intensively. However, again we witness the lack of conceptuali-
sation, how this would integrate with a wider systemic approach. Also, human 
rights are widely discussed in the literature but not connected within a broader 
framework. Economy of the de facto states is one field that is not touched upon 
very intensively though. Economic relations have been discussed while 
analysing patron-de facto state relations but not much independently. And these 
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relations are rather shown as the two states interact not as the two conditions 
might be connected.  
Coming back to what has been said in the beginning of this chapter, we can 
see that the different aspects of international system have not been clearly 
conceptualised in the literature concerning de facto states. There has been a lot 
of discussion on individual conditions; they have mostly been treated 
separately. This study tries to fill the void in conceptualised approach to the 
system concerning de facto states. Here we fill the gap in the literature by 
finding the connections of different conditions. Current literature falls short on 
that. A more detailed connection between the conditions used in the compo-
nents and literature on de facto states is given in the Chapter 1.4. 
 
 
1.2. Quest for de facto statehood 
1.2.1. The state in international law 
When we start to talk about de facto states as states, there are several concepts 
to pay attention to. Furthermore, these concepts might show substantial 
overlaps, even though they are denoted with different terms such as statehood, 
stateness, sovereignty, and independence. ‘Statehood’ is used to denote what it 
literally means or whether an entity can be considered a state. In this sense, it is 
somewhat an umbrella term, because being a state includes being sovereign. 
‘Stateness’ is similar in its meaning to statehood. Several authors use it to 
indicate the presence of a state, and it includes sovereignty. For example, 
Møller and Skaaning (2011) refer to stateness as ‘the twin attributes of the 
monopoly on the use of force within a sovereign territory and a basic agreement 
about citizenship’. Elsewhere, stateness has been used as a measure to analyse 
how well a state exercises sovereignty (Melville, 2009). Independence is also 
used in the literature, but its meaning is similar to that of sovereignty. Again, as 
we will observe below, what in international law is considered to be inde-
pendence (Crawford, 2006, p. 89) is in fact sovereignty in our approach.  
We cannot get past international law, however, because we determine 
whether de facto states can be considered states at all by using legal theories. 
Basically, we want to determine the statehood of de facto states before we 
analyse sovereignty to find the differences that separate unrecognised entities 
from recognised states. 
There are two approaches to statehood in international law with formal 
recognition by other states being in the centre of the argument. These 
approaches are constitutive and declaratory theories of statehood. Because of 
the legal nature of these theories, the focus is not on an entity being a state 
rather than it being a legal person under international law. This means the 
emphasis is on the rights and duties that arise from the international law, not on 
the plain fact of whether an entity is a state or not. However, we can quite freely 
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equate these two notions and consider the existence of the legal personality as 
the existence of a state. 
As stated, the difference between the constitutive and declaratory approach 
concerns formal recognition. The former stipulates that recognition is necessary 
for the legal personality of a state while the latter claims that it is not. The 
constitutive theory can be summarised in a quote by Oppenheim, cited in (van 
der Vyver, 1991, p. 16): ‘A state is, and becomes, an International Person 
through recognition only and exclusively’. This theory is a less supported 
approach in international law (van der Vyver, 1991). Still, it has been supported 
by several influential international law scholars like Hans Kelsen and Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht. According to van der Vyver (1991, p. 16), Lauterpacht 
went even further than admitting the necessity of recognition by making it an 
obligation. When an entity has the empirical features of a state, then existing 
states are under obligation to recognise it as such.  
For another constitutive approach, Van der Vyver refers to von Bieberstein, 
who divides the recognition issue into two categories. First, the state as a legal 
person is an existing state. This means that a state has required a legal capacity 
when it fulfils the criteria of statehood. Second, in relations with particular other 
states, an entity needs recognition from those particular states. Otherwise it has 
no contractual capacity to enter into relations.  
The declaratory theory, on the other hand, does not require formal recogni-
tion. To offer another quote cited by van der Vyver, ‘recognition presupposes a 
state’s existence; it does not create it’, the quote itself coming from Alan James. 
This approach is more accepted in international law and it has even been 
codified in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
(1933). Article 1 of the Convention establishes the criteria for statehood: ‘The 
state as a person of international law should possess the following quali-
fications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and 
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states’. As one can see, there is 
no requirement for formal recognition from other states. Recognition is 
mentioned in the Convention as an acceptance on behalf of the recognising 
state, it does not make an entity any more state than it already is. This is 
established in Article 6: ‘The recognition of a state merely signifies that the 
state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights 
and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and 
irrevocable’. Additionally, Article 7 states: ‘The recognition of a state may be 
express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of 
recognizing the new state’. 
As one would imagine, there is an ongoing debate between the two schools. 
Van der Vyver (1991, p. 14) gives examples where declarationists have 
approached constitutionalists by not explicitly giving formal recognition as a 
criterion but emphasising the recognition of a state’s ability to enter into 
international relations. Some lawyers have added self-determination among the 
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criteria. So, there are examples where declaratory theory has approached the 
constitutive approach. 
The latter has also received criticism. Kurtulus (2005, p. 119) indicates the 
problem of relative existence as an area of criticism. This means that a state 
could be recognised by some states but not by others. With no higher power 
above the state, they are the sole deciders of whom to recognise and whom not 
to. In this position, where a new state has recognition of some but not all 
existing states, it could be and not be an international legal person at the same 
time.  
This leads to another problem with the constitutive theory, namely the 
possibility of receiving recognition beyond the state level. As states have 
political interests in addition to being guardians of international law, Kurtulus, 
citing Lauterpacht, writes that this kind of ambition has been existent among 
students of constitutive theory. Both universal global organisations, the League 
of Nations and the United Nations, have been set as thresholds, whose member-
ship is equated with collective recognition. Kurtulus (2005, p. 121) terms it 
“general recognition as a state’ to be distinguished from the centralized, 
authoritative, and universal recognition implied by the term ‘collective re-
cognition as a state”.  
In a slightly different position is Dugard, cited by van der Vyver (1991, p. 
22), who claims that ‘the international community of states has delegated the 
authority to recognize a political entity as a state to the United Nations Organi-
zation’ and that ‘recognition as a prerequisite of statehood is exercised by the 
international community of states through admission of the political entity in 
question to membership of the United Nations’.  
The UN as a recognising organ has been a subject of heated debate. Van der 
Vyver (1991) differentiates three types of opinion on this matter, three types 
that are, indeed, appropriate for all arguments – those that oppose it, those that 
favour it and those that are in between. The pro arguments are somewhat 
empirical in nature. When a state has been admitted, one cannot deny its 
existence and even if another state does not recognise it, the former is obliged to 
deal with the latter, at least within the UN framework. The con arguments can 
be traced back to the UN itself. Some of the documents show that the intent of 
the ‘founding fathers’ was not to give the UN authority to recognise states when 
a Norwegian proposal was declined (van der Vyver, 1991, p. 23). Also, the UN 
Secretary General has denied the organisation’s authority to recognise states in 
his correspondence with the Security Council (van der Vyver, 1991, p. 24). 
Also, the UN Charter itself declares that its members, both original and joining, 
must be states (Articles 3 and 4 (1)). 
In this dissertation we will adopt the declaratory theory of statehood for 
several reasons. First, it makes possible the analysis of de facto states’ position 
in the international system. Not taking recognition as a criterion of statehood is 
the basis of this work. Therefore, declaratory theory allows us to talk about de 
facto states as actors in the international system of states; actors who, for some 
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reason, have not found acceptance among their peers but nevertheless must be 
somehow dealt with. Second, following from this, the absence of recognition 
can be used as a criterion in defining de facto states. This will be elaborated in 
detail in section 1.2.4, ‘Comparison of different approaches’. A third reason is a 
consequence of the second: UN membership can be used as a threshold of a 
substantive number of recognitions rather than recognition of itself. Again, this 
is elaborated in section 1.2.4. Fourth, in the following overview of the concept 
of sovereignty, the declaratory approach allows us to split sovereignty into two 
– juridical and empirical. If recognition were part of the definition of statehood, 
then the empirical and juridical parts of it would constitute one whole. In the 
following section, however, we can deal with the juridical part separately and 
create a matrix with internal-external division on the other axis. This division is 
again used in defining the de facto state. 
 
 
1.2.2. Sovereignty 
While the previous section emphasised that de facto states can be considered as 
states, this section shows the differences between confirmed and unrecognised 
states by using the concept of sovereignty. A short but thorough overview will 
be given of the concept with an emphasis on two aspects, or dichotomies to be 
precise: those of internal-external and juridical-empirical dimensions. The 
authors chosen have contributed to the study of sovereignty and/or have 
approached the concept using these dichotomies. 
Kalevi Holsti (2004) distinguishes internal and external sovereignty, which 
he describes as a ‘foundational institution of international relations because it is 
the critical component of the birth, maintenance and death of states’ (p. 113, 
emphasis original). Internal and external dimensions help to define sovereignty 
and are critical to Holsti’s claim that in international relations the concept is 
reasonably clear despite being one of the notable contested concepts of social 
science. Internally, sovereignty is a ‘supreme authority within a defined terri-
tory’ and, externally, the state ‘is not legally subject to any external authority’ 
(Holsti, 2004, p. 113). 
Janice Thomson (1995) tries to establish a link between theory and empirical 
research and therefore looks for a definition that might be more suitable for the 
latter. She gives a working definition of sovereignty as ‘recognition by internal 
and external actors that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene 
coercively in activities within its territory’ (Thomson, 1995, p. 219). As 
Thomson herself notes, this is derived from the definition used in international 
law with an added element of recognition. Five elements arise from this 
definition: recognition, state, authority, coercion and territory (Thomson, 1995, 
p. 219). While analysing the recognition component, Thompson (1995, p. 220) 
argues that states’ capabilities also play an important role in acquiring 
sovereignty. At least, this was so throughout European history but in the era of 
decolonisation it is not that important. The new sovereignty regime, as Jackson 
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(1990) put it, does not require capabilities to deal with internal and external 
threats and impose authority within a state’s territory. 
Robert Jackson’s (1990) approach to sovereignty can also be viewed as 
dichotomous. The first issue is one of positive and negative sovereignty, 
inspired by Isaiah Berlin’s idea of positive and negative freedom. Starting with 
negative sovereignty, Jackson (1990, p. 27) describes it as ‘a legal foundation 
upon which a society of independent and formally equal states fundamentally 
rests’. Next to it is positive sovereignty that is ‘a substantive rather than a 
formal condition’ (Jackson, 1990, p. 28). A government which has positive 
sovereignty is capable of providing the nation with essentials. While negative 
sovereignty is absolute in nature, positive sovereignty can vary between diffe-
rent states: some are more capable than others. 
Jackson (1990, p. 32) also writes that ‘sovereignty in international relations 
signifies constitutional independence of other states’. This approach indicates 
that Jackson analyses the external side of sovereignty and also emphasises its 
juridical nature. But there are elements that refer to factual sovereignty in his 
approach. Jackson uses the metaphor of a game to describe sovereignty where 
there are two sets of rules – constitutive and instrumental (Jackson, 1990, p. 34). 
In what he calls classical sovereignty, the former meant rules of the game and 
the latter strategies used by actors. When speaking about actors, Jackson (1990, 
p. 38) introduces empirical statehood as a characteristic of the players – 
sovereign states. Government needed to have authority over the state’s domestic 
and international affairs to be part of the game. Together with the notion of 
negative and positive sovereignty, this idea corresponds to the actual 
sovereignty of Krasner and Kurtulus. Jackson’s idea of new (as opposed to 
classical) sovereignty will be analysed later in this thesis. 
What political scientists refer to as sovereignty is in international law 
referred to as independence (Crawford, 2006, p. 89). The legal meaning of 
sovereignty is more of a consequence of statehood, the state’s competence, 
rather than a criterion for statehood. Therefore we will look at the concept of 
independence, which corresponds to the sovereignty of other authors viewed in 
this section. Crawford distinguishes two types of independence – formal and 
actual independence. Formal independence ‘exists where the powers of a 
government are vested in the separate authorities of the putative State’ (Craw-
ford, 2006, p. 67). The basis for formal independence comes for example from 
the constitutional arrangement of a territory or from a treaty. It can be seen as a 
juridical aspect of independence even though Crawford does not bind it to 
recognition. Real or actual independence is defined as ‘the minimum degree of 
real power at the disposal of the authorities of putative State that is necessary 
for it to qualify as ‘independent’’ (Crawford, 2006, p. 72).  
Also not emphasising recognition, Crawford does admit, however, that it 
could be an important factor, along with longevity, when one needs to assess 
statehood in borderline cases. These are cases where the link between formal 
and actual independence is blurred. These cases possess either factual or formal 
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independence but lack the other. Crawford (2006, pp. 88–89) gives some 
presumptions that could be helpful in ‘applying the criterion of independence as 
a basis for statehood’ and according to these presumptions the element of 
formal independence dominates over the actual. 
Ersun Kurtulus (2005) distinguishes two approaches to sovereignty: spatial 
dimensions and dichotomies. He takes the latter approach and tries to con-
ceptualise sovereignty from a set of binary questions. Among other dichotomies 
that might characterise sovereignty, two sets are important for this thesis. The 
first is the distinction between factual and juridical state sovereignty, with the 
former referring to actual phenomena and the latter to legal status. The 
definitions of factual and juridical sovereignty share some aspects, such as the 
agent being a state or similar entity and sovereignty being exercised within a 
certain territory and independent of agents outside of this territory; but they 
differ as to whether sovereignty as a condition according to law or as a matter of 
material circumstances makes the agent supreme (Kurtulus, 2005, p. 84). 
Kurutlus (2005, pp. 63–64) also gives three ‘cogent arguments’ to support 
this kind of dichotomisation: 
 First, legal rights must have material capabilities to enforce them. This idea 
is derived from political theory; capabilities materialise these rights.  
 Second, the historical perspective says that these two kinds of sovereignties 
follow each other temporally. Factual sovereignty is antecedent to juridical 
sovereignty. 
 Third, from the perspective of international law, this distinction is useful in 
understanding what Kurtulus calls territories with double status.  
 
From the perspective of this analysis, further points are especially useful. 
Kurtulus (2005, pp. 64–65) proposes two additional ‘immediate advantages’ of 
clarifying political rhetoric and incorporating de facto entities into analysis of 
sovereignty. The latter is particularly important as these entities ‘aspire to 
international juridical personality while controlling a demarcated piece of 
territory’ (Kurtulus, 2005, p. 65).  
The second dichotomy that interests us is that of external and internal 
aspects. Kurtulus calls this the issue of ‘spatial division of power or authority’ 
(Kurtulus, 2005, p. 81) and classifies it as something of a sub-issue of 
divisibility and indivisibility. In the case of judicial sovereignty, this is not a 
problem ‘as possession of one form is considered to imply, by definition, 
possession of the other’ (Kurtulus, 2005, p. 81). In the case of empirical or 
factual sovereignty, the problem appears to be more complicated. An entity can 
have internal but lack external sovereignty or vice versa. A ‘normal’ state has 
both but some states may have neither. According to Kurtulus, possession of 
either is the outcome of power relations with internal sovereignty meaning the 
capability to exert authority within one’s boundaries and external sovereignty 
meaning doing so in relations with other states.  
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Stephen Krasner (1999) proposes four meanings of sovereignty and also 
divides them in the internal-external dichotomy. The two meanings that make 
up the internal sphere are domestic and interdependence sovereignty, the 
external meanings are Westphalian and international legal sovereignty.  
Domestic sovereignty has been, according to Krasner, the meaning most 
associated with the term sovereignty. This meaning deals with issues of 
authority within the state which again has two dimensions – organisation and 
effectiveness. The former means the way a state is organised, whether it is a 
democracy or dictatorship, or a unitary or federal state. The latter means 
whether the one who has the authority actually controls the state. An important 
aspect of Krasner’s approach to domestic sovereignty is that it does not need to 
have any influence on the external dimensions of sovereignty. The model of 
organisation and the extent of actual authority are ‘not necessarily related to 
international legal or Westphalian sovereignty’ (Krasner, 1999, p. 12). This 
does not mean that there cannot be any connections. A weak state might lose its 
Westphalian sovereignty to stronger neighbours, for example. But there is no 
logical connection between the two. A weak state might just as well retain its 
Westphalian sovereignty. 
The other internal meaning of sovereignty is that of interdependence, which 
deals with the issue of border control. The flow of goods, people or anything 
that can move across borders between states requires control over the borders 
and the ability to have this control can be seen as sovereignty. It is tied to the 
control element of domestic sovereignty, but again, as Krasner (1999, p. 13) 
claims, it has no logical relation to the external dimensions of the term.  
The external dimension also consists of two different meanings. The first of 
these, international legal sovereignty, is similar to the meaning of juridical 
sovereignty proposed by Kurtulus above. Krasner’s main feature of inter-
national legal sovereignty is recognition. Krasner (1999, p. 14) writes that ‘the 
basic rule for international legal sovereignty is that recognition is extended to 
entities, states, with territory and formal juridical autonomy’. And he adds that 
recognition must be given by other states (p. 16). Occasionally this recognition 
is meant for governments, but Krasner sees this practice, first, as uncertain 
because of the possible political reasons behind it and, second, as action that 
violates the basic principle of granting recognition to juridically independent 
territorial entities.  
International legal sovereignty offers many advantages. It can secure 
external resources (enter contracts and alliances, get foreign capital, for 
example), it gives secure status in other states’ courts, and provides immunity 
for diplomatic representatives (Krasner, 1999). However, recognition is not 
necessary for all these benefits. Non-recognised entities or governments can 
also enjoy the existence of allies or being invited to ‘sit at the table’, but 
international legal sovereignty reduces uncertainty in interactions with other 
states. On the other hand, it does not guarantee territorial integrity or the 
existence of any state.  
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The fourth meaning of sovereignty is Westphalian. This meaning can also be 
described as autonomy and is similar to the actual or factual sovereignty that 
Kurtulus wrote about. It is based on two aspects: territoriality and the exclusion 
of external actors from domestic authority structures (Krasner, 1999). The main 
principle governing the latter aspect is non-intervention. Westphalian 
sovereignty can be violated both voluntarily and coercively and the principle of 
non-intervention covers coercion. As Krasner notes, intervention has received 
more attention in the literature than invitation. This is understandable, because 
the subject has been more prominent in both international law and practice. The 
principle of non-intervention is written into the UN Charter and has generated 
debates throughout history. Invitation, voluntarily granting power to some other 
state or international organisation, also violates the autonomy of the state but is 
less debated, with the European Union a prime example. While intervention 
violates both international legal and Westphalian sovereignty, invitation 
concerns only the latter.  
Another author who conceptualises sovereignty on an internal-external 
continuum is David Lake (2003). Lake (2003, p. 304) defines sovereignty as ‘a 
type of authority relationship’ but concedes that the concept is difficult. It has 
not been conceptualised clearly enough. Taking into account the internal-
external dimension, Lake (2003, p. 305) proposes the following definition: ‘an 
attribute of units which, depending on the referent, entails relationships of both 
hierarchy and anarchy’ (emphasis original). His internal sovereignty is 
Krasner’s domestic and external international legal sovereignty. External 
sovereignty therefore concerns recognition. Factual or Westphalian sovereignty 
is analysed by Lake, but not defined as a separate form. In a footnote Lake 
(2003, p. 305) treats this form as a ‘corollary to juridical sovereignty’.  
Berg and Kuusk (2010) have also dichotomised sovereignty. When 
conceptualising attributes of sovereignty, they claim that internal and external 
sides of sovereignty are equally important ‘because entities’ internal legitimacy 
and external recognition issues matter most in the praxis to relatively locate 
them within international society’ (Berg & Kuusk, 2010, p. 42).  
Moreover, the juridical and factual sides have been distinguished as de jure 
sovereignty and de facto power respectively, although only it appears in the 
case of the external side of sovereignty. However, in analysing the relative 
sovereignty of entities, the authors suggest three groups of attributes in 
‘symbols and/or constitutional arrangements, and world standing’ (2010, p. 42). 
The first two are presented as alternatives and can be treated as one group and 
can roughly be seen as part of de jure attributes. The latter can be seen as power 
variables.  
Most of what Berg and Kuusk (2010, p. 43) call ‘semi-quantitative’ analysis 
is based on internal-external dimensions. Forty-one cases including ‘normal’ 
states, de facto states and other possible entities that are present in the 
contemporary world are involved in the analysis. De facto states have lower 
scores in external sovereignty, but do not make up a homogenous group in 
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internal sovereignty. Both lower and higher scores are present in this category. 
As expected, most confirmed states have high scores in both categories.  
The dichotomies described above have been summarised in Table 1. The 
two-by-two table is built to some extent on the approach of Stephen Krasner, 
with international recognition added to the fold. The distinction between 
internal and external dimensions within empirical sovereignty might be a little 
blurred because the states’ capabilities are not differentiated between those that 
are meant for internal control as such and those that are meant for defensive 
actions as such. States with capabilities are usually good in both areas; it is a 
practical question of distributing one’s resources and not a theoretical problem 
of two very different kinds of capabilities.  
 
Table 1: Dimensions of sovereignty 
 juridical empirical 
internal domestic constitutional arrangement 
internal authority and control; 
control over borders 
external 
international recognition; 
capabilities to enter into 
international agreements 
independence of external 
actors; capabilities to defend itself 
 
In the analysis of de facto states, and indeed in the analysis of their relative 
positions in the international system, the external dimension of sovereignty is 
more important. This will also be visible in the next section where different 
notions and names of de facto states are analysed. 
 
 
1.2.3. The de facto state 
Before we continue with the definition of the de facto state, we look at different 
concepts by which the phenomenon has been described. In this section we will 
give an overview of the most commonly used terms that describe these entities. 
This is followed by a systematic and critical approach to these concepts. The 
section ends with a working definition based on the concept of sovereignty and 
common features from different authors. 
The phenomenon of statehood without international recognition has been 
conceptualised under several different labels. ‘Unrecognised state’ is probably 
the most straightforward and ‘de facto state’ probably the most well-known. 
Between these two, there are notions like ‘contested state’, ‘state-within-state’, 
‘quasi-state’, ‘pseudo-state’, ‘statelike entity’ and others. In this section we will 
take a look at most of them and see how different authors have conceptualised 
this phenomenon. 
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We will take a chronological approach and start with Scott Pegg who in 
1998 introduced the concept of de facto states into academic literature of 
international relations. The most recent contributions include Caspersen and 
Stansfield (2011), Caspersen (2012) and Isachenko (2012). We will give a 
rather descriptive overview of different concepts that are in a later section 
compared more thoroughly. 
 
1.2.3.1. De facto states 
The first and therefore somewhat pioneering work on de facto states was written 
by Scott Pegg in 1998 and entitled ‘International Society and the De facto 
State’. Pegg gave the first definition of a de facto state and introduced a theo-
retical framework in which to distinguish de facto states from other non-
sovereign entities. Pegg chose Northern Cyprus, Eritrea, Tamil Elam and 
Somaliland as cases.  
Pegg (1998) suggests several criteria that de facto states must fulfil. There 
must be ‘organised political leadership which has risen to power through some 
degree of indigenous capability’ (Pegg, 1998, p. 26). Pegg therefore excludes 
puppet states from his definition; a de facto state is a product of a local 
population. The notion of ‘some degree’ is a qualification made because of 
empirical reality, as de facto states usually rely on some amount of external 
help. The first part of the sentence, ‘organised political leadership,’ is a weaker 
formulation than government, as Pegg (1998, p. 27) himself admits. Why he 
uses the softer concept is however left unexplained. Comparing de facto states 
to sovereign states, Pegg (1998, p. 47) concludes that most of the former fare 
better in the government capabilities criteria than some of the latter.  
Pegg adds to the government criteria other requirements found in the Monte-
video Convention, first providing government services to a given population in 
a specific territory. With both categories – territory and population – de facto 
states have significant problems of definition. Of course, there could be some 
unclarified situations, but overall the sovereign states are not in a better 
situation.  
The forth condition set out in the Convention, capability to enter into 
relations with other states, is somewhat softer for Pegg as he defines the de 
facto state as perceiving this capability for itself. As Pegg (1998, p. 27) puts it, 
it is an ‘opinion not necessarily shared by other states’.  
Pegg also adds two additional conditions. The first of these is temporal: the 
entity must have had this non-recognised status for a significant period of time. 
What this time period could be is arbitrary. Pegg (1998, p. 32) argues, based on 
empirical evidence, that one month, for example, is definitely too short. A life-
span of at least one year seems necessary, but Pegg himself is more strict and 
establishes the threshold of two years.  
An additional condition is the feature that distinguishes de facto states from 
‘normal’ states: international recognition. Pegg (1998, p. 26) phrases its lack of 
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recognition as the state being ‘unable to achieve any degree of substantive 
recognition’. This phrasing refers to the possibility that there could be some 
degree of substantive recognition. Therefore Pegg does not exclude entities that 
have received some international recognition and this shows in his case 
selection. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has received some, albeit 
solitary recognition, from Turkey and qualifies as a de facto state. Substantive 
recognition means formal recognition by different actors, and Pegg (1998, 
p. 38) has divided these into five categories in which an ‘entity would need 
success in at least a majority’. The categories are: major powers, defined as 
permanent UN Security Council members or great regional powers; parent 
states (with an exception to recognition: there must be at least no opposition to 
secession); neighbours; a majority in the UN General Assembly; and inter-
national organisations, both global and regional.  
Pegg goes on to give ten theoretical dimensions of de facto states that should 
make them more distinct in the international arena. Some of these dimensions 
are especially useful in distinguishing de facto states from other actors or 
situations like power vacuums, ‘random banditry’, puppet states, peaceful 
secessionist movements, other non-sovereign entities and ‘premature recog-
nition of colonial liberation movements’ (Pegg, 1998, p. 29). The remaining 
dimensions deal with preservation, goals, territorial justification and democratic 
accountability. 
According to Pegg, the difference with power vacuums or state-less 
situations and riots, terrorism or random banditry lies in the capabilities of de 
facto states. A power vacuum is a clear-cut distinction: the de facto state 
possesses some governmental capabilities and thus is able to fill any possible 
vacuum. A clear-cut distinction can also be made with respect to common 
criminals as the de facto state is political in its aims. Pegg (1998) turns to 
international law to differentiate the de facto state from political movements 
like rebellions and finds the solution in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II), which apply to armed 
groups exercising control over territory but do not apply to ‘situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions’. Puppet states differ from de facto states in 
the ‘more organic and symbiotic relationship with its population’ (Pegg, 1998, 
p. 36). This is connected to the indigenous capability aspect. Peaceful seces-
sionist movements are accepted by the parent state and are negotiated with as 
such, unlike de facto states, which are contested. Other non-sovereign entities 
are probably more difficult to distinguish from de facto states. International 
acceptance is the criterion that Pegg uses to exclude entities like Palestine and 
Kurdish safe havens. Authors like Geldenhuys (2009) and Bahcheliet al (2004) 
do include Palestine, however, so this theoretical dimension is probably most 
contestable. Other possible types of entities include colonies and protectorates, 
and they are accepted as such in the international system. Colonies bring us to 
the last distinction: these are what Jackson (1990) calls quasi-states. When they 
received recognition they were not in control of their territories and lacked 
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capabilities to be so. The process of decolonisation, however, legitimised their 
quest for independence and they received substantial recognition. 
Dov Lynch (2004) elaborates on Pegg’s definition and breaks it into judicial 
and empirical notions. According to Lynch, in this definition the de facto state 
lacks judicial statehood: it has no right to claim the territory. It does possess a 
claim to empirical statehood. Following similar logic, Lynch divides the state’s 
sovereignty into two notions – internal and external. Placing Pegg’s definition 
in this analytical framework, he claims that de facto states enjoy full internal 
sovereignty but lack external sovereignty. Their governments are supreme 
authorities within their territories but there is an absence of formal recognition 
(Lynch, 2004, p. 16). 
In addition to that, Lynch compares four cases of de facto states in the 
territory of the former Soviet Union with another conflict in the former 
communist state. The civil war of Tadjikistan came to a solution, but conflicts 
involving unrecognised entities are frozen. The main difference according to 
Lynch is the objective of the respective movements. When Tadjik rebels wanted 
to overthrow the government, then de facto states wanted to exit the former 
parent state altogether. They have no interest in ruling in the former capital and 
want to interact with the parent state on equal grounds: as sovereigns. There are 
different drivers behind the continuing existence of de facto states and absolute 
sovereignty is one of them. Lynch (2004) states that adherence to Montevideo 
criteria and appealing to self-determination are the main sources of legitimacy 
that can be derived from the existing legal framework to support claims to 
sovereignty. 
Barry Bartmann (2004) also uses the term de facto state and ties it to the 
question of recognition. Like Lynch’s, his approach makes the distinction 
between judicial and empirical statehood. There are cases where recognition is 
‘persistently maintained in spite of conditions on the ground’ and other cases 
where ‘recognition is stubbornly withheld even though the realities on the 
ground themselves expose the legal fictions which the international community 
supports in the defence of the principle of territorial integrity’ (Bartmann, 2004, 
p. 12). Bartmann (2004, p. 13) goes so far as to call the international system 
‘one of egregious double standards,’ with sub-Saharan Africa an extremely 
glaring example of such behaviour where empirically non-viable states are kept 
in the system because of legal recognition.  
Judicial and empirical statehood are the main concepts of concern for 
Bartmann and other authors in that volume. For Bartmann, juridical statehood is 
the legal status of the state and is ‘reflected in the act of state recognition’ 
(Bartmann, 2004, p. 14). The other side of the coin is more complicated. 
Bartmann analyses tensions between legality and legitimacy, and while the 
latter is defined through the state’s capabilities to perform, moral terms are also 
added. The capabilities of the state are conceptualised as survivability – the 
state has to perform to some extent and non-performance can be seen as a 
possibility of ‘succumb[ing] eventually to a more rational and capable political 
37 
system’ (Bartmann, 2004, p. 15). In what Jackson (1990) calls the old 
sovereignty regime, the non-performing states would have been devoured by 
their more capable neighbours. The moral dimension deals with justification, 
both in terms of internal and external support. The internal side is legitimacy in 
the eyes of the respective people and the external side is to some extent based 
on the internal. Overall, Bartmann (2004, p. 15) claims that legitimacy is the 
‘conviction that a particular territorial community has the right to be constituted 
as a state’ (emphasis original).  
These concepts, legality and legitimacy, are however connected. As Bart-
mann (2004) puts it, as time progresses the recognised but underperforming 
states of Africa might acquire legitimacy through their nation-building efforts 
and unrecognised states would like to think that international recognition 
cements their legitimacy in the eyes of their populations. The difference bet-
ween legality and legitimacy is the main defining feature of de facto states for 
Bartmann. Unrecognised states are illegal in the eyes of other states and 
international organisations, even though they might hold internal legitimacy, at 
least among their respective populations. And they do possess some capabilities 
which they use to perform tasks that are usually assumed from states. 
Geldenhuys (2009) criticises this term, and that of ‘statelike entity,’ because 
it indicates that no de jure recognition whatsoever must have been possessed by 
de facto states, but this is not true in practice. There is quite substantial formal 
recognition is some cases. However, as Geldenhuys himself declares, UN 
membership should be the ultimate recognition and none of the de facto states 
are UN members. Therefore, some de jure recognition should not be a problem 
in terming these entities de facto states. Esewhere, the term ‘de facto state’ has 
also been used by Caspersen (2009) and Berg and Toomla (2009), who also 
emphasise recognition and empirical statehood. 
 
1.2.3.2. Pseudo-states 
Kolossov and O’Loughlin (1999) and Kolossov (2001) use the term ‘pseudo-
state’. They take a geopolitical approach and claim that there is a world-wide 
belt of these entities around Eurasia. Their own example, Transniestria, is one 
of these states. The existence of these states is supposed to be ‘one of the basic 
and long-term features of the contemporary world geopolitical order’ 
(Kolossov, 2001, p. 87). They are located in a ‘civilisation clash belt from the 
Balkans to Afghanistan, a zone of contact between empires’ (Kolossov & 
O’Loughlin, 1999, p. 155). Pseudo states are ‘islands of ‘transitional’ or 
‘incomplete’ statehood’ (Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 1999, p. 151) (Kolossov, 
2001, p. 87). There are low levels of international recognition and these levels 
vary. Conflict has been involved in the history of pseudo-states and current 
instability might contribute to the break-out of more.  
Kolossov and O’Loughlin also speak about quasi-states and take a different 
approach to both Jackson (1990) and Kolstø (2006), whose concepts are 
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elaborated later. Their quasi-state is a criminal entity, essentially some sort of 
‘parallel universe’ that can even exist in urban areas of Western states. These 
quasi-states are governed or controlled by drug barons, for example. Pseudo-
states, on the other hand, are institutionalised entities that have declared their 
independence, fulfil the empirical criteria of statehood but lack recognition by 
the international community. Kolossov and O’Loughlin (1999) distinguish four 
types of pseudo-states based on genesis and function. These include: state by 
nationality; state that has come into being because of the collapse of an empire; 
areas lacking control because of civil war or foreign invasion; and pirate states 
based on criminal-terrorist activities. The latter seems to correspond to their 
definition of quasi-states, but institutionalisation could be the difference. The 
eventual aim of these ethno-territorial groups is international recognition that 
can be shown through three criteria (Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 1999, p. 156): 
‘membership in the UN, political sovereignty and economic autonomy; a 
distinctive national culture that is both primary and primordial; political 
development and separation over time’. These three criteria combine nation-
building with the quest for recognition and state-building. In Kolossov’s and 
O’Loughlin’s approach these three are tied together.  
 
1.2.3.3. Statelike entity 
Charles King (2001) analyses Eurasian de facto states and makes two 
arguments: that separatist entities of the early 1990s have become state-builders 
a decade later; and that the conflicts associated with these entities are frozen 
because both sides can benefit from the status quo. Therefore, King does not get 
involved in conceptualising the phenomena, but rather places an emphasis on 
state-building in four post-Soviet cases based on the end of civil war. However, 
he gives a definition of what he considers to be a statelike entity in a footnote 
(King, 2001, p. 525). He uses the common empirical-juridical dichotomy such 
that a statelike entity is a political unit that must have a population and a 
functioning government on a specific territory, but lack international 
recognition. Or, as King (2001, p. 525) himself puts it, the entity is ‘without the 
imprimatur of international recognition’. Even though the main name King 
gives these units is statelike entity, he uses a variety of other terms like 
unrecognised states (Title), de facto countries (p. 525) and even quasi-states (p. 
528).  
The next sentence of the aforementioned footnote is also interesting. He 
claims that ‘in Eurasia the conceptual bar for statehood cannot be raised too 
high, for many of the qualities that define relatively well functioning states in 
central Europe do not exist farther east …’ (King, 2001, p. 525). This is quite an 
honest appraisal of the situation and shows that conceptualising state or 
statehood might not be the easiest of tasks. An example from King’s own 
research shows the ambiguous empirical state of some of the statelike entities. 
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For example, in Nagorno-Karabakh ‘local authorities have been able to 
construct something resembling a state, with its own foreign ministry (which 
charges visitors $25 for visas), armed forces, police, and court system’ (p. 536); 
but, on the other hand, King admits that ‘Karabakh is now more an autonomous 
district of Armenia…’ (p. 542). For example, the Armenian currency is legal 
tender in Karabakh. Therefore, it is complicated to conceptualise de facto states 
and indeed the empirical bar should not be too high. 
 
1.2.3.4. States-within-states 
States-within-states is a term given to a wider range of entities than just de facto 
states in a volume edited by Paul Kingston and Ian Spears. We will take a look 
at three of the contributors. 
Kingston (2004, p. 4) in the introductory chapter confirms the wider 
approach by claiming that their ‘interest is more with ‘incipient’ rather than 
full-blown political entities’. The aim of the volume is to take into account a 
broader range of political authority; earlier definitions were stricter and left out 
some of phenomena like Columbian state erosion or Lebanese militia cantons. 
Therefore, only some of the cases might be defined as de facto states, as ‘most 
of the states-within-states examined in this volume exhibit severe imbalances in 
their institutional development’ (Kingston, 2004, p. 7). The overall emphasis is 
on weak states and actors operating within their borders, rather than entities that 
have independence as their ultimate goal. Most of the analysed units do not 
possess the state’s qualities as defined by Weber, namely a legitimate monopoly 
on the use of force within a certain territory. 
Ian Spears (2004), in the same volume, disagrees to some extent. He finds 
that states-within-states have enough territorial control and that they fulfil most 
of the Weberian criteria for statehood. More importantly, Spears (2004, p. 16) 
makes a distinction between quasi-states and states-within-states using the 
juridical-empirical dichotomy. The quasi-state is defined in the manner of 
Jackson (1990): they are juridical ‘shells’ with little or no empirical state within 
the recognised framework. States-within-states are the opposite. They ‘have 
imposed effective control over a territory within a larger state’ (Spears, 2004, p. 
16). They have some institutional power to collect taxes and provide the 
population with some services, but still remain what Spears calls ‘political 
subunits’. They may be more viable than their parent state. As with some other 
authors, Spears’ main distinction is that states-within-states are to some extent 
efficient but lack recognition from the international community. 
Spears (2004) also illustrates some empirical features that states-within-
states possess and their impact on the entities. War against the parent state is 
common to every state-within-state and it is useful in creating a common 
identity and reducing diversity. Revenue generation is dependent on external 
patrons or illegal activities. There is also some economic contact with the 
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outside world. The revenue is used for fighting and also for building 
infrastructure. Spears also provides us with some political objectives of states-
within-states and he lists five of them: protection against hostile government; 
secession, autonomy or political power in the existing state; demonstration of its 
capabilities to the outside world; generation of wealth for its leaders; and use as 
a tool in conflict resolution. 
In the case of the second objective, that of achieving secession or autonomy 
or overthrowing the existing government of the parent state, Spears also 
presents a temporal feature of states-within-states. Namely, he claims that 
‘states-within-states are a fleeting or temporary phenomena’ (Spears, 2004, p. 
28). The idea behind this is that they want to achieve some further status, such 
as independence, and see themselves as a temporary solution towards a greater 
end. 
Pegg (2004, p. 36) admits that he and Spears ‘share broad areas of general 
agreement with one another’. The main common theme is the juridical-empiri-
cal dichotomy that has been emphasised by both, and several other, authors. 
However, there are differences and Pegg claims that two areas especially differ 
substantially. The first of these areas is purpose or objective. While Spears cites 
five different purposes, Pegg refers to only one – independence. This narrows 
the potential universe of cases but adds to theoretical clarification. The goal of 
achieving sovereignty separates politically motivated de facto states from other 
entities that control some territory but are not recognised as governments. One 
of Spears’ possible objectives, taking control of the existing state, is excluded 
from Pegg’s approach. The de facto state exists only to achieve independence, 
even though, in reality, it may accept other solutions like autonomy.  
The second disagreement between Pegg and Spears is, according to the 
former, ‘an enlargement or amplification of this first difference’ (Pegg, 2004, 
p. 37). This is again a question of how wide or narrow the definition is, but in 
this case it is about theoretical criteria rather than objectives. Spears, as cited 
above, only uses a Weberian definition of statehood with a lack of international 
relations. Pegg, as also cited above (Pegg, 1998), uses several criteria and ten 
additional theoretical dimensions define his unit of analysis. This makes Pegg’s 
definition narrower and does not include a wide array of cases, which can be 
seen in Spears’ case. 
Another concept of states-within-states has been developed by Pełczyńska-
Nałęczet al (2008, p. 371), who define them as ‘regions that formally recognize 
the central government but in fact maintain a very high degree of 
independence’. This approach contradicts that of Spears and Pegg mostly in the 
conflict aspect. Pegg’s de facto state and Spears’ state-within-state are in 
conflict with the central government and have different objectives with respect 
to it. Furthermore, de facto states seek independence, but those who recognise 
central government do not. Therefore, these entities cannot be considered as 
having no juridical sovereignty, as they possess it within the domestic 
framework of a particular state. 
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1.2.3.5. Quasi-state 
Quasi-state is the term introduced by Kolstø (2006) to identify what we call the 
de facto state. However, to start with quasi states, we must first briefly explain 
the more well-known use of the concept. Specifically, it is a mirror image of 
Kolstø’s use which was developed by Robert Jackson. Jackson (1990) defines 
quasi-states through his approach to sovereignty. They are territorial juris-
dictions which are supported by international law and material aid. They would 
not survive without that support and in a more competitive international 
environment would be devoured by stronger units. Jackson distinguishes 
between old and new sovereignty regimes. The point at which the new replaced 
the old was after World War II. The old sovereignty regime is characterised by 
two aspects – plurality and empirical statehood. The rules of the old regime had 
to correspond to the existing reality and, as there were many states in the world, 
some of these rules were there to protect the plurality of states. Otherwise, the 
situation might have ended in a world government. Those who participated in 
the regime were sovereign states and their sovereignty roughly aligned with 
empirical statehood (Jackson, 1990, p. 40). Governments had to provide the 
populations within their territories with services and, most of all, internal and 
external protection. In conclusion, then, the old sovereignty regime had rules for 
independent states that, in turn, had to be strong enough to be considered part of 
the regime. 
The latter aspect, a strong enough state or empirical statehood, has been 
abolished by the new sovereignty regime as a prerequisite for participation. 
Jackson acknowledges that there are several levels or ‘divisions’ of sovereignty 
in the contemporary world and that the new regime is mostly applicable to the 
Third World. The new regime adds to the old one two ‘normative innovations: 
self-determination of ex-colonies, and development entitlements of im-
poverished countries’ (Jackson, 1990, p. 40). These two new aspects mean that 
international law and other states recognise the Third World countries as 
sovereigns. They possess juridical sovereignty, however, this sovereignty is not 
achieved through empirical existence but by the will of the stronger. 
Decolonisation created states that are taken as such, but that are ineffective. 
Many of them cannot provide their populations with ‘the advantages tradi-
tionally associated with independent statehood’ (Jackson, 1990, p. 21). One of 
the reasons for this is their lack of state institutions and authorised domestic 
power. Jackson points out that there have always been weak states, or rather 
states that are less capable than others. But these states had to fight for their 
survival, and many of the weak did not survive – a burden that has been 
removed from today’s Third World. In a nutshell, Jackson’s (1990, p. 5) quasi-
states ‘appear to be juridical more than empirical entities’ and they are 
‘creatures of non-competitive international norms’ (p. 26). 
As one can observe, Jackson’s quasi-state does not fit with other entities 
described in this section. Kolstø (2006) takes a different approach. The 
juridical-empirical dichotomy is again at the centre of analysis, but Kolstø’s 
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conceptualisation of the term ‘quasi-state’ is exactly the opposite of Jackson’s: 
it refers to an entity lacking external sovereignty. Kosltø admits that different 
names, listing ‘de facto states’, ‘unrecognized states’, ‘para-states’ and ‘pseudo-
states’ (Kolstø, 2006, p. 725), have been given to these entities, but he sticks to 
quasi-state for two reasons. First, Kolstø acknowledges similarities between his 
and Jackson’s quasi-states, such as their being ‘on the margins of international 
system of states and challeng[ing] basic assumptions of this system’ (2006, p. 
725). Even though they lack different aspects of sovereignty, they can still be 
viewed together because of their relevant position in the system. The second 
reason, Kolstø believes, is that when achieving international recognition, the de 
facto-type quasi-state becomes a rather non-performing-type of recognised 
state. This terminological polysemy is quite confusing and to offer conceptual 
clarity Kolstø (2006, p. 725) proposes that ‘Jacksonian-type quasi-states are 
henceforth referred to as ‘failed states’ while the term quasi-states is reserved 
for unrecognized states only’.  
Kolstø goes further than just explaining quasi-states with juridical-empirical 
sovereignty. He suggests three criteria that a quasi-state must fulfil: govern-
ment, seeking of independence and a temporal criterion. Government means 
‘leadership control of (most of) the territory it lays claim to’ (Kolstø, 2006, pp. 
725–726). As with de facto states, when their boundaries are challenged, then 
the addition ‘most of’ seems reasonable. Seeking independence means that the 
entities have sought but not received international recognition. States ‘wish[ing] 
for but [being] denied a seat in the UN General Assembly’ (Kolstø, 2006, p. 
725) indicates that UN membership is their ultimate goal. In this regard, Kolstø 
takes a similar stand to Geldenhuys, whose position about the UN was 
described above. The third criterion is the same as Pegg’s: the quasi-state has to 
be in this empirical situation for no less than two years. This definition excludes 
some of the cases analysed in this thesis from the list of quasi-states, mainly 
because they have not proclaimed independence (e.g. Taiwan). 
There is also a third way to conceptualise the quasi-state. Stanislawski 
(2008) gives a wide definition of quasi-states in a Forum edited by him and 
published in International Studies Review in 2008. He takes into account both 
juridical and factual statehood. The former is defined as international re-
cognition and the latter as power in and control over their territory. They are 
termed ‘as-if-states’ and ‘almost-states’ respectively. In Stanislawski’s (2008, 
pp. 367–368) words, ‘as-if-states’ ‘are quasi-states that enjoy international re-
cognition and the rights and duties of states, but in effect, their internal power 
and control is limited, or fragmented, or non-existent’, and ‘almost-states’ are 
‘quasi-states that do not enjoy international recognition, but contrary to ‘as-if 
states’ they are characterized by efficient internal control of their territories and 
populations’. The third category that Stanislawski (2008) talks about is called 
‘black spots’ where there is neither control of an existing government nor 
entities that claim authority and seek international recognition. These are areas 
where states have lost their control and ‘in which illicit organizations control 
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what has become a criminal enclave’ (Stanislawski, 2008, p. 368). The fourth 
category is obvious; it is the normal, functioning state. There might be different 
levels of control, or factual statehood, but if a government is doing well enough 
then the state can be considered as such. Stanislawski (2008, p. 369) presents 
these concepts as a two-by-two table where government control is graphed 
against international recognition in the same manner as in this thesis. 
 
1.2.3.6. Contested states 
Deon Geldenhuys (2009, p. 1) uses the term ‘contested states’ to describe ten 
entities and ascribes them the defining feature of ‘internationally disputed 
nature of their purported statehood, manifested in their lack of de jure 
recognition’. He acknowledges that the extent (and therefore the extent of the 
lack) of this recognition varies among cases and therefore sets a benchmark of 
UN membership as full recognition by the international community. Admitting 
that in some cases the UN might even endorse ‘contested states’ right to 
statehood’, they still have ‘no collective recognition of both their right to exist 
as sovereign states and their actual existence as such’ (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 1).  
Taking into account the requirements of confirmed states that are set out in 
the Montevideo Convention from 1933, Geldenhuys elaborates on the definition 
of contested states. First, he claims that ‘all contested states have settled 
populations’ (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 23) with problems of popular support or 
refugees. Second, territories of contested states have boundaries, as is the case 
with every state, but these boundaries are disputed to the full extent. Their 
territories are seen as part of existing states. Third, very much similar arguments 
can be applied to governments: they are not recognised no matter how they 
perform. Fourth, there is the desire and capabilities to enter into relations with 
confirmed states (Geldenhuys (p. 13) treats this as a consequence rather than a 
criterion of statehood) on behalf of the contested states, but these approaches 
are rejected.  
Though not mentioned in the Montevideo Convention, Geldenhuys adds 
sovereignty and recognition to these four conditions. In the case of the former, 
he distinguishes internal and external sovereignty (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 14; 
24). As for internal sovereignty, contested states have built constitutional 
arrangements and institutions, even though they are contested by confirmed 
states. The external sovereignty of contested states is limited, according to 
Geldenhuys, because the origins of these entities are considered to constitute 
violations of international law.  
Recognition is mentioned in the Montevideo Convention: not as a criterion 
for statehood, but rather as an acceptance of it by the recognising state (art 6). 
However, recognition comprises the core of the definition of contested state. 
Recognition leads to the ‘formal birth certificate of confirmed statehood, 
namely full UN membership’ (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 25).  
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1.2.3.7. Non-recognised/Unrecognised states 
Unrecognised (or non-recognised) states might be the most common and easily 
understandable name given to de facto entities. The major problem with this 
title is that at least some of the cases in point enjoy some formal recognition, a 
few even quite substantial recognition.  
Nina Caspersen (2012) uses the term ‘unrecognised states’ and offers a 
definition that does not differ much from the one offered by Pegg above. There 
are some additional aspects, though. Caspersen (2012, p. 11) presents five 
aspects of the definition. First, there has to be de facto independence of the 
entity, with the condition that it must control at least two-thirds of the territory it 
has claimed. Second, there has to be on-going state-building and legitimisation 
of the leadership. Third, there has to be a declaration of independence or, in its 
absence, a clear aspiration for independence. Caspersen states an independence 
referendum and independent currency as examples of this intent. Fourth is the 
recognition aspect. Generally, there is none, but Caspersen allows the 
recognition by a patron state and a ‘few other states of no great importance’. 
However, she gives no exact threshold of what separates important states from 
unimportant ones. Finally, there is a temporal clause that a de facto state has to 
be existent for at least two years. Like Pegg’s, this threshold is arbitrary. 
Caspersen does not approach the entities on a case-by-case basis but on the 
basis of issues that are important to their existence. She ‘demonstrates how 
important internal dynamics are for the development of these entities, but these 
intra-communal dynamics also interact with the international system, internal 
politics is shaped and constrained by external factors, including international 
norms and practices’ (2012, p. 24). Cases she uses include Abkhazia, Chechnya, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, TRNC, SrpskaKrajina, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Tamil 
Eelam, Transnistria and Taiwan. 
Caspersen does, however, provide a list of de facto states that have existed 
since 1991. The list (2012, p. 12) includes 18 items (date in brackets indicates 
the end of the entity’s de facto status): Abkhazia, Bougainville (1997), 
Chechnya (1999), Eritrea (1993), Gagauzia (1994), Kurdistan (2004), Monte-
negro (2006), Nagorno-Karabakh, Republika Srpska (1995), Republika Srpska 
Krajina (1995), Somaliland, South Ossetia, Tamil Eelam (2009), Transnistria, 
and TRNC. Additionally, there are two borderline cases of Kosovo and Taiwan.  
The unrecognised state has also been analysed by Caspersen and Stansfield 
(2011). The criteria they provide are very similar to those of Caspersen, 
although small differences exist. The first is temporal: they include cases prior 
to 1991, which adds Biafra and Katanga to the list. Secondly, Caspersen and 
Stansfield add Anjouan (from Comoros, 1997–2008) and East Timor (from 
Indonesia, 1999–2002) to the list, although they actually existed after 1991. 
Thirdly, the case of Iraqi Kurdistan is included as still existing (from 1991), 
whereas Caspersen gives an end-date of 2004 to the entity’s de facto status. 
Finally, Taiwan and Kosovo are included as borderline cases by Caspersen but 
not as such by Caspersen and Stansfield. They also omit Palestine and Western 
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Sahara from their list though some contributors to the volume have included 
them, as the editors willingly admit (p. 5). Most contributions to Caspersen and 
Stansfield (2011), unlike other edited volumes, are not case studies. The volume 
is divided into three parts: Conceptualising unrecognised states; Interaction of 
recognised and unrecognised states; and Conflict management and 
unrecognised states. None of the chapters in these parts deal with only one case, 
but on the other hand not all of them analyse all possible cases either.  
 
1.2.3.8. Other concepts 
In addition to the previous concepts, there are several others that have not 
achieved as widespread use. Still, some of them are more elaborated and 
discussed than others. We will start with Jacques deLisle (2002), who writes 
about Taiwan’s status and presents possible scenarios concerning its sove-
reignty. The spectrum runs from one unitary Chinese state to that of two 
independent states. Between these two extreme models (extreme in the case of 
Taiwan-China relations, of course; conceptually, it is the same sovereignty, only 
in the former case the two entities are one and in the latter case two states) 
deLisle suggests several other options including a federal solution, confede-
ration and commonwealth. One of the scenarios is labelled ‘near-state’, or sui-
generis entity, and deLisle describes it as ‘fail[ing] to satisfy one of the 
elements of statehood reflected in the 1933 Montevideo Convention’ (deLisle, 
2002, p. 741). He adds that ‘[i]n some cases, the issue is the failure to satisfy 
another implicit factor, that of claiming to be a state’ (deLisle, 2002, p. 741). 
Even though an entity may lack only one of the Montevideo criteria, it is hard to 
imagine such a case. Only the capacity to enter into relations with other states 
could be the absent criterion, as territory and population usually go hand-in-
hand and the lack of government also means a lack of foreign relations. 
However, the examples of Vatican and Palestine are noted.  
As recognition is not among the elements included in the Montevideo 
convention, lack of recognition cannot be one of the defining features of near-
states. We must agree with Geldenhuys’ (2009) critique that this concept 
concerns the state’s factual qualities rather than its recognition. Near-states as 
defined above would be deficient in both juridical and empirical sovereignty 
and unsuitable for our research.  
Montserrat Guibernau (1999, p. 1) refers to nations without states which 
are ‘cultural communities sharing a common past, attached to a clearly 
demarcated territory, and wishing to decide upon their political future which 
lack a state of their own’. This definition differs from others in this thesis in an 
important aspect of empirical statehood. They do not have juridical inde-
pendence, as with de facto states, but they also lack control over their territory. 
They still strive towards independence but have not yet achieved it on the 
empirical level. And their quest for self-determination may not even involve full 
independence. As Guibernau puts it (1999, p. 2), self-determination is ‘some-
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times understood as further autonomy within the state, though, in other cases it 
involves the right to secession’. The aspect of common culture and identity is 
central to the concept, rather than empirical but unrecognised statehood. The 
argument is that the parent state is alien to a particular group who do not 
identify themselves with the state and therefore have an explicit wish to rule 
themselves. They have not achieved that wish and are more like secessionist 
movements than unrecognised states. 
The idea of areas of special sovereignty violates the concept of absolute 
sovereignty. This concept has been theorised by Jackson (1990), as the old 
sovereignty regime, and Holsti (2004, p. 114) who claims that ‘a state is either 
sovereign or it is not’. Holsti does concede that there are anomalies in practice 
and offers the examples of India as a founding member of the League of 
Nations or Hong Kong as a founding member of the WTO. Holsti’s (2004, 
p. 114) acceptance is limited to ‘deviation from standard practice, no more’. He 
goes on to claim that ‘there is a standard practice, and that is that a polity cannot 
participate in the great games of international politics unless it is sovereign’ 
(Holsti, 2004, p. 114). 
Still, the term ‘area of special sovereignty’ indicates that this kind of status is 
accepted and recognised in contemporary international relations. In contrast to 
this perception, Geldenhuys (2009) refers to National Geographic’s Atlas of the 
World where Somaliland is given that title. However, there are entities that can 
be considered special and are recognised as such. The United States’ Depart-
ment of State factsheet ‘Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty’ (U.S. 
Department of State, 2010) applies the ‘Special Administrative Region’ title to 
Hong Kong and Macau. Therefore, areas of special sovereignty are arrange-
ments that are recognised as such and do not lack juridical sovereignty in the 
way de facto states do. 
Geldenhuys (2009) criticises the label ‘non-state actors’ for lacking 
‘stateness’ and it is a criticism that is hard to argue with. The non-state actors 
introduced to international relations theorising were international organisations 
and transnational corporations rather than de facto entities with territory and 
population. Buzan and Little (2000) play down the role of intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs), as they do not possess enough autonomous actor quality. 
For them, the main non-state actors, or units, to be precise, as they are analysing 
the international system, are firms and international non-governmental organi-
sations (INGOs) (Buzan & Little, 2000).  
The book by Isachenko (2012) entitled The Making of Informal States. State-
building in Northern Cyprus and Transdniestria uses the term informal states 
and analyses the two mentioned cases. Isachenko’s focus is on the state-
building efforts of the de facto entities. She uses figurational analysis to 
understand developments in PMR and TRNC in the context of long-term 
processes. The emphasis is on interdependence and networks. Isachenko starts 
with conceptualising the state, continues with the history of the cases and ends 
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with state- and economy-building efforts and the position of the de facto entities 
in the international arena. 
While defining the informal state, she refers to definitions proposed by Pegg, 
King, Lynch, Kingston and Spears and Geldenhuys, but persists with informal 
states because of the state-building emphasis of her work. She argues that 
informal, as opposed to something that is legal, official or established, suits her 
focus. The entities she analyses (Transniestria and Northern Cyprus) use 
informal practices in their state-building and also get involved in informal 
diplomacy because of the existing rules and their unrecognised status 
Elsewhere, proto-states refer to entities that existed before modern nation 
states. In Southeast Asia, these kind of entities were ‘based primarily on control 
of people rather than territory’ (Chong, 2009, p. 141). Proto-states are presented 
as early, pre-state phenomena also by Rosenberg (2010). Bakke et al (2011) use 
mostly the term de facto state but claim that they are ‘sometimes also referred to 
as breakaway regions’. Hsiao (2011, p. 2) uses the term unrecognised 
claimants to statehood (UCS), which are ‘political communities that meet 
many of the criteria of a state according to international law, but whose claims 
to statehood do not receive unequivocal recognition by existing states generally 
or collective recognition by the international community as a whole’. The latter 
is defined as full UN membership, which in turn can be achieved only after 
recognition by the majority of states. Dent (2004) argues that the best title for 
these entities would be sovereign land in a larger independent country. The 
term ‘land’ is used because it is considered to be more inclusive than nation. As 
the focus of his research is identity, the use of land is highly justified.  
 
 
1.2.4. Comparison of different approaches 
In the following section we will compare the different definitions of major 
‘labels’ for de facto states. There are several similarities between different 
approaches but also some notable differences. As we have referred to quite a 
number of different terms by which de facto states have been described, we will 
concentrate on only those more commonly used. As for the authors, some terms 
are used by many, some by only one. The following concepts are analysed in 
this section: 
 De facto states (Pegg (1998); Lynch (2004); Bartmann (2004)); 
 Contested states (Geldenhuys (2009)); 
 Unrecognised states (Caspersen (2012); 
 Quasi-states (Kolstø (2006)); 
 Pseudo-states (Kolossov and O’Loughlin (1999)); 
 States-within-states (Spears (2004)); 
 Statelike entities (King (2001)). 
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With seven definitions and nine main authors, one can identify eight different 
criteria that are used in defining the de facto state. Even though they are not 
used by all authors and there are some differences within these criteria, one can 
distinguish the following: 
 Territory; 
 Population; 
 Government; 
 Capabilities for international relations; 
 Absence of recognition; 
 Legitimacy or some indigenous capacity for existing, popular support; 
 Temporal criterion, some threshold in years that must be exceeded in de 
facto states’ existence; 
 Declaration of independence or some other statement of intent. 
 
The differences (and similarities) between authors among these eight criteria are 
shown in Figure 2: 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Criteria for de facto statehood. Comparison of different authors. 
 
On the right hand side of the radar chart, starting from the North and going 
clockwise, there are criteria that correspond to the Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States, Article 1. In the South, there is the absence of 
international recognition. On the West there are additional criteria used by the 
authors. As one can observe, the four Montevideo criteria and the absence of 
recognition are well-represented with different authors, with all criteria scoring 
nine on the chart. This means that all respective authors have used them in one 
capacity or another. The differences will be explained shortly. The three 
additional criteria, however, are not universally acknowledged by our pool of 
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authors. Now we will take a look at each criterion separately, even though we 
find them very closely connected. 
 
Population 
To function as a state, de facto entities must have people to rule over. As there 
are no restrictions on how big or small a country should be (absurd possibilities 
of, for example, two people are highly debatable of course), there is general 
consensus among authors in this regard. The only requirement is that the 
population should be permanently connected to the territory. As Geldenhuys 
rightly points out, this does not rule out emigration. Population is an aggregate 
not an individual level criterion.  
 
Territory 
Territory is another of the Montevideo criteria. Pegg (1998, p. 27) argues that 
de facto states are ‘territorially-based and in the business of providing gover-
nance’. He also provides criteria for distinguishing de facto states from 
emigration to emphasise the territorial nature of the entities. Unlike the 
emigration of a population, de facto states want to take their territory with them. 
Pegg also ties territory to the question of justification. To receive recognition, a 
secessionist entity must show that it has the right to a particular territory. 
 
Government 
The next criterion is government and it is closely related to the previous two. 
There is no point talking about government without population and territory, 
with problems of the latter being debated more intensely among students of de 
facto states. Therefore, the differences among authors as to what this means are 
somewhat larger than with the previous criteria. There are two issues with 
government. First, some authors have elaborated on the scope of territory that 
needs to be under the control of the de facto state. The reason behind this is 
practical, because several of these states do not control the whole territory they 
have claimed. Caspersen for example gives a threshold of 2/3 of claimed 
territory to be controlled, including the capital and key areas. In a volume co-
edited and a definition co-written with Stansfield, Caspersen substitutes the 
two-thirds threshold with a wider notion of ‘most of the territory’. ‘Most of’ is a 
term also used by Kolstø, but compared to its use by Caspersen, it is used more 
softly and put into brackets rather than an exhibited part of the criterion. Kolstø 
acknowledges the empirical reality that de facto states do not control all the 
territory they have laid their claim to but gives a theoretical criterion of full 
control. 
Geldenhuys writes about borders that might be unstable. Spears takes a 
similar position and admits that borders may shift in time. But neither of them 
considers it to be a problem in defining the de facto state because it is not 
limited to de facto states. Issues over the control of territory are common in 
many parts of the Third World and arguably cases like Somalia do not even fit 
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the rather generous thresholds of capital and key areas. Additionally, there are 
border issues between functioning and even powerful states. The Russo-
Japanese argument over the Kuril Islands might be an example.  
The second issue is the range of the control. The limits of constitutional 
arrangements and institutions as well as services the government provides are 
quite open. Pegg, for example, argues for ‘organised political leadership’ 
instead of government. Kingston, in the same volume as Spears, acknowledges 
imbalances in institutional development between the entities. Again, there are 
differences in government among confirmed states, therefore the wider 
thresholds seem reasonable. Caspersen analyses the concept of sovereignty and 
concludes that while one aspect of it – authority – might be absolute, the other – 
control – is not. She claims it to be relative and a matter of degree. Again, this is 
not uniquely inherent to de facto states. Recognised states vary, and to a large 
degree, in this matter. 
 
Capacity for international relations 
Related to government is the capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
The Montevideo Convention, however, does not specify what this capacity 
exactly entails. To interpret this grammatically, one comes to the conclusion 
that a state must have resources, both finances and people, to establish diplo-
matic connections with other states. In the case of de facto states, another 
element comes into play: the possible partner. Most of the authors emphasise 
that even though the de facto state possesses the capacity, recognised states do 
not want to engage in relations with them. Pegg (1998, p. 26) puts it a little 
differently, saying that the entity ‘views itself as capable of entering into 
relations with other states’. As stated, technically it does not take much to enter 
into international relations; therefore, one-sidedness is probably the only theo-
retical elaboration that can be offered concerning this criterion.  
 
International recognition 
The main difference between recognised and de facto states is the absence of 
recognition in the latter case. The Montevideo Convention does not list re-
cognition as a qualification of a state, but rather as an acceptance by other 
states. Article 6 states: ‘The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state 
which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and 
duties determined by international law’. This formulation is based on a decla-
rative rather than a constitutive approach to statehood and is therefore easily 
applicable to de facto states. 
The main difference between authors here concerns how much recognition is 
tolerable for an entity still to be considered a de facto state. Theoretically, the 
continuum goes from no recognition at all to full recognition by all existing 
states. As in practice most de facto states enjoy some level of formal 
recognition (the exceptions being Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and 
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Somaliland) and none have full recognition, the threshold must be somewhere 
in between. And setting this threshold is a subject of much debate. 
Geldenhuys expects the de facto state to have no recognition at all and 
suggests his term ‘contested state’ is therefore better. However, he does not 
propose a particular level of recognition at which the state is no longer a 
contested one, but refers to full UN membership as the ultimate form of 
recognition. This is a practical approach, because not all UN members enjoy 
recognition by all other states. The People’s Republic of China, Israel, Cyprus, 
Armenia and both Koreas are full members of the organisation but have limited 
recognition, especially China and Israel. Others are not recognised by one or 
two UN member states.  
UN membership is arguably the widest possible threshold and is also shared 
by Kolossov&O’Loughlin and Kolstø. The UN is the only global organisation 
that deals with a wide array of issues and it is natural to associate its 
membership with full recognition. There are in addition to the aforementioned 
cases still some problems with this reasoning. First, UN membership is 
voluntary. Even though most states are members, there have been entities that 
have decided not to join the organisation though they were still fully confirmed 
states. Switzerland, which joined the UN only a decade ago, is the best example. 
Secondly, in practice a UN member does not have to be a sovereign state, 
although at the moment all members are. The cases of the Ukrainian and Belo-
russian SSR’s and India are prime examples of this. The former two were 
constituent republics of the Soviet Union, while the latter gained full inde-
pendence from the United Kingdom two years after admission to the organi-
sation. Thirdly, the UN itself does not recognise anybody; states do. 
There is a way, though, in which UN membership is relevant for assessing 
the level of recognition. Even though not clearly stated by the authors analysed, 
UN membership can be seen as a fixed threshold on the degree of recognition at 
two levels. The UN Charter, Article 4 (2) states that ‘The admission of any such 
state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the 
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council’. The two 
levels here are the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (SC). The 
GA level means that the majority of UN members must be in favour of a new 
member. Article 18 (2) of the Charter states that for the admission of new 
Members to the United Nations, a two-thirds majority of the members present 
and voting must be achieved for a decision to be made. Although theoretically 
this means that if one voting member state is present, its vote would be enough, 
this is inconceivable in practice. This means, then, that (nearly) two-thirds of 
the UN member states must vote for the new member’s admission and we can 
assume that they have recognised the latter.  
The second level is that of the SC, where the permanent members’ votes are 
important. According to Article 27 (3), ‘an affirmative vote of nine members 
including the concurring votes of the permanent member’ is necessary for non-
procedural decisions to be made. On the political level, this means that the 
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major powers must not be against the new member and we can assume that they 
have recognised it. This means that a state can be considered a recognised or a 
confirmed one when it has the recognition of two-thirds of UN member states 
with no objections from the major powers. 
Caspersen takes a different approach and limits the range of recognition to a 
patron and small number of less powerful states for a state to be classified as 
unrecognised. Or, as Caspersen puts it (p. 11) (in a passage already cited 
above), a ‘few other states of no great importance’. There are two things to 
analyse in this formulation. First, the importance of a patron and the criteria for 
how to identify one are given in following chapters. In this context, Caspersen 
makes an important point: no matter how powerful the patron might be, its 
recognition should not affect the theoretical status of the unrecognised entity. 
The other aspect of the criterion is vaguer, as Caspersen does not clarify what is 
meant by ‘no great importance’. What makes a state important? Or, indeed, can 
a state be important at all?  
There is no overwhelming consensus on this matter in international relations 
theory. Waltz’s neorealist approach considers powerful states to be important. 
However, as Waltz considers only military power to be relevant, the question is 
whether some militarily non-powerful states might also be important? Some 
authors, usually labelled as liberal, think in terms of issue-areas. This can widen 
the scope of important states along non-military lines so that, for example, 
economic power could make a state important. As one can observe further in 
this dissertation, an issue-area approach is also adopted here. The problem of 
this approach might be where to draw the line: economy can be further 
separated into sub-issue areas like oil or finance, for example.  
Taking all this into consideration, one must conclude that Caspersen’s 
definition is not the best mainly because of a lack of clarity which can lead to 
inconsistency. An example here might be Kosovo. Caspersen is somewhat 
cautious in her approach towards the entity and calls it a borderline case. 
However, she and Stansfield list it as a ‘proper’ non-recognised state. Clarity 
related questions here are twofold. First, are some of the states that have 
recognised Kosovo important? They include the United States, the United 
Kingdom and France, all permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
Although there might be no questions about the US, being among the world’s 
leading economies and nuclear powers, but not superpowers, are France and the 
UK important? If the answer is affirmative, can Kosovo be considered an 
unrecognised state? Therefore, Caspersen’s definition is less useful than the 
threshold of UN membership, even though the latter appears to be unrelated to 
recognition at first glance. Treating some cases as borderline adds depth to the 
analysis, but sacrifices clarity.  
 
Indigenous capacity or legitimacy 
Coming to the West side of the graph, we do not see such consensus regarding 
criteria as we do with those in the Montevideo Convention and the absence of 
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recognition. As regards indigenous capacity or legitimacy, this criterion has 
several ‘faces’ as the label would indicate. We can differentiate between two 
approaches: top-down and bottom-up. The former means that the elites of the de 
facto entity are involved in nation-building to create a common identity and to 
legitimise their rule. The latter means that the state has indigenous support from 
the start. On closer observation, these two approaches are not mutually exclu-
sive, therefore, they can be considered as a single criterion. The second diffe-
rentiation we can make is between state-building and legitimacy. Technically, 
these can be two different phenomena but in reality they tend to go hand-in-
hand. These issues of connectedness are the reasons why we consider these two 
as one criterion. 
We have gone beyond differences within the criteria to differences of 
whether some criteria should be used at all. The authors that favour the inclu-
sion of some indigenous capacity include Pegg, Caspersen, Spears and 
Bartmann. Some of the others like Kolossov&O’Loughlin and King emphasise 
the problem and analyse it quite thoroughly but do not include it in a definition. 
So, what do the authors tell us about this criterion?  
Pegg includes it to differentiate the de facto state from puppet states. South 
Africa’s ‘Bantustans’ could be a prime example of unrecognised states that 
were created by a parent state. Caspersen (p. 11) clearly emphasises the state-
building aspect and legitimacy. Her approach is also elite-centred, as it is the 
government, or leadership to be precise, that is doing the institution-building 
and trying to show its legitimacy. Internal aspects are an important part of 
Caspersen’s analysis of de facto states, as she argues that ‘unrecognised states 
cannot be reduced to their external dimension, however, and the success or 
failure of their state-building efforts owes a lot to internal dynamics’ (p. 76). 
She goes on to analyse different aspects of state-building that can contribute to 
the de facto state’s efforts in state-building, like fighting between internal 
forces, institution-building, and different obstacles that hinder these efforts. 
Bartmann connects legitimacy and recognition. In his approach, legitimacy 
involves both sides of the statehood ‘coin’: the internal side of capabilities and 
the external side of a right to exist. Additionally, these sides develop each other. 
On the one hand, legitimacy is viewed as a basis for statehood by the leaders of 
the entities and, on the other, recognition of this statehood reinforces these 
claims to legitimacy (p. 16).  
Some authors do not include the legitimacy or state-building aspect in their 
exact definition of what we call the de facto state, though it is still involved in 
their analysis. Kolossov&O’Loughlin, in their geopolitical approach, emphasise 
the identity aspect. For them, de facto state-building is closely related to or even 
intertwined with identity and nation-building. Their case study – Transnistria – 
is an example of civic nationalism emphasising the state rather than ethnic 
origin, which is understandable as Transnistria is a multi-ethnic society. King 
also emphasises state-building but does not include it in his definition. He calls 
this state-building ‘surreptitious’, however. The idea behind this phrasing is that 
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there are several reasons why the conflicts that brought about the emergence of 
de facto states have not been ended, but the real reason is the state-building 
efforts of the elites in the entities. Spears also emphasises identity formation and 
state-building without explicitly binding it to the definition. He states that ‘in 
many cases, it is also possible to discern a social identification with the sub-
state’ (p. 22). In this case, it cannot logically be part of a definition because of 
the quantifier ‘in many cases’. Definition must embrace all cases. Like 
Kolossov&O’Loughlin, Spears views extending state power and identity as 
‘similar and mutually reinforcing processes’ (p. 22) 
Beyond the authors analysed in this section, there are of course works about 
the legitimacy of unrecognised entities, with Daria Isachenko’s book The 
Making of Informal States. State-building in Northern Cyprus and Transd-
niestria being the most recent and exhaustive example. As Isachenko focuses on 
internal dynamics of the entities and does not give a definition of her term 
‘informal states,’ she is not involved in the current analysis. She emphasises the 
informality aspect of de facto states but builds on the authors discussed here. 
Also, Berg (2012), Berg and Solvak (2011) and Berg and Toomla (2013) have 
analysed survey data to establish the legitimacy of governments in different de 
facto states. 
 
Temporal criterion 
This criterion has been listed also with a somewhat different meaning by Pegg, 
Kolstø, Caspersen, and Lynch. As Lynch accepts Pegg’s definition without 
much elaboration in this aspect, the former three authors have been added to the 
chart. 
Pegg, Caspersen and Kolstø all set the threshold at two years. There is no 
theoretical justification for this but it is useful for considering empirical 
evidence. Pegg quite freely admits to this and states that intuitively the 
necessary minimum seems to be one year (p. 32). It takes some time to show the 
credentials of a state, especially if the birth of this state is during warfare. One 
just cannot empirically evaluate whether there is ‘enough’ government when the 
state is, say, two months old. On the other hand, too high a threshold might 
exclude cases that do merit academic study as de facto states. Pegg gives the 
examples of Biafra and Krajina here. Both ceased to exist after three to four 
years but were ‘substantial enough entities with large enough impact on inter-
national relations to merit serious academic study’ (p. 32). Caspersen and 
Kolstø have followed in Pegg’s footsteps and set the threshold at two years.  
There are also other ways to include time in the analysis of de facto states. 
Kolossov (2001) takes a somewhat different approach to what might be called a 
temporal criterion. He claims that de facto states are long-term features in the 
contemporary world without setting any particular threshold. In fact, his 
approach could be viewed as the opposite to that of the previous three authors. 
While Pegg, Caspersen and Kolstø want to distinguish de facto states from 
short-term power-holders, they somewhat assume that the lifespan of these 
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entities is short rather than long. To be ‘worthy’ of analysis as de facto states 
they have to pass some early tests and survive. Kolossov, on the other hand, 
assumes the long term presence of these entities.  
Another author who uses time in a different way to Pegg, Caspersen and 
Kolstø is Spears. He does share the notion that de facto states are not long term 
phenomena, however. But instead of setting a threshold as part of his definition, 
Spears considers them to be exactly the opposite – temporary. The reasoning 
behind this is that the concept of ‘state-within-state’ that Spears uses is a bit 
wider than the de facto/unrecognised/quasi state of the other authors. This in 
turn leads to different goals of these states and independence might be just a 
stepping stone to some other goal. Hence there is a temporal nature to the 
entities.  
 
Declaration of independence 
The final criterion that has been mentioned in the literature is the declaration of 
independence or, more broadly, the purpose of the de facto entity. The latter 
notion may be more useful because not all units that could be considered de 
facto states have explicitly declared their independence. Taiwan is a prime 
example here. And it is also the case in the literature that authors have not 
bound themselves with formal declaration. Altogether, four authors have 
included this criterion: Pegg, Kolstø, Kolossov&O’Loughlin and Caspersen. 
Starting with Pegg, he emphasises sovereignty as the only goal for the de 
facto state. It ‘seeks sovereignty as full constitutional independence’ (p. 33). 
Pegg suggests this criterion to distinguish de facto states from other territorial 
units that have seceded from larger entities, but do not want independence. 
These are mainly units in a federal state; Pegg provides Jura’s secession from 
Berne Canton as an example. Also, this criterion differentiates de facto states 
from units that do not want sovereignty and those that want to overthrow an 
existing government. 
Kolstø states quite explicitly that a de facto state ‘must have sought but not 
achieved international recognition as an independent state’ (pp. 275–276) as one 
of his three definitional criteria. He does not say that there must have been a 
declaration of independence but the intent of the entity is made clear. 
Kolossov&O’Loughlin say that institutionalised pseudo-states have ‘dec-
lared sovereignty’ (p. 155) but do not elaborate on how exactly this might have 
happened. Their phrasing indicates some sort of formal declaration of 
sovereignty. 
Caspersen is more precise than the previous two authors. She states that 
there should be either a declaration of independence or a demonstration of a 
clear aspiration for it. She offers a list of examples that might fit into the latter 
category. The list, however, is neither long nor exhaustive. It includes only a 
referendum on independence and a separate currency with the notion of some 
‘similar act that clearly signals separate statehood,’ leaving the list open. There 
are some ambiguities with these possible demonstrations. First, Caspersen does 
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not state whether the referendum of independence was successful. Presumably it 
was, but there are still questions about what constitutes success. These are 
technical problems, however. The second ambiguity is the openness of the list 
itself. What could these possible acts be? One could name statements by an 
entity’s leaders or border checkpoints, for example.  
One author who takes a different approach is Spears and he does so by 
listing several goals that a ‘state-within-state’ could have. Being a stepping-
stone or a way-station, as he himself puts it, is mentioned in this section and 
others further above. Once again, as this is not part of the definition, Spears is 
omitted from the chart. 
If only a formal declaration of independence were the criterion, then some 
cases like Taiwan should be omitted from the list of de facto states. In this 
sense, the additional elements listed by Caspersen are very useful. The problem 
is what kind of actions constitute substitutes for the declaration. Pegg’s 
distinction between de facto states and federal units that have territory, 
population and government by emphasising the goal of sovereignty actually 
overlaps with the Montevideo criterion of government itself. A government is 
sovereign if there is no upper-level government above it. Therefore, the 
additional criterion of the goal of sovereignty does not add much. Likewise with 
Caspersen’s possible alternatives to a declaration. If an entity has a functioning 
government that has effective control over a territory, that should be enough to 
consider it as a state. Having its own currency, for example, is just a policy of 
that government, as not having one might be. And, again, these are not unique 
features of de facto states: Germany does not have a currency of its own.  
The same applies to Pegg’s other distinctions between de facto states and 
those entities that do not have sovereignty as their goal or want to overthrow an 
existing government. Starting with the latter, the goal of overthrowing a 
government could actually be a reason for a de facto state to emerge. Taiwan 
could be an example here. The fact that there is another government controlling 
a territory (also claimed by the de facto state) and the fact that it has inter-
national recognition do not make a de facto state exist any less.  
Entities that do not want to be sovereign states, but have a functioning 
government can also be classified as de facto states. Again, their existence is not 
influenced by the fact that they themselves do not want to be in that particular 
position. Human action can bring about unintended consequences and if a 
political movement has ended up carrying out state functions, then at a 
particular moment in time their original goal does not matter. If an entity 
functions as a state even against its own will then it can be considered a de facto 
state. 
However, the absence or presence of a declaration of independence can be 
useful in determining whether the de facto state is secessionist or not. If there is 
a declaration, then we can say that there is a case of secession. By definition, 
the declaration implies that there is a parent state from which independence is 
declared. Without the parent state there is no need for declarations. The 
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opposite does not apply though: there can still be secessionist cases in which 
independence is not declared. 
 
The working definition 
Creating a working definition involves two aspects. First we take into account 
our theoretical findings about statehood and sovereignty. The dichotomies 
sovereignty – internal and external; empirical and judicial – are used in the 
definition. Secondly, we take the consensus from authors discussed above. 
These two aspects merge very well because the agreement between authors 
corresponds to our earlier theoretical findings. Theory also allows us to leave 
aside the components that different authors do not agree upon. 
All of the conceptions that were described above deal with recognition and 
empirical statehood and that will be taken as the basis for our working defi-
nition. The ‘level’ of being a state obviously differs between de facto states, as 
it does between confirmed states. Therefore, we must admit that the judgement 
of whether there is a functioning government controlling a territory is itself 
arbitrary. An analysed de facto state must have some control over some 
territory. Some control means that they are independent in their judgement. This 
does not exclude external influences, but these are not uniquely reserved for de 
facto states. Some territory means that it does not have to control the entire 
territory it has claimed; at least some territory is enough. Obviously, this 
territory must have some population living on it. The fourth Montevideo 
criterion, capability for international relations, is assumed from the presence of 
a functioning government. In a nutshell, de facto states must have empirical 
sovereignty. 
The other aspect of de facto statehood is international recognition. Again, 
this aspect, or the absence of it, has been ever-present in the literature. Here we 
will take UN membership as a threshold. As argued above, membership means 
the acceptance of most of the states including all permanent members of the 
Security Council. There is the issue here that some recognised states might not 
want to be members of the organisation, but this claim does not hold 
empirically. 
If we take these two sides of the definition, the Montevideo criteria and the 
absence of international recognition, we can show the positioning of de facto 
states in relation to other possible actors. If we take the external side of 
sovereignty shown in Table 1, and elaborate on the juridical and empirical 
dimensions, then we can create Table 2 showing where de facto states are 
positioned.  
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Table 2: De facto states’ position according to the dimensions of external sovereignty 
Juridical statehood 
Yes No 
Empirical 
statehood 
Yes Confirmed states De facto states 
No Quasi-states (Jackson) Secessionist movements, Nations without a state 
 
The de facto state is therefore a ‘state that fulfils all the criteria set in the 
Montevideo Convention but lacks sufficient recognition from fellow states’.  
The definition of the de facto state used in this thesis consists therefore of 
two dimensions of statehood, juridical and empirical. The former is formal 
recognition by other countries, with the threshold being enough recognition to 
pass a vote for UN membership. The latter dimension is more arbitrary and is 
decided on a case-by-case basis. On the internal side, the state does not have to 
be on the level of industrialised countries; it has to provide some basic services 
to the population. On the external side, it has to be independent from the parent 
state from which it tries to secede. All states have some influences on their 
autonomy and decision-making, but independence from the former ‘master’ is 
crucial. 
Other elements of definitions used by different authors have been dropped 
for, in addition to not achieving consensus in the literature, different reasons 
outlined below. Pegg’s, Caspersen’s and Kolstø’s temporal requirement of two 
years of existence is important, but in this case unnecessary, because all empiri-
cal cases analysed have existed longer than that. And this thesis deals only with 
present cases. 
Even though we are using the declaratory theory to define a state, the 
declaration of independence is not one of our criteria. This slight contradiction 
is due to the fact that declaratory theory itself, as set out in the Montevideo 
Convention, does not require a declaration of independence for an entity to be a 
state. In our case, the declaration is useful in determining whether there has 
been secession, but it does not determine whether a particular entity is a de facto 
state. There can be de facto states that have not declared independence or even 
lack the intention to become independent.  
Indigenous support or legitimacy is also dropped from this analysis. The 
main reason for this is that legitimacy in particular is again not a feature specific 
to the de facto state. There are a number of confirmed states that are governed 
by regimes that do not possess popular support or legitimacy and still are 
considered as rulers of these countries. Furthermore, the legitimacy component 
would be a part of the definition of a regime rather than a state. As for the latter, 
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the government that is sovereign, i.e. has no higher level government to 
overrule its decisions, is sufficient.  
This definition can be described as minimal in terms of including conditions. 
There are several reasons for choosing this approach to the definition. First, as 
mentioned also elsewhere in this dissertation, research of de facto states is a 
rather new direction in international relations studies. This means that there is 
no coherent theory to cover these entities and definitions differ significantly. 
There is, as seen above, multiplicity of terms and concepts which is accompa-
nied by varieties in substance. Being a new subject of research, authors try to 
leave their marks on the research by devising different conceptions. This is 
mainly due to different angles the researchers approach the issue. Here we have 
taken an approach to find the common grounds on what makes a de facto state 
de facto. And a helpful tool is the accepted definition of state with additional 
theoretical approaches to sovereignty.  
 
 
1.3. Case selection 
In this chapter, we take a closer look at cases. Each case is covered taking into 
account three aspects that form the structure of the sections. First, we look 
briefly at the history of the analysed entities with an emphasis on how they have 
become de facto states. Secondly, we fit the cases into our working definition. 
The five criteria we identified in section 1.2.4, ‘Comparison of different 
approaches’ – territory, population, government, capacity for international rela-
tions, and the absence of recognition – are described. Most of the following is 
encyclopaedic knowledge derived mostly from Britannica Online, CIA World 
Factbook and Freedom House country reports. In some cases the historical 
evolvement of de facto states has been described in more detail. Data used in 
the analysis is not presented here and can be found in Table 5 (Section 2.4.1).  
 
 
1.3.1. Abkhazia 
The roots of Abkhazian independence date back to the 8th century when the 
independent kingdom of Abkhazia was established. After periods of indepen-
dence and dependence, in 1864 the region was annexed by the Russian Empire 
in which it remained until the October Revolution of 1917. The communist 
rulers of Russia gave the region autonomous status in 1919 and the status 
offederal republic in 1921. The latter did not last long, however, as later in the 
same year Abkhazia was united with the Georgian SSR. In 1930s this 
arrangement was overlooked and Abkhazia became an autonomous part of the 
Georgian SSR. This lasted until the end of the Soviet Union.  
The current de facto status of Abkhazia was achieved via war with Georgia. 
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 all federal republics gained inde-
pendence (in addition to those which had already declared independence and 
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were recognised as such). Therefore Abkhazia with its lower status was denied 
an independent state and the entity remained part of Georgia. In 1992, 
secessionists in Abkhazia staged an armed revolt against the Georgian central 
government in a bid to obtain Abkhazian independence. The rebels defeated 
Georgian forces and established control over Abkhazia in 1993, and in May 
1994 a cease-fire was arranged. Despite the cease-fire and the subsequent 
deployment of a largely Russian peacekeeping force in the region, hostilities 
continued, and in 1999 the region formally declared its independence. 
(Abkhazia, 2012). 
During the separation, Abkhazia has been active in state-building. Public 
institutions have been established and the entity has had several elections, both 
parliamentary and presidential. The competitiveness of the elections has 
increased over the years. In presidential elections, only one candidate, the in-
cumbent president, ran for office in 1999. In 2011, there were several 
candidates and the elections were generally considered competitive. Freedom 
House has therefore considered Abkhazia to be partly free since 2005. 
Abkhazians consider their bid for independent statehood to have grounds in 
their status within the USSR. The union between Abkhazia and Georgia from 
the 1920s was supposed to be on equal grounds and as Geldenhuys(2009, p. 70) 
puts it, it can be ‘regarded as the source of their contemporary statehood’. This 
has led to demands for Abkhazia to have equal status with Georgia and to the 
challenging of the results of the Soviet breakup. As far as Abkhazia is con-
cerned, it should be an independent nation like the recognised former Soviet 
republics. Additionally, the democratic achievements of Abkhazia have created 
the feeling within the entity that international recognition is deserved.  
Currently Abkhazia possesses all the features set out in section 1.2.4 to 
qualify as a de facto state. It has a fixed territory at around 8600 km2, covering 
most of the territory of the old autonomous republic. In 2008 Abkhazia gained 
control over the Kodori gorge, the only area that had previously remained under 
Georgian rule. As one would expect, Georgia considers the whole territory to be 
under its jurisdiction, a notion that is supported by international opinion and 
contested by Abkhazia.  
Estimates of the population of the entity vary from around 180,000 to 
250,000, with the latest census recording 240,705 people (Апсныпресс, 2011). 
The ethnic composition of the entity is diverse with the titular nation making up 
less than half of the population. Other notable ethnic groups are Georgians, 
Armenians and Russians.  
As can be seen from the empirical data, it has the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Abkhazia (MFA website), there are three ambassadors of UN member states to 
the entity. Only one of them, the Russian, is a resident ambassador; the 
Venezuelan and Nicaraguan ambassadors reside in Moscow. The MFA website 
also states that Abkhazia has representatives with different titles in 12 states. 
Abkhazia is recognised only by six UN member states, leaving it short of the 
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127 required for full UN membership. Therefore, we can state that the non-
recognition criterion is also fulfilled. 
The main problem with de facto states regarding our working definition is 
the criterion of government. There may be situations where another power, 
usually what we have identified as a patron, controls them to the extent that they 
cannot be considered independent anymore. In Abkhazia’s case, that power is 
Russia. There are several features that point towards the fact that Abkhazia is 
highly dependent on Russia: economic, military and political. It is the latter that 
is of the utmost importance because it defines whether an entity is independent 
in decision-making.  
In economic terms, it can be said that Abkhazia is very dependent on Russia. 
Russia is the dominant trade and investments partner for the entity. Also, 
Abkhazia is extremely dependent on Russian aid. In an article in The Wall 
Street Journal (2009), Samantha Shields says that in 2009 the Russian 
contribution to the Abkhaz budget was around $66.5 million, which constituted 
57% of the total. A similar proportion, around 60%, is also stated elsewhere 
(Shvedov, 2009). Additionally, the Russian rouble is the official currency of 
Abkhazia. 
In the military sector, Russia has had a defence agreement with Abkhazia for 
49 years from September 2009 which allows it to station 1700 troops there 
(RFE/RL, 2009). This is in addition to border guards that Russia has sent to 
help Abkhazian units. Russia has also deployed anti-aircraft missiles on 
Abkhazian territory (BBC). During the war of independence, Russian support 
was pivotal in the success of the rebel forces against Georgia. Today, Abkhazia 
is dependent on Russia for the provision of the entity’s security with the main 
fear coming from possible forceful reunification with Georgia. 
These two sectors are of a practical nature and this kind of influence is not 
unique to de facto states. Economic aid, dependency on an economic partner 
and military assistance are quite usual practices in the world. Moreover, 
Montenegro, a UN member, uses the Euro as its currency without being in the 
monetary union or the EU in general. To determine whether a de facto state can 
be considered independent one must analyse the involvement of the patron in its 
political affairs and decision-making.  
First, on the individual level, Russian influence is visible in people’s 
passports, as it is made ‘easy for people in Abkhazia to gain Russian citizen-
ship, and most now hold Russian passports’ (BBC). One reason for this is that 
Russian citizenship gives people possibilities to travel that they lack with 
Abkhazian documents. But it can also be seen as a political tool. 
Secondly, on the government level, Russia has had aspirations to get its 
‘own’ people into powerful positions. However, this has not always been 
successful. In 2004–2005 the presidential elections were won by an opposition 
candidate, Sergei Bagapsh. Even though the elections were marred by 
controversy, which led to an eventual coalition between the government and 
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Russian-supported incumbent Prime Minister Raul Khadjimba, the Bagapsh 
victory shows that Abkhazian politics is not dictated from Moscow.  
Furthermore, Freedom House (Freedom in the World, 2012) in its country 
reports states that the Russian influence on political matters has in fact 
decreased in recent years. In 2010 Russia ‘continued to tighten its grip on 
Abkhazia’ to the extent that ‘opposition and independent media repeatedly 
accused the government of ceding too much control to Moscow’. This is 
possible because of the rather strong NGO sector. The presence of the 
opposition and independent media already indicates that the entity is not 
controlled from outside. Also, in 2011 ‘in contrast to previous elections, Russia 
did not endorse a candidate, though the Kremlin continued to exert economic 
and military pressure on the territory’. This does not seem to influence the 
legitimacy of the government, though, as Bakke, O’Loughlin and Ward (2011) 
find. They conclude that internal security threats like crime and corruption are 
more likely to have a negative effect on state and regime legitimacy, whereas 
political violence and external security threats have no or little effect. 
This shows that, notwithstanding economic and military dependency, there is 
at least some independent political decision-making and the entity is not a de 
facto Russian province. Russia’s political pressures are countered to an extent 
that we can talk about an independent, albeit unrecognised, nation. 
 
 
1.3.2. South Ossetia 
The independent South Ossetia dates back to 1920, when it was first declared. It 
did not last long, however, and in 1922 Ossetia was incorporated into the Soviet 
Union along with Georgia. The latter received the status of a titular republic 
while South Ossetia became an autonomous oblast within Georgia. In internal 
hierarchy, this was a lower status than the autonomous republic of Abkhazia. 
This situation was maintained peacefully until the late 1980s when a separatist 
movement emerged in South Ossetia that had irredentist aspirations in seceding 
from Georgia and uniting with North Ossetia or Alania, a republic in the 
Russian Federation which is mostly populated by Ossetians. Moreover, in 
population terms, Alania was around ten times larger than South Ossetia. In 
1989 the Ossetian independence movement requested that the status of the area 
be upgraded to an autonomous republic. That plea was not satisfied and, 
furthermore, Georgian legislators started to pass laws that were seen as hostile 
by South Ossetia. These included language laws, establishing the supremacy of 
Georgian in the region.  
These nationalist trends in Georgia prompted South Ossetia to declare its 
sovereignty within the USSR in 1990. Again, this declaration was not re-
cognised and was followed by the revocation of its status as an autonomous 
oblast. With Georgian independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
non-recognition of South Ossetian claims, heavy fighting broke out. In 1992 
Russia helped broker a cease-fire and established a peacekeeping operation but 
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did not resolve the conflict. In the same year Ossetia held an independence 
referendum that was not considered valid by most governments. In 1993 South 
Ossetia approved a constitution which saw the entity as an independent 
republic. State-building processes followed and in 1996 Ossetia organised 
presidential elections. 
Without much change in the situation, relations between Georgia and South 
Ossetia remained stable until the mid-2000s. In 2006, another referendum was 
held to reaffirm the nation’s desire to secede from Georgia. In 2008, South 
Ossetia was the main theatre for the Russo-Georgian war. The conflict started 
with Georgian forces engaging with local fighters and grew into war with 
Russia when the latter’s troops entered the fighting. The main implication of the 
war was Russian recognition of the entity’s independence, which has been 
followed by four other nations. 
The South Ossetian territory covers nearly 4,000 km2, but is inhabited by 
only around 70,000 people. The territory is more or less the same as that of the 
autonomous oblast. The most important geographical feature of South Ossetia is 
the Caucasus mountain range that separates it from North Ossetia. Its 
connection with Russia is established through the Roki tunnel, which is one of 
the few paths through the North Caucasus Mountain Range. This proved to be 
vital in the 2008 war for Russian troops to enter Ossetia. 
The population of the entity is fairly small and is compromised mostly of 
ethnic Ossetians, who constitute around two thirds of the population. Another 
major nationality is Georgian. However, these estimates are from the pre-war 
year of 2007 and there are different evaluations as to how much the war 
influenced the population figures. Some sources (UN News Centre, 2008) claim 
that around 15,000 ethnic Georgians may have fled the entity. This would leave 
the population at around 55,000 and ethnically homogeneous. 
The capacity of South Ossetia to enter into international relations and its lack 
of recognition can be established empirically. Five nations recognise South 
Ossetia as an independent nation and Russia has an embassy in the entity. 
According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA-RUS), there is also 
a South Ossetian embassy in Moscow. 
The issue of governmental control is most arguable in the case of South 
Ossetia among de facto states. Russian patronage is more visible than in the 
cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria. To start with economic influence, Russia is 
the main economic and investments partner for South Ossetia, where the 
Russian Rouble is the also an official currency. However, there is not much 
trade or investment to report. The International Crisis Group (ICG, 2010) says 
that private investments are in a state of ‘near-absence’ and foreign trade is in a 
similar situation. The reason for the former is mainly because of ‘the unstable 
security situation, underdeveloped legal framework and high level of corrup-
tion. Even ethnic Ossetian businessmen operating in Russia refrain from 
investing’ (ICG, 2010). There are some developments, though, as an Agreement 
Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia on 
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Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs was signed and ratified in 2011 
(President of Russia, 2011). But the main financial connection between the de 
facto state and its patron is aid. The ICG says that the per capita Russian aid is 
about 28,000 dollars, which roughly corresponds to the per capita GDP of 
Greece (ICG, 2010). On the Russian website polit.ru, Andrey Illaryonov (2008) 
states that estimates for per capita Russian aid in 2008 were 2091 dollars as 
budget guarantees and 11,386 as aid for the war effort. The latter makes up to 
746.5 percent of the South Ossetian GDP.  
In the military sphere, the situation is not much different. As with Abkhazia, 
Russia has signed a defence agreement with South Ossetia and stations 1,700 
troops in the entity (RFE/RL, 2009). The ICG report, citing several sources, 
estimates that there are 3,000–4,500 Russian troops in the entity and that the 
military presence is armed with tanks, artillery, missile launchers and air 
defence systems. Additionally, Russian bases are in locations that can be used 
to control Georgia proper and its own Caucasus provinces (ICG, 2010).  
In the political sphere, Russian influence is also very noticeable. Freedom 
House (2011) reported that ‘[President] Kokoity dismissed his cabinet and 
replaced most ministers with officials from Russia’ in 2008. The Russian 
businessman Vadim Brovtsev was appointed Prime Minister in 2009. In 2011 
the presidential elections were annulled by the Supreme Court when opposition 
candidate Alla Dzhioyeva appeared to win the poll ahead of Moscow-backed 
Anatoly Bibilov. This sparked protests and a re-run was organised in 2012. 
Showing some independence, the South Ossetian ‘parliament rejected the terms 
of a Russian-brokered compromise’ (Freedom in the World, 2012). The re-
elections were won by Leonid Tibilov, as no candidates from previous elections 
ran. The reported Russian favourite, Dmitry Medoyev, did not make the second 
round (Tsvetkova, 2012). The new president and his competitor in the elections, 
David Sanakoyev, distanced themselves from the previous administration’s 
claims that South Ossetia would join Russia (Tsvetkova, 2012). Although 
heavily dependent on its patron, South Ossetia shows some traits of independent 
government that might be lacking in full scale puppet states.  
 
 
1.3.3. Nagorno-Karabakh 
The tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh are not as old as in the Georgian breakaway 
regions. The area was incorporated into the Russian empire in the 19th century 
and established as an autonomous oblast with an ethnic Armenian majority in 
the Azerbaijan SSR in 1923. The time under Soviet rule was quiet and the 
frictions started only in the 1980s with the decay of the USSR.  
In 1988, ethnic Armenians started to campaign for the enclave to be united 
with the Armenian SSR. This was in the form of a resolution from the local 
legislature, but these claims were rejected by both the Azerbaijani and Soviet 
authorities. This rejection fuelled the ethnic tensions that had developed in the 
entire Caucasus region with the raise of nationalist tendencies. When the Soviet 
65 
Union collapsed and Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence, Nagorno-
Karabakh remained under the rule of the latter. In 1991 Azerbaijan revoked 
Karabakh’s autonomy. The frictions soon escalated into war in the 1990s, which 
saw NKR declare its independence in 1992. The war lasted until 1994 when a 
cease-fire agreement was reached with mediation from Russia and the OSCE’s 
Minsk Group. After the war, Nagorno-Karabakh started state-building through 
the creation of institutions and the organisation of elections. In 2006, a new 
constitution was adopted on a referendum.  
The territory controlled by the de facto state is much larger than the old 
autonomous oblast. The latter had a territory of around 4,400 km2, while today 
the area under NKR’s rule is around 7,000 km2. As the oblast was an enclave, 
most of the extra territory is gained from the lands between Armenia and 
Karabakh. What is more, some territory claimed by NKR is under Azerbaijani 
control. The population has stayed similar to that in Soviet times, but the ethnic 
composition has, as expected, changed drastically because of the war. Before 
the hostilities, Armenians made up around three quarters of the population, but 
the war made practically the entire Azerbaijani population flee. Therefore, the 
area is around 95% Armenian today. 
Nagorno-Karabakh has not been recognised by any UN member state, not 
even its patron kin-state Armenia. Its only recognition comes from fellow de 
facto states. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NKR (NKR-MFA, 
2012), the entity has seven representative offices abroad which are called 
‘Permanent Missions’. There are no foreign missions of other representations to 
the NKR, however. One might assume that the patron, Armenia, should have 
one, but in reality there is no need for it. 
The proximity and kin-ties with Armenia make its influence on the entity 
noteworthy. In economy, Armenia is NKR’s single largest trade partner, with a 
share of over 90 per cent. Most investment also comes from Armenia. 
Armenian aid to Nagorno-Karabakh’s budget is not as extensive as Russia’s to 
Abkhazia or Ossetia. Indeed, it is reported that other countries, such as the US 
(Hayrumyan, 2010), also support the entity to some extent. Moreover, the 
reported numbers are not that enormous, covering half of the budget deficit 
rather than the budget itself. Close economic ties are emphasised by the fact that 
the Armenian dram is the currency of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
In the military sphere, Armenia assisted Karabakh’s war against Azerbaijan 
with Armenian forces taking part in the hostilities alongside the NKR’s troops. 
In NKR’s armed forces, over half of the active troops come from Armenia 
(Blandy, 2008). Armenia is also reported to supply equipment and training to 
Karabakh forces. Hence, the military of the two are very closely tied. 
In the political sphere, the ties between the two states are best shown on an 
individual level. But unlike the three other post-Soviet de facto states, NKR’s 
case involves the political elite rather than the general population. Among a few 
examples is that the incumbent president and former Prime Minister of 
Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, is from Nagorno-Karabakh. So is his predecessor, 
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Robert Kocharyan, who actually served as the President of NKR before 
becoming Prime Minister and later President of Armenia. Because of the kin-
state relations between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, there is no need for 
Armenia-backed candidates in elections because all candidates are assumed to 
support close ties with Armenia. And because the elections are not free, the 
opposition has either disappeared or been brought into government (Freedom in 
the World, 2012). Nagorno-Karabakh is also one of the territories which had its 
Freedom House rating decreased from ‘partly free’, a status it had enjoyed since 
2002, to ‘not free’ in 2011. 
Overall, one can say that Nagorno-Karabakh is relatively free in its political 
decisions, though these decisions are supportive of Armenia for reasons other 
than political pressure. The kin-state status of NKR guarantees quite stable 
support from Armenia. However, on the personal level, one might say that NKR 
has control over Armenia, as its executive comes from the entity. 
 
 
1.3.4. Transnistria 
Transnistria has been part of Moldova since the incorporation of the latter into 
the Soviet Union following World War II. Before that, the area was part of the 
Moldavian Autonomous SSR within the Ukrainian SSR. After the annexation of 
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (mostly today’s Moldova) from Romania, 
Transnistrian areas were united with the newly formed Moldavian SSR.  
Transnistrian efforts for independence began when the Soviet Union still 
existed. As a reaction to Moldavian Romanisation efforts (for example, 
establishing Moldovan as the main state language and returning to the Latin 
alphabet) and during times of ethnic tension in the Soviet republic, Transnistria 
declared its independence from Moldova as a Soviet republic as early as 1990. 
However, the declaration created the Transnistrian SSR, not an independent 
republic. This was due to a Soviet-inclined elite which wanted to stay in the 
Union in case of Moldovan independence. This declaration was recognised 
neither by the Soviet and Moldavian authorities nor by other states, and legally 
Transnistria stayed within Moldova. 
With Moldovan independence and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Transnistria considered itself to be a Soviet republic and therefore entitled to 
similar treatment to 15 titular republics. This claim was again not recognised. In 
1991, the entity dropped ‘Soviet Socialist’ from its name and became the 
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR).  
In 1992, a short war between the secessionist entity and Moldova broke out. 
With the intervention of the Russian 14th Army, a ceasefire was established in 
July 1992. Roper (2004) estimates the causalities of the conflict to have been 
around 1,000. After that, several negotiations have taken place but, as Cham-
berline-Creanga and Allin put it (2010, p. 2), no permanent solution has been 
found despite mediation ‘by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
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Europe (OSCE), Russia, and Ukraine… later joined by the United States and 
the European Union (EU) as ‘observers’ (known as the 5+2 format)’.  
Today, Transnistria generally controls the left bank areas of the river 
Dniestr. Its territory is approximately 4,000 km2. Territorial control is not 
strictly divided by the river, however. There are areas and villages on the 
eastern (left) bank that are under Moldovan control and areas on the western 
bank under Transnistrian rule. The Moldovan villages on the left bank create 
small corridors in the elongated Transnistrian map.  
The population of the entity is just over half a million people and its ethnic 
composition is rather heterogeneous. Three ethnic groups – Moldovans/Roma-
nians, Russians and Ukrainians – each make up around 30 per cent of the 
population. This ethnic diversity does not generate major tensions within the 
nation. Transnistria has been involved in concerted state- and nation-building, 
with the main focus on regional identity. Soviet symbols are frequently used and 
are also present in the coat-of-arms and the flag of the entity. This has led to the 
question of whether the Transnistrian conflict is ethnic or political in character, 
with no clear conclusion on either side. Arguments supporting a political 
conflict are given by Kolstø and Malgin(1998) and Roper (2001), while 
Kaufman (1996) and Kaufman and Bowers (1998) argue for an ethnic conflict.  
The relative success of state-building also shows in the functioning govern-
ment that the entity possesses. Despite this, Transnistria is not very active in 
foreign relations. This is effectively seen in the representations or, to be precise, 
the lack of them in Transnistria. Of UN member states, only Russia has opened 
a consulate in Tiraspol (Kalikh, 2009). The situation is no better concerning 
PMR’s representations abroad. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(МИД Приднестровья, 2012) of the entity, only embassies in Abkhazia and 
South-Ossetia have been established. No UN member state has recognised PMR 
and its main foreign activity seems to focus on relations with fellow post-Soviet 
secessionists Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. 
As with most de facto states, there are issues about political control over the 
entity. In Transnistria’s case, the question is how much independence there is in 
political decision-making and to what extent there is Russian influence. There 
are several features that a show strong Russian hand in Transnistria. Kamilova 
and Berg (2012) have gone so far as to consider Transnistria a puppet state. 
Still, as we can see below, there is considerable Russian influence but also 
independent decision-making.  
In the military sphere, there are similarities with Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
in that Russian support was instrumental in gaining de facto independence in 
the early 1990s. Today, there are two kinds of Russian presence. First, there is a 
peacekeeping operation that has been active since 1992, a joint operation with 
Moldova and Ukraine (Peacekeeping operation in Transnistria, 2012). The 
second Russian presence is considered to be illegal. This has been reaffirmed by 
NATO, which has called on Russia to end this particular operation (NATO, 
2008). The estimated troop presence is around 1,300 soldiers (Rettman, 2011). 
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Additionally, the continued presence of the Russian 14th Army in Transnistria 
has contributed to more than just this particular conflict. It is one of the reasons 
that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-II) failed to be 
implemented. But in Transnistria, the Russian presence can be seen as a 
guarantee that the entity will not be liquidated by force.  
In the economic sphere, Russian influence is less visible than in Abkhazia or 
South Ossetia. Angela and Igor Munteanu (2007) analyse the debt of Trans-
nistria, which is the main channel through which Russia can exert its influence. 
They claim (p. 52) that ‘gas debts started to be accumulated while Russian 
giants used the debts to take over important industries in Transnistria’. Popescu 
(2006, p. 12) states that in 2004 the Transnistrian debt was around €1 billion, 
roughly the same as Moldova’s. Two-thirds of this debt was from Russian 
loans. Although Transnistria receives gas from Russia under the market price, it 
has still accumulated a relatively large energy debt. But unlike Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, Transnistria is not dependent on Russia to meet its state budget. 
Furthermore, Transnistria’s trade is more diverse, with both import and export 
markets in the CIS and the EU. Finally, the Transnistrian Central Bank issues its 
own currency, the PMR rouble. 
In the political sphere, Russia has a direct way of influencing the conflict by 
being one of the participants in the 5+2 negotiation format. In broader relations 
with Europe and the US, ‘Moscow-friendly, independent (or even de facto inde-
pendent) Transnistria provides Moscow with a forward operations base in South-
eastern Europe’ (Sanchez, 2009, p. 175). Chamberline-Creanga and Allin (2010) 
conclude that Russian influence in the de facto entity and the whole conflict 
resolution process is growing, especially in the wake of the 2008 war in Georgia. 
Therefore, Russia is thought to be interested in the internal politics of the 
entity. However, this has not always been a successful enterprise. In the 2011 
presidential elections, Russian-backed candidate Anatoly Kaminsky finished as 
runner-up to Yevgeny Shevchuk. As the entity is considered to be ‘not free’ by 
Freedom House and election results could be manipulated, this development 
shows that Russian influence does not go that deep. Also, the then incumbent 
president Igor Smirnov was openly urged ‘not to seek a fifth term, arguing that 
the territory needed new leadership’ by the Russian presidential chief of staff 
(Freedom in the World, 2012). That suggestion was ignored.  
On the level of the individual, the population has not been given Russian 
citizenship to the same extent as in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, but still ‘a 
significant minority of the region’s residents hold Russian passports’ (Freedom 
in the World, 2012).  
Overall, Russia undoubtedly has influence over Transnistria, but it seems 
that this influence has more to do with other actors in the region than having 
political control over the entity itself. In its foreign relations, Transnistria is 
dependent on Russian support and the latter is willing to give it, but when it 
comes to internal matters, there is enough independent decision-making to 
consider Transnistria a de facto state. 
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1.3.5. TRNC 
The issues concerning the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have been 
hotly debated for a long time. The Cyprus Question or The Cyprus Problem are 
common titles in the academic literature; examples include Ierodiakonou 
(1971), Uslu (2003), Moran (1998) and Ker-Lindsay (2011). There are also 
numerous edited volumes about the Cyprus issue, using the phrase ‘Cyprus 
conflict’ in the title; two examples include Diez (2002) and Diez and Tocci 
(2009). 
One reason for this is that the ethnic tensions in Cyprus are nearly as old as 
the state itself. Becoming independent from British rule in 1960, peaceful co-
existence lasted only for three years. The 1960 constitution established power-
sharing mechanisms where the Greek Cypriots secured 35 seats in the 
parliament and the post of president, while Turkish Cypriots secured 15 seats 
and the post of vice-president. Both the president and the vice-president had 
veto powers in matters of security and foreign policy. Power-sharing was also 
included in the manning of the civil service and the armed forces. This 
constitution is still in force today in the Republic of Cyprus. 
In 1963, the president of the republic, Archbishop Makarios, put forward 
amendments to the constitution that would have reduced Turkish Cypriots’ 
position within the constitutional framework. The amendments were rejected by 
the Turkish side, and soon the conflict turned violent. Turkish Cypriots retreated 
into enclaves where they stayed until 1974. The enclaves were situated all over 
the island, not only in its northern part. The capital Nicosia was divided into 
two and separated by what became known as the Green Line. The UN 
established a peacekeeping force in 1964 that is still active today. An overview 
of the UN’s actions in the conflict between 1954 and 1996 is given by 
Bolukbasi (1998). Additionally, Greek and Turkish military support for the 
respective Cypriots grew in the 1960s. Relative peace without inter-communal 
talks lasted from 1967 to 1974.This is also the period in which the Cyprus 
conflict (or Cyprus problem) entered academic literature. Among of the first 
treatments is Castleberry’s (1964), which gives an overview of factors that 
contributed to the Cyprus’ civil war of 1963 and generated analytical problems 
in the field of conflict resolution. More recently, the conflict resolution theme 
has been very prominent. 
In 1974, Cyprus saw a coup which led to Turkish intervention to overthrow 
the rebel government. Most Turkish Cypriots relocated to the northern part of 
the island, with Greeks staying in the south. In 1975, Turkish leaders pro-
claimed a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and in May 1983 the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed. The UN Security 
Council condemned the move and repeated its demand, first made in 1974, that 
all foreign troops be withdrawn from the Republic of Cyprus. Renewed UN 
peace-proposal efforts in 1984 and 1985 were unsuccessful.  
Because of several international attempts to unite the island, there has also 
been intense academic debate over the possibilities of unification that is absent 
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in most other cases. Bahcheli (2000) analyses several possible solutions – a 
federation, a confederation and two independent states. Overall, he is pessi-
mistic about any of them working. As Bahcheli notes, the possible solutions 
have been discussed since the conflict began and there is still no solution. 
Earlier, Wolfe (1988) advocated for a federal solution with international 
safeguards. In practice, negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
had begun in 1968. They continued inconclusively until 1974, the Turks 
demanding and the Greeks rejecting the proposal for a bi-zonal federation with 
a weak central government. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus announced 
that their purpose was not independence but federation. Talks resumed in 
Vienna in 1975 and 1976 under UN auspices, and in early 1977 respective 
leaders agreed on acceptable guidelines for a bi-zonal federation. However, the 
plans were not enforced. The most recent international mediation attempt was 
before the EU enlargement in 2004, when Turkish Cypriots voted to accept the 
UN-backed reunification plan, while the Greek Cypriot community overwhel-
mingly rejected the plan (Cyprus, 2012). 
Today the island of Cyprus is divided into a northern Turkish part and a 
southern Greek one. Northern Cyprus covers around 3,300 km2, which is around 
one third of the territory of the whole island. The two communities are divided 
by the United Nations Buffer Zone, commonly known as the Green Line. The 
population of TRNC is debatable, as is its composition. Starting with the latter, 
there is no certain figure for how many of the population are Turkish Cypriot 
and how many are from mainland Turkey. Some estimates say that the latter 
may be around half of the population. The estimates of the entire population are 
also diverse, but amount to around 250,000 to 300,000. The 2006 census 
records a population of around 265,000 of whom about 100,000 were born in 
Turkey (State Planning Organisation, 2006). 
The ethnic composition shows that most of Northern Cyprus’ residents are 
Turkish-speaking. The history of the conflict and ethnic composition have also 
entered the academic debate, with issues of identity seen as the main reasons for 
the conflict. Constantinou and Papadakis (2001) analyse the discourse of 
recognition and touch on issues of identity. Papadakis (2003) looks closer at 
identity when analysing commemorations organised by political parties on both 
sides of the conflict. These commemorations are very closely linked to histori-
cal narratives and identity. Lacher and Kaymak (2005) analyse the impact of the 
failure of the Annan Plan on the cultural and political identities in Northern 
Cyprus that were previously dominated by Turkish nationalism. Differences 
between communities are also seen through the legitimacy prism which is 
shaped by identity. Survey data is used by Berg and Toomla (2013), who 
analyse the legitimacy of claims on both sides of the border. They find identity 
to be an important variable in shaping people’s opinions about possible 
solutions that governments both in the North and the South might find most 
preferable.  
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TRNC clearly has the capacity to enter into international relations as the 
entity is involved in Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, having state observer 
status as the ‘Turkish Cypriot State’. Recognition has been limited to that of 
Turkey, with which, as one would expect, TRNC has close ties. We have 
already covered Turkish military assistance to the entity during the hostilities. 
Today, the Turkish military is still present and considered vital by the Turkish 
Cypriot administration to their security. Turkey keeps around 30,000 (BBC) or 
40,000 (Press and Information Office (PIO, 2007)) troops on the island.  
In terms of economy, Turkeys influence is again large. Over half of TRNC’s 
exports go to and about two thirds of its imports come from Turkey. In addition 
to trade, Turkey finances one-third of TRNC public sector costs, which have 
exceeded $400 million annually in recent years (CIA, 2012). Furthermore, the 
Turkish lira is the official currency in the de facto state. 
The political influence of Turkey can be considered marginal for two 
reasons. First, Northern Cyprus is considered free by Freedom House. This on 
its own does not mean that there are no influences at all, but it does show that 
the society is open to debate, including that on relations with Turkey. It is more 
difficult to force a democratic government to adopt specific policies than a non-
democratic one. Secondly, as with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey 
and TRNC can be seen as kin-states. This means that their aims are similar on a 
voluntarily basis; there is no need for commands or threats from the stronger 
government. So, we can say that the TRNC’s government is free in its 
decisions, but for several reasons they do not contradict Turkey’s expectations.  
 
 
1.3.6. Somaliland 
The history of Somaliland can be traced back to the colonial era when European 
empires divided the Horn of Africa among themselves. Of an area known as 
Somaliland, France received today’s Djibouti, Britain today’s de facto state and 
Italy the rest, Somalia. During the decolonization of Africa, British Somaliland 
became independent on June 26, 1960. According to Kaplan (2008), there were 
thirty-five states that recognised Somaliland in its (quite literally) days of 
independence. Six days later, on July 1, the Trust Territory of Somalia, the 
former Italian Somaliland, followed suit. On the same day, the two territories 
joined and formed the Somali Republic. The brief independence of the State of 
Somaliland is today the basis for Somaliland’s quest for recognition. 
The situation in the united Somalia cannot be described as problem-free. In 
1969 General Siad Barre came to power and established a military dictatorship 
that adopted ‘scientific socialism’ as its ideology. This approach outlawed clan 
loyalties and used political repression to achieve its political ambitions. 
Barre’s regime also had foreign policy ambitions that eventually contributed 
to the beginning of the civil war in Somalia. The Somali National Movement 
(SNM), an opposition movement mostly from the Isaaq clan in Somaliland, had 
bases in Ethiopia from where it launched guerrilla attacks on Somalia. Barre’s 
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need to better his relations with Ethiopia led to an agreement that both states 
would not support guerrilla operations against the other from their respective 
territories. Somalia’s opposition movements took their operations to Somalia 
and this gave rise to civil war in the 1980s. 
The result of the war was the overthrow of Barre’s government in 1991 and 
the concentration of power in the clans. The situation has been similar since 
then and different unification attempts have not been successful. SNM managed 
to secure the northern regions of the country, mainly the area of former British 
Somaliland and that of the Isaaq clan. In May 1991, it declared Somaliland’s 
independence by announcing the invalidity of the 1960 union agreement.  
Somaliland is a case where secessionism can be debated. The reason is its 
brief status as an independent nation in 1960. It can be and has been argued that 
Somaliland is not seceding from Somalia, but just restoring its independence. In 
history, similar cases include the Baltic States during the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Even though the process was seen as the regaining of independence lost 
after World War II, in the literature about secession, the Baltic States are 
considered as cases. For example, Buchanan (1991) considers Lithuania to be 
an example of secession. Therefore, previous independence is not an obstacle to 
considering an entity as secessionist.  
Another question regarding Somaliland and secessionism is ‘from whom?’ 
The central government of Somalia is arguably non-existent; its control over the 
claimed territory is debatable at best. Still, Somalia is internationally recognised 
within the boundaries from which Somaliland wants to gain independence; 
therefore, it can be considered secessionist. 
Somaliland has since 1991 established state institutions that combine 
democratic elements like a Western parliament with local, traditional power 
structures based on clans. The Upper House of Somaliland’s parliament consists 
of clan elders, who also appointed the first president. In 2003, for the first time, 
the president was elected and several elections have been concluded since. 
However, there have been setbacks mainly due to the postponement of 
elections. The presidential elections of 2008 were held in 2010 and the 
parliamentary elections of 2010, yet to be held, are planned for 2013. 
Despite these setbacks, Somaliland is considered ‘partly free’ by Freedom 
House and its democratic credentials have been noted in academia. Several 
authors have written about Somaliland’s democracy and stressed the differences 
between the entity and its parent state, Somalia; see Farah and Lewis (1997), 
Bradbury et al(2003), Hansen and Bradbury (2007), Kaplan (2008), Walls 
(2009). Some authors claim of these achievements that they promote inter-
national recognition for Somaliland; an example is Poore (2009). 
Today, this democracy-building is taking place on a territory of around 
137,000 km2. This covers the area of former British Somaliland. However, the 
borders of the entity are disputed. The Somali region of Puntland, which 
declared its autonomy in the late 1980s, claims the eastern regions of Sool, 
Sanaag, and Cayn which are currently under Somaliland’s control. There have 
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been armed clashes over these territories that have led to causalities on both 
sides. The relations between Somaliland and its eastern neighbour remain tense. 
The population of the entity is estimated at around 3.5 million people. 
Somaliland’s population can be approached in two ways and both show high 
levels of homogeneity. First, the overwhelming majority can be considered 
Somalis and therefore share linguistic and cultural traits with the people of the 
rest of Somalia, Djibouti and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Secondly, there are 
clan differences within the Somali people. Somaliland is populated mostly with 
people from the Isaaq clan and its sub-clans.  
Despite its democratic efforts and its relative stability compared to the parent 
state of Somalia, Somaliland is not recognised by any UN member state. Unlike 
some other de facto states, it is not recognised by its peers either. There is a 
capability for international relations, which is manifested in two representative 
offices in Somaliland, one from the neighbouring Ethiopia (Qarannews, 2009) 
and the other from Denmark (MoFAoD, 2012). Somaliland itself has 11 
representative offices (Government of Somaliland, 2012). 
The question of governmental control over the claimed territory is affected 
only by border disputes with Puntland. This is mostly the result of two factors. 
First, Somaliland has indeed achieved some extent of stability and created state 
institutions that can keep control over the state. Additionally, these institutions 
show some democratic character. The second factor is the absence of a patron. 
In concert with the condition of Somalia, this means that there is no power 
which wants to intervene in Somaliland’s internal affairs. Of course, this also 
robs it of potential aid and investment, but it does allow Somaliland to build a 
state on a concrete territory without external influences.  
 
 
1.3.7. Kosovo 
The history of Kosovo that is relevant to the creation of the de facto state dates 
back to the 1980s, with the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe in 
general and Yugoslavia in particular. This does not mean that were no earlier 
tensions between Kosovars and Serbs, the titular nation of the parent state. 
During World War II, Kosovo was made part of Albania, a status they wanted 
to maintain after the war. Yugoslavia’s communist government crushed these 
aspirations and suppressed Albanian nationalism. From the mid-1960s relations 
improved and the 1974 constitution gave Kosovo the status of an autonomous 
province within Serbia with extensive autonomy.  
The economic situation in the 1970s made the situation tenser because of the 
differences between federal republics. These tensions took the form of protests 
in the early 1980s and escalated later in the decade. When Slobodan Milosevic 
became president of Serbia in 1989, he revoked Kosovo’s autonomy and placed 
control of matters pertaining to the province in Belgrade. Subsequent protests 
led to military intervention and the dissolution of the province’s parliament in 
1990. 
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During the 1990s, most Kosovars reverted to nonviolent resistance to Serbia. 
Before, in 1991 Kosovo’s self-declared parliament had declared the country 
independent. They managed to build quasi-governmental institutions under the 
pacifist leader Ibrahim Rugova. The non-pacifist side of the Albanian resistance 
formed Kosovo’s Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996 and started attacking Serbs 
the following year. By 1998 fighting had become intense and international 
mediation was needed for a cease-fire in November. This agreement did not last 
long, however, and fighting continued at the end of the year. Negotiations in 
1999 bore no results and NATO entered the war by starting to bomb Serbian 
targets. The campaign ended in NATO and the UN taking control over the 
security and civil administration of the province, which remained part of Serbia. 
Peacekeeping troops were also sent to the area. 
During the international administration Kosovo held two parliamentary 
elections (2001 and 2004) and generally engaged in the creation of state 
institutions, which were considered provisional and for self-government rather 
than independence. In 2008, the parliament or Assembly of Kosovo declared the 
entity independent. This declaration received different responses from other 
states. Some of them, around 50 by the end of the year, recognised the newly 
independent country. Some, including the parent-state Serbia and the UN 
Security Council members Russia and China, did not.  
Kosovo’s legal status was reviewed by the international court of justice 
when Serbia requested such a review. In 2010 the Court gave an opinion that 
the declaration of independence did not violate international law. However, the 
question that has attracted more interest among (legal) scholars is the NATO 
bombardment of 1999. The Report by the Independent International Commis-
sion on Kosovo (2000) claimed the NATO intervention to be illegal but 
legitimate, as it was not performed in accordance with positive international law 
but helped the people of Kosovo and reduced their (potential) sufferings. The 
same issue is covered by O’Connell (2000), who claims that NATO still needs 
UN authorisation to execute similar operations. Koskenniemi (2002) concludes 
that most international lawyers agreed on the ‘goodness’ of the Kosovo 
intervention as a result of a turn to ethics in the profession. The problem of 
morality in international law is also analysed by Buchanan (2001), who tries to 
initiate a debate about morally improving the system of international law to 
justify illegal but morally acceptable acts like the Kosovo intervention. 
Kosovo’s independence was therefore a product of international action rather 
than indigenous effort. This is not to underestimate the local achievement, but 
the foreign contribution was relatively larger than in other cases of secession. 
Kosovo’s territory is around 11,000 km2. The main issue apart from Serbia 
claiming it to be its territory is the border area with a mainly Serbian popu-
lation. Ethnic Serbian municipalities along the northern border challenge the 
boundary between the entity and Serbia. Non-Albanians make up around eight 
per cent of the whole population, with Serbians typically living in compact 
areas near the northern border. Ethnic tensions are still a reality and NATO-led 
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peacekeepers have to separate ethnic Serbs from ethnic Albanians within 
Kosovo. 
The main issue with Kosovo’s de facto status according to our definition is 
control over territory. But unlike other cases with a similar problem, such as 
South Ossetia, the question regarding Kosovo is one of international control. It 
was international intervention that created the entity within its current borders 
and international support helped to build the institutions necessary for running a 
state.  
In the economic sphere, Kosovo has established a market economy but still 
relies on international aid. According to the CIA World Factbook, international 
aid comprises around 10 per cent of the entity’s GDP. Another 18 percent 
comes from diaspora remittances. That said, Kosovo has several trading 
partners and does not rely on a patron. However, it does not have its own 
currency and uses the Euro, a practice that started in 2002 and continued after 
the declaration of independence. 
In the military sphere, Kosovo’s dependence on NATO is generally huge. 
The NATO bombing campaign created the possibility of independence. As 
mentioned above, there is still a NATO-led peacekeeping force in the country. 
On the political side, international involvement until recently has been an 
obstacle to considering Kosovo fully independent. By Freedom House 
standards, Kosovo is ‘partly free’ and not an electoral democracy, mainly 
because of the International Civilian Representative (ICR), which has powers to 
overrule some of the government’s decisions. There are three aspects to this 
issue. First, the mandate of the ICR expired in September 2012 and the office of 
the ICR, the International Civilian Office, closed by the end of that year. 
Therefore, there are now no powers to overrule Kosovo’s government. But our 
thesis deals with data from a time when the Representative was still working. 
The second and third aspects are related to the status and work of the ICR. 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was a reaction to the failure 
to reach compromise regarding the Ahtisaari plan, which was supposed to set 
the path for the future status of Kosovo in 2008. Still, the declaration of 
independence reaffirmed that Kosovo will stand by the requirements of the 
plan. As the creation of ICR is part of the Ahtisaari plan, the acceptance of the 
ICR’s authority can be considered a voluntary act from the Kosovo side, not as 
something forced onto Kosovo by outside powers. As for the actual mandate of 
the ICR, its powers were limited to the Ahtisaari plan with an emphasis on 
minority rights. The Representative was not to interfere, for example, in the 
budgetary matters of Kosovo. Therefore, we can consider Kosovo sufficiently 
independent to fit into our working definition. 
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1.3.8. Taiwan 
The history of Taiwan is different to that of other de facto states. After being 
under Japanese rule, the island became a stronghold for Chinese nationalists in 
their fight against the People’s Liberation Army of the communists. With the 
eventual victory of the latter on mainland China, Taiwan remained under 
nationalist control. The Korean War provided much needed assistance from the 
US and culminated in the 1954 mutual defence treaty. The Taiwanese govern-
ment was considered the legal representative of China and under the name 
Republic of China it had a seat at the United Nations. Morover, Taiwan was a 
permanent member of the Security Council. 
This political arrangement lasted until the 1970s. At the beginning of the 
decade, relations between the US and the People’s Republic improved. Several 
restrictions were eased and American opposition to PRC’s representation in the 
United Nations began to change. In 1971 American opposition did not prevent 
the replacement of Taiwan with Communist China in the UN. Relations were at 
a level where the US president Nixon visited China in 1972. Its ousting from the 
UN also led to many states swapping recognition from Taiwan to China in the 
1970s. This culminated with the United States establishing diplomatic relations 
with the People’s Republic. It also meant that the US cancelled formal defence 
agreements with the island and swapped its recognition. However, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act which preserved economic and 
cultural ties and gave Taiwanese officials equal status to that of recognised 
diplomats.  
Therefore, the Taiwanese case is a more complex one. In the aftermath of the 
withdrawal of recognition Taiwan definitely did not see itself as a secessionist 
entity. It had not declared independence and did not see how it could do so, 
because the only state it could secede from would be China. But Taiwan 
considered itself to be China. After the end of martial law in 1987, the 
Taiwanese independence movement emerged.  
As there is no formal declaration of independence, Taiwan cannot be 
considered fully in the set of secessionist entities, to use the methodological 
language of this dissertation. We can, however, point to the fact that it is more 
secessionist than it used to be. There are secessionist tendencies in the country 
and independence has been a subject of heated debate. There are positions that 
emphasise democracy and the attributes of statehood and call for the recognition 
of an independent Taiwan (Otopalik, 2006). There are also views opposed to 
independence (Yazhou, 2007), mostly from mainland China.  
The issue is a divisive one, with proponents and opponents among both 
politicians and the general public. Surveys show that the idea of Taiwanese 
independence is popular and, according to some, it has received support from 
over 50% of respondents (Wang, 2012). This can be interpreted as Taiwan at 
least thinking about independence from China, about creating a separate state. 
How secessionist this makes Taiwan is, of course, quite debateable. Here we 
consider today’s Taiwan to be non-secessionist. 
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Taiwan’s relations with China are complicated, but there have been calls for 
unification. In early 1980, Taiwan rejected calls for negotiations. However, 
economic relations have blossomed, especially since the 1990s. This has led to 
questions about whether a union similar to Hong Kong’s could be a possibility 
and what the reasons are for the two states not uniting. Chao (2003) combines 
economics, identity and politics and argues that while economic relations bet-
ween the two different entities have developed since Taiwan split from the 
mainland, mostly identity differences are the reasons for political differences. 
However, Kennedy (2007) argues that the reason for different politics is not so 
much identity as the United States. Chinese perceptions of US policies as 
hostile, or at least opposed to closer cross-strait ties, could lead to coercive 
action rather than negotiations. Saunders and Kastner (2009) in turn are 
optimistic about the possibility of an agreement between the two Chinas, 
although they have their reservations. The reasons for their optimism come 
from the domestic politics of Taiwan after the change in administration in 2008. 
Internally, Taiwan’s development can be divided into two separate eras. The 
first lasted until the mid-1980s and could be described as an authoritarian 
regime. The entity had two presidents, Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang 
Ching-kuo. The country was ruled by the Nationalist Party Kuomintang without 
opposition. Most of the high officials were from mainland China with little 
participation from local Taiwanese people. Until 1975 Freedom House 
considered Taiwan to be ‘not free’. After that Taiwan became ‘partly free’, a 
status held until 1995. The reason for upgrading was reforms that mostly started 
in the 1980s. 
In 1986 an opposition party was formed and a year later martial law was 
lifted. Local Taiwanese politicians also started achieving higher positions. Lee 
Teng-hui was the first local to be elected president in 1988. In 1989 the first 
multiparty elections took place. Since 1996 Taiwan has been considered ‘free’. 
Taiwan controls the main island and some small islands off the coast of 
mainland China and in the South China Sea with the Republic of China 
claiming a much larger territory including mainland China and even Mongolia. 
Apart from the Chinese claims to Taiwanese territories, there is a major 
territorial dispute concerning the Spartly Islands in the South China Sea. 
Taiwan, the People’s Republic, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines occupy 
some of the islands, with Brunei also claiming some.  
The population of Taiwan is above 23 million people, making it by far the 
most populous of the de facto states. This has also been a rise of over five 
million since 1980. Most of the population are Chinese and around 2 per cent 
are indigenous Malayo-Polynesian aborigines. The Chinese population is itself 
divided into two categories. The first are the early settlers from the mainland 
and the second those who arrived with the Nationalist Chinese government after 
the Communist revolution. The latter are usually referred to as being from the 
mainland and they constitute around 15 per cent of the whole population. 
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Since the events of the 1970s, Taiwan has been replaced by the People’s 
Republic in most international organisations and the majority of states have 
swapped recognition to the mainland. Copper (1981, p. 56) claims that after 
PRC’s acceptance to the UN, by 1980 Taiwan ‘had already experienced the 
flight of embassies over the past nine years’ and ‘maintained formal relations 
with just over twenty countries’. Today Taiwan has 23 recognitions from 
around the world and over 70 representation offices on its territory. 
Additionally, not all international organisations threw Taiwan overboard. In 
1977 Taiwan was a member of 10 inter-governmental organisations, a figure 
that was relatively stable until the end of the 20th century (Goldstein, 2008). 
Therefore, de-recognition did not strip Taiwan of its capacity to enter into 
international relations. 
The question of control does not arise in Taiwan’s case, although American 
support to Taiwan is large. Even though the economic ties between Taiwan and 
America are ‘normal’ in the sense that they are similar to those which Taiwan 
has with other countries, American political and military support are visible. On 
the political side, the United States has endorsed the special relationship in the 
Taiwan Relations Act that was passed after the USA changed its recognition 
from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China in 1979. The Act states that its 
purpose is ‘to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific 
and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the 
continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of 
the United States and the people on Taiwan’ (Taiwan Relations Act, 1979). The 
Act also states that ‘whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to 
foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms 
shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan,’ which 
gives Taiwan equal standing with other nations. 
To achieve these goals, the US created the American Institute in Taiwan, 
which is a non-profit organisation carrying out functions usually associated with 
diplomatic representations. The respective organisation representing Taiwan in 
the USA, as in any other country that has official diplomatic relations with PRC 
but maintains a Taiwanese representation, is the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office. But as one can observe, these relations are between 
equals and do not show American intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs. 
On the military front, the Act has several provisions. In Section Two of the 
act the United States aims ‘to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive 
character’ and ‘to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort 
to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the 
social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’. Section Three of the Act 
adds that ‘the United States will make available to Taiwan such defence articles 
and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defence capability’. 
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1.3.9. Palestine 
Although Palestine has been a troublesome area for the past few millennia, the 
roots of the contemporary Palestinian ‘problem’ surfaced after World War II 
when the British mandate over the territories of today’s Israel and Palestinian 
areas ended. Nevertheless, it attracted earlier academic interest; for example, 
Wright (1926) deals with different interests in the League of Nations mandate. 
The UN proposed a two-state solution in 1948 which was accepted by Israel 
but refused by Arab states. A war followed which ended in Israeli victory in the 
sense that the Jewish state survived but today’s West Bank ended up under 
Jordanian control and the Gaza Strip under Egyptian control. The war of 1948 
also created the first wave of Palestinian refugees, a problem that still exists 
today. Later wars gave control of Palestinian areas to Israel, which started a 
controversial settlement policy in 1967, and led to peace treaties with Egypt and 
Jordan at later dates. The question of the Palestinian State was unresolved, 
however. 
In 1987 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip started massive 
demonstrations which became known as the first intifada. In addition to demon-
strations, other methods, like civil disobedience and attacks on both Israeli 
military and civilians, were used in both the occupied territories and Israel 
proper. This led to the proclamation of the State of Palestine on November 15, 
1988 by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The PLO was formed in 
1964 as an umbrella organisation bringing together Palestinians who had 
previously been spread among several resistance organisations. The PLO also 
had a legislative assembly, the Palestine National Council (PNC). 
The next year, on April 2, 1989, the PNC elected Yasser Arafat as president 
of the state which, in fact, was more like a government in exile. It had no 
control over the areas it laid claims to. Still, Arafat was accepted as the 
representative of the Palestinians and in 1993 Israel and the PLO signed an 
agreement on a possible peace settlement, the Declaration of Principles on 
Palestinian Self-Rule. These became known as the Oslo Accords because of 
Norwegian intermediation. 
The Oslo Accords were actually a series of agreements; the second was 
signed in Cairo a year later. According to both treaties, a Palestinian Authority 
(PA) was formed which would gradually take control over the West Bank and 
Gaza. The latter was to be the first area handed over and within five years the 
rest would follow. During these five years an agreement on the final status was 
to be reached. Also, mutual recognition was exchanged, albeit far from 
recognising each other as a state. Israel took the PLO as the sole representative 
of the Palestinian people, while the PLO recognised the Israeli right to exist. 
The plan did not work, however. Negotiations through the 1990s did not result 
in an end product and collapsed in 2000. That year also saw the beginning of 
the second intifada, called the Al-Aqsa intifada, which lasted until around 2005.  
The Oslo Accords foresaw Palestinian elections which have been held with 
regularity. Ironically, the terrorist group Hamas has done remarkably well in 
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these elections, winning the 2006 legislative elections. The irony is in the fact 
that Hamas opposes the Oslo accords and does not recognise the Israeli right to 
exist. Today the group has control over the Gaza Strip, while the Palestinian 
Authority controls the West Bank in accordance with the administrative 
divisions of the Oslo accords.  
These divisions are one reason for considering Palestine a borderline case of 
de facto state. There is a territory that it controls (around 40 per cent of the 
5,600 km2 of the West Bank and 360 km2 of the Gaza Strip) with a population 
of around 4.1 million people. The Palestinian state is recognised by 122 states, 
just short of our threshold of 127, and it has an obvious capacity for 
international relations. The issue is with control, especially in the West Bank. 
Hamas has full control over the Gaza Strip. 
According to the Oslo Accords, the West Bank is divided into three 
administrative divisions from which the Palestinian Authority has full control 
over just one, covering less than 20 per cent of the territory. The second 
division, again covering around 20 per cent of the area, exhibits Israeli control 
over security issues and Palestinian civil control. The third division is under 
Israeli control and covers around 60 per cent of the West Bank. This kind of 
arrangement has two implications. First, it shows that Palestine does not control 
the territory it claims. This is a lesser problem, because it is not uniquely 
Palestinian. The second aspect is of more importance because it involves a 
treaty. Palestine has formally and presumably on a voluntary basis given control 
over their claimed area to a foreign government. Although an interim solution, 
this was still in force in 2010 with no permanent solution reached.  
The second reason for considering Palestine a borderline case of de facto 
state is the division between the West Bank and Gaza. The relations between 
governments of the two areas are tense. After clashes between rival supporters, 
the Palestinian Authority President Abbas dismissed the Hamas-led government 
that resulted from the 2006 elections in 2007. This has led to bifurcated 
government in the Palestinian areas. One might wonder whether it is proper to 
consider the Gaza Strip a de facto state because of the international recognition 
of the PA.  
Here we still consider them as one entity because no intention has been 
shown by either side to give up the other’s territories. We also consider Pales-
tine to be a borderline de facto state because it does execute some control over 
some territory with a permanent population and is not fully recognised. The 
power-dividing agreement with Israel makes it a borderline case. 
Opinion is also divided among academics. For example, Pegg(1998) and 
Caspersen (2012) do not include Palestine but Geldenhuys (2009) and some 
authors in Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) do. Earlier academics questioned 
whether the State of Palestine exists at all; see, for example, Segal (1989). He 
answers in the negative for the main reason that the claimed state does not 
function as a government but is more concerned with the struggle against Israel, 
the intifada which it has failed to institutionalise. Apart from its (de facto) 
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statehood, Palestine has received a lot of academic attention due to the 
conflict’s long history and the problem’s prominence on the international 
agenda.  
To take into account other aspects of external influence, in the economic 
sphere the Palestinian Authority is very dependent on foreign aid but this comes 
from different sources. Therefore, there is no particular influence one can talk 
about. Also, in the military sphere, the Palestinian National Security forces use 
the same aid given to the PA in general. Unlike other de facto states, Palestine 
uses the currency of the parent state, the Israeli shekel.  
With the conditions for de facto status explained, the next obstacle is to 
determine whether Palestine is a secessionist entity, which has its own compli-
cations. On the one hand, the initial solution foresaw a Palestinian state when 
the British mandate ended. That plan was ruined by Arabian reluctance to 
recognise Israel. On the other hand, the current Palestinian territories controlled 
by the Palestinian Authority were under Israeli control before power was 
transferred to the Palestinians. So, there are some similarities with the Western 
Sahara case, which is considered to be one of decolonisation, but also with 
secessionist cases as the area was controlled by another power. The Declaration 
of The State of Palestine in 1988 would indicate secessionism, but then again it 
is a declaration about the territories that should have been Palestine’s in the first 
place. The declaration refers to the initial partition plan of the British Mandate 
Territories. 
The crucial factor in determining secession lies, indeed, in the reference to 
the 1948 plan. The West Bank and Gaza sector areas are trying to free them-
selves from Israeli occupation rather than secede from the latter. Therefore, we 
do not consider Palestine as a secessionist entity. 
 
 
1.3.10. Western Sahara 
Western Sahara was a Spanish colony from the 19th century, although formal 
unification of the territory as Spanish Sahara took place as late as 1958. The 
previous year Morocco had claimed the territory, an act that still has an impact 
today. In 1960 Mauritania also claimed the territory, but abandoned the claim in 
1979 after peace with Polisario. Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro) is an anti-colonial movement composed 
largely of Saharawis that began a guerrilla insurgency against Spain in the 
1970s. Today, Polisario claims to be the government-in-exile of Western 
Sahara, with residency in Tindouf, Algeria. 
In 1975 Spain declared that it would withdraw from the area and divided it 
between Morocco and Mauritania. Polisario fought both until 1979 but, as 
Mauritania withdrew, Morocco annexed the rest of Western Sahara. Morocco 
and Polisario continued fighting until 1991 when a UN brokered cease-fire took 
effect. The agreement foresaw a referendum on the status of Western Sahara but 
the vote has been postponed several times and has not taken place as yet. The 
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main problem is voter eligibility, with Morocco moving settlers to the area and 
Polisario claiming that only indigenous Saharawi people should participate. One 
obstacle to the latter is that a significant number of them live in refugee camps 
near Tindouf.  
The possibility for de facto state status results from the fact that Polisario 
controls around one fifth of the Western Saharan territories, the proclaimed 
independent Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). However, there are 
several problems with fitting the entity into our working definition, although the 
territory exists. Along with control issues, which we will address shortly, there 
is a problem with population. This is estimated to be around 30,000 nomads 
(NRC, 2008), which raises the question of a permanent population. Here we 
consider this population to be permanent in the sense that it practices its nomad 
lifestyle in a particular area. This is because movement is restricted by both 
Morocco and Polisario, so it is hard for the population to leave the country. 
The second aspect is the usual question of control. First, Polisario is not a 
resident government but one in exile in Algeria; therefore, it is harder for them 
to carry on normal state functions. Secondly, the nomadic population makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to create state institutions that could exercise the 
control. However, there are some functions that can be considered control 
functions, such as the aforementioned restriction of movement. Thirdly, as 
regards the economic and military spheres, Polisario is very much dependent on 
external aid that is mostly provided by Algeria, which also backs Polisario 
politically (BBC, Western Sahara profile, 2011). Without functioning state 
institutions, revenue collection is difficult to undertake.  
Overall, the issues with population and especially political control make 
SADR a borderline case. On the one hand, there is a territory with a population 
and a government but, on the other, the government’s control over the territory 
is debateable. As with Palestine, some authors include Western Sahara among 
their samples, for example Geldenhuys(2009), although most do not. Therefore, 
the status of a borderline case seems appropriate. 
Finally, there is a question of secession. To determine whether Western 
Sahara is a secessionist entity or not is arguably most problematic in 
comparison with other cases analysed here. On the one hand, most of the 
territory is controlled by Morocco and the proposed referendum indicates that 
SADR is a secessionist entity. On the other hand, the territory currently 
controlled by Polisario has never been under Moroccan rule; therefore, one 
cannot speak about secession, at least from Morocco. The UN (2011) considers 
Western Sahara to be non-self-governing territory and a question of decoloni-
sation. Therefore, we consider SADR to be a non-secessionist entity. 
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1.4. Filling the System with Conditions 
In this section we will take a closer look at the conditions we defined as 
elements of the international system. As there is no coherent theory of how de 
facto states are or should be treated in the international system, in the following 
section we will provide a systematic justification of why these conditions 
matter. Some aspects of the data will also be discussed. We start with the 
outcome followed by conditions.  
 
 
1.4.1. Representations, involvement in international 
organisations and formal recognition 
The outcome condition in this thesis is related to the political process of the 
Buzan and Little model. Before we go to the measurements of these conditions, 
we look why the engagement might matter do de facto states and to what extent 
they might be engaged. 
We will start with the importance of international engagement to de facto 
states themselves. As one would assume, acceptance by confirmed states is very 
important to these entities. The reasons for this importance can be found in 
political as well in economical spheres. In economic arena acceptance is more 
related to international finance than commodity markets. As our theoretical 
framework establishes, economic systems and interaction usually develop 
before political. Therefore the political acceptance can influence the economic 
aspects that are more related to government. Access to government loans or 
official development aid might be the major incentives. Private sector enter-
prises including exports and foreign investment are easier to obtain than 
government related economic activity even in under the conditions of non-
recognition.  
On the political side possible benefits that come with recognition are even 
larger. Most often are they associated with security. And the reasons for this are 
rather obvious. De facto states exist on territories that, although under their 
control, are claimed by some confirmed state. International acceptance would 
make the position of the de facto in that particular argument much stronger. 
Without formal recognition it would fall short of victory for the entities’ 
position but it would have significant practical implications. Widespread 
acceptance f the de facto state would add an international dimension to 
argument that is considered to be an internal affair. And that dimension would 
be different from mediation. Besides disputes over borders, acceptance could 
create allies. The more an entity is involved in international affairs the more it 
could attract supporters. Therefore it could reduce the military threat to de facto 
states that come from former parent state and could also decrease the reliance 
on the patron. 
Still, de facto states are to some extent already engaged in the world politics, 
or ‘embedded in the network of international politics’ as Isachenko (2012, 
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p. 157) puts it. One facet of being embedded is that at the moment different de 
facto states enjoy different levels of acceptance from confirmed states (Cas-
persen, 2008), (Pegg, 1998). Some, like Taiwan are rather well accepted and 
enjoy even some formal recognition. Some are very much ignored, like 
Somaliland. Some, like the de facto states of former Yugoslavia are opposed 
very strongly and positions of parent states are restored with international help. 
Also, Yugoslavia gives us an example where international intervention helped 
to create a de facto state in Kosovo. Finally, in some cases like Tamil Eelam, 
the external actors let the parent state to deal with the entity without 
intervention. Altogether, there are differences in acceptance between de facto 
states. These differences have been studied (see for example Berg and Toomla 
(2009)) but this thesis takes a more complex approach. We try to find out what 
conditions cause this differentiation in engagement. 
For this we have taken three outcome conditions that will be analysed – 
number of foreign representations in the de facto state, number of formal 
recognitions by confirmed states, and involvement in international organi-
sations. These conditions are chosen because of how states can interact with 
each other. Logically, there are three types of actions in international relations – 
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral. 
To recognise a state, another state can act unilaterally. A declaration of 
recognition, for example, can be made without any relations to the recognised 
state. Therefore, formal recognition is included as a unilateral action. There can 
be other actions of course like declarations or speeches but these do not have a 
lasting effect in a sense that they are easier to take back. A speech does not 
leave a similar footprint to a formal recognition.  
Empirically, most of the de facto states enjoy some recognition, at least that 
of the patron state. However, there is no particular theoretical approach to 
exactly why states recognise each other. International law, a field that has 
studies recognition the longest, is not interested why it happens; the focus is 
more on the implications of the recognition. Similarly, research on de facto 
states has not given answers as to why the entities are recognised. Mostly the 
issue has arisen when defining the de facto state. This is visible from Chapter 
1.2.4 of this thesis. A slightly different view is given by Pegg (1998, p. 38) who 
introduces a possible hierarchy of different recognitions on the road to full 
recognition but, like many others, it is more useful in defining the de facto state 
than finding causes for recognition. 
The second outcome condition corresponds to the bilateral relations and is 
measured by the number of foreign representations in the de facto state. 
Establishing a representation involves two actors: one state has to establish a 
representation and the other has to host it. Bilateral relations between two 
nations are arguably the most important type of relations in the academic study 
of International Relations. The major theories emphasise the nation-state as the 
main actor and relations between these actors constitute the discipline. 
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Theoretical legacy is, however, not the main reason why this type of relations 
forms the core of this thesis.  
As opening and running a representation involves costs it can be argued that 
the decision to open one could be more calculated than a unilateral step, 
definitely more than a speech. Formal recognition should not be done hastily, 
however, because it is very difficult to reverse. This possibility exists with 
representations. It is easy for a state to abolish a mission in a de facto state if 
circumstances demand. These two aspects of representations – the relative 
gravity of a decision to establish one; and the possibility to back away if 
necessary – make it a good measure of engagement. Also, it is easier done than 
accepting a de facto state into an international organisation which needs consent 
of several actors.  
One question that arises is what are foreign representations in a de facto 
state? We do not differentiate between ranks of diplomatic missions. As those in 
de facto states are rarely embassies, we treat them equally no matter how they 
are labelled – as mission, representative office, or representation. The data is 
mostly provided by de facto states themselves, via the website of their Foreign 
Office, for example, but occasionally sources from the media have been used. 
The final outcome condition, representing multilateral relations, is 
involvement in international organisations. Membership in any international 
organisation in general and the United Nations in particular, is a concrete proof 
of statehood. As cited earlier in the dissertation, Geldenhuys considers UN 
membership to be the formal birth certificate of a state. Among de facto states, 
UN membership is the most relevant issue in the cases of Taiwan and Palestine. 
Taiwan is a founding member of the organisation which was ousted from it. 
Naturally, there have been discussions on the island about rejoining, or at least 
about the possibilities of rejoining, the organisation. This is also reflected in 
scholarly debate. Palestine’s bid for full UN membership in 2011 was well-
covered by the world’s media. The bid has stalled, however, with opposition 
mainly from the United States. Ironically, the Palestinian state was initially 
created by the UN.  
Membership in an international organisation can definitely be considered an 
acceptance into the international system. Main reason for this is the multi-
lateralism; it needs several actors to accept the de facto state. While bilateral 
relations are important and most proliferate, one could argue that international 
organisation membership is better security guarantee for de facto states. This is 
exemplified in the case of Taiwan where international organisation membership 
is considered to cement its independence (Zaid, 1997–1998) and protect itself 
from claims from the parent state (Li, 2006). And it is indeed difficult to argue 
against a statement that, membership of an organisation like the WTO would 
increase an entity’s credentials as a state.  
Overall, with all the outcome conditions – formal recognition, foreign 
representations and international organisations – de facto states’ motives are 
more prominent in the research. The main question that has been asked seems to 
22
86 
be why de facto states would like to have these kinds of relations. Here we pose 
a slightly different question, namely why these relations have occurred. What 
are the conditions that lead to this engagement? 
 
 
1.4.2. Structure 
The first condition we use is secessionism and it corresponds to the political 
structure element of our systemic approach. The classical account of structure in 
international relations is associated with Waltz (1979), who claims that the 
structure of international politics is anarchical, i.e. the principle of the structure 
is anarchy rather than hierarchy. The structure is created by actors, rational units 
– states – who unintentionally recreate the structure through their actions. 
Dessler (1989), on the other hand, argues that structure can be altered by 
actions, be they intended or unintended. Buzan et al (1993) argue, therefore, 
that as cooperation between states is not precluded by anarchy, the latter is not 
incompatible with the formation of rules. Buzan et al consider this kind of 
anarchy-with-rules to be international society. 
Here we build on this notion, but in a slightly different way. The anarchic 
structure of international politics is supposed to constrain the behaviour of 
states. As stated above, there can be norms within this anarchic structure and 
these norms seem to restrict the behaviour of de facto states even more than that 
of confirmed states. To be specific, the main restrictive norm is that of territorial 
integrity. All of the world’s territory has been divided between states and new 
states must gain their land from existing ones, hence they must be secessionist. 
There are two sets of issues with secessionism. First, as states are eager to 
protect their territorial integrity, secessionism is not tolerated in international 
relations. Territorial integrity is also a fundamental part of contemporary 
international law, which offers a legal framework which does not support 
secession. With political and legal objections to secessionism, de facto states 
face a problem of breaking this arrangement in their quest to gain international 
acceptance. It is made more difficult because of the effectiveness this environ-
ment is being implied with (Pegg, 1998), (Geldenhuys, 2009). The second issue 
comes derives from the first. As secessionism is not tolerated it is considered to 
be an internal affair of a particular state. For de facto states this means that their 
position vis-à-vis their parent state is much weaker than that of the latter. Even 
without power considerations, de facto states start from more difficult 
circumstances. 
Not all de facto states were born through secession, though. Cases that are 
not fully secessionist include Taiwan, Kosovo, SADR, Palestine and Somali-
land. Taiwan was stripped of recognition and has moved from being a non-
secessionist entity towards a more secessionist one as talk of independence has 
become more extensive since the 1980s. Kosovo gained independence with 
external help. Western Sahara and Palestine were created through decoloni-
sation and by the UN respectively; they are not considered to be secessionist. 
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The last, non-clear case is Somaliland which enjoyed independence for six days 
after decolonisation and then merged with Somalia. Therefore, there are claims 
for the restoration of independence rather than the creation of a new state. 
However, as Somaliland and Kosovo are considered to be secessionist in our 
research because they are territories claimed and once ruled by their parent 
state. Taiwan, SADR and Palestine do not fit into this criterion. 
 
 
1.4.3. Powerful patron 
The second element of international system, interaction capacity within the 
political sphere, has been important in historical international systems where 
technological restrictions especially constrained actors’ interaction with each 
other. The modern international system does not present the same limitations. 
However, de facto states are isolated and there are severe constraints on their 
interaction with confirmed states. The main reason is that the latter just do not 
want to interact with unrecognised entities. This is where an external patron can 
be useful as a condition corresponding to the interaction capacity element.  
Patron can be, and usually is very important to de facto states in many 
aspects. Patrons can be seen as ‘opening doors’ for de facto states to the world. 
They help relatively weak unrecognised entities to resist both international 
pressure and that of the former parent state. 
The first, and arguably the most important, sector is the military. This helps 
unrecognised states, especially those which want to secede from a confirmed 
state, to maintain their very existence. Military support in both deploying troops 
and assisting local fighters were crucial in the initial military victories of 
Abkhazia, Transnistria, South Ossetia (by Russia) and Nagorno-Karabakh (by 
Armenia) (Caspersen, 2012). In addition to involvement in actual fighting, the 
military presence of a patron state adds to the security of the entity. There can 
be many forms of this presence. It can be straightforward with military bases 
located in the de facto state. It can also be disguised as a peacekeeping force 
that in reality is more of a deterrent contributing to the security of the de facto 
state, like is the case with Russia in Transnistria and Caucasus. Without actual 
troops security guarantees reduce the threat posed to de facto states as the 
United States offers Taiwan. Also, any kind of material assistance helps build 
de facto states’ power and security. 
The second area where a patron can be helpful is economy. This is mani-
fested in several ways, starting from the use of the patron’s currency through 
special trade relations to straightforward aid. Northern Cyprus uses the Turkish 
lira, Abkhazia and Ossetia the Russian rouble and NKR the Armenian dram. 
The latter is also an example of a dominant trade partner, where Armenia makes 
up the majority of Nagorno-Karabakh trade. Financial aid in the form of 
inexpensive loans or budget injections is also common. Russian aid to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia is an example. 
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Thirdly, the patron can give political support. Sometimes this comes as 
formal recognition, as in the case of Turkey vis-à-vis TRNC, sometimes just as 
strong political support. In the case of Armenia and NKR, the political ties are 
so close that people have held important state offices in both, as the example of 
Robert Kocharyan shows. He has served as president of both Armenia and 
NKR. 
Still, there are differences between ordinary support and being a patron. To 
define a patron one must look not only on the quantity of the relationship but 
also its nature. It is true that patron’s relationship with a de facto state must 
include volumes of trade and intensive security cooperation otherwise the 
patronage would not exist. Additionally, there must be a security guarantee 
involved. A patron is a state that contributes to the very existence of de facto 
state, without it the presence of the entity would be very much in doubt. And, as 
stated above, the support of a patron does take many forms. The presence of a 
patron for each case is presented in respective chapter (Chapter 1.3). 
External patron is considered important factor in survival of de facto state 
(Kolstø, 2006). It helps relatively weak unrecognised entities to resist both 
international pressure and that of the former parent state. The relationship 
between patron and de facto state might not be only one sided as Caspersen 
(2009) concedes, the patrons still provide vital support for the entities. On the 
downside of having a patron, there can develop dependence relations rather than 
ones of cooperation. More isolation can lead to more dependence (Caspersen, 
2012) which can turn the de facto state to a puppet state. Puppet state position is 
of course not unique to de facto states. This may happen with weak confirmed 
states too. But de facto states are especially vulnerable to this because of their 
international position. Even short of puppet states, occasionally patron’s wishes 
overrule those of the de facto states (Isachenko, 2012).  
Additionally, there are two important issues to discuss: first, the differences 
in patron-de facto state relations; and, second, the differences in the patron 
itself. In the former instance, the reasons for relations can be narrowed down to 
two main causes – ethnicity and strategic interest (Isachenko, 2012). Armenia 
and NKR and Turkey and TRNC represent cases where the de facto state gets 
its support from an ethnic kin state. Strategic interests are the main reason for 
Russia helping the breakaway regions of Georgia and the US supporting 
Taiwan. In this dissertation, however, we do not differentiate between motives 
of the patron. Both kin-state and strategic interests are taken as one. 
There is also a difference between patrons themselves. Logic dictates that 
the more powerful the patron is the better are the chances for the de facto state 
to achieve international support and recognition. Powerful patrons have more 
say in the international arena and are therefore more able to push the agenda of 
the de facto state. Hence the power of the patron has been taken into account in 
our analysis.  
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1.4.4. Economy 
Moving away from political sector and its sources of explanation, the next 
condition that influences political processes is that of economy. Before we turn 
to the economic relations of de facto states we must clarify how economy can 
influence political processes of our international system’s model. According to 
Buzan and Little, different sectors can influence each other and this derives 
from the idea that they ‘can be seen as hierarchy /…/ and as a possible (but not 
inevitable) development sequence’ (2000, p. 96). The hierarchy would start, top 
to bottom, from full international systems that involve the full range of sectors, 
from political-military through economic to socio-cultural. The second level 
would be economic systems which lack the military-political element, but 
involve social and cultural connections, which on their own would constitute 
the third and least complex international system. The development sequence 
would operate vice versa, from a less to a more complex one, with the socio-
cultural system being the first and the military-political the last. This means that 
cultural and economic interactions can lead to political interactions. Although 
this hierarchy means that cultural processes should influence political ones via 
economic processes, they are considered to be equal in this paper. The same 
logic applies also to cultural processes explained in next section. 
The next step would be to explain why economic affairs can influence the 
political behaviour of particular states. Economy’s relations with diplomacy 
have been termed ‘economic diplomacy’ in the literature. Authors in this field 
emphasise the influence that economy has on the diplomatic behaviour of a 
country. They build on the empirical observation that economic matters have 
increasing importance in states’ diplomatic efforts. To promote one’s com-
panies in foreign markets and to invite foreign investments to one’s own 
country have become major tasks for diplomatic staff (Coolsaet, 2004), (Lee & 
Hudson, 2004). Hence we can say that economy is very important to states and 
that their diplomatic efforts must be aimed to promote country’s economy. This 
can be seen in the practice of states, for example the British white paper by the 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Trade and Investment for 
Growth, 2011) states clearly that different governmental institutions cooperate 
to promote the United Kingdom’s commercial interests. This means both that 
there is a clear emphasis on economic affairs in the diplomatic service and that 
this involves joint efforts from different branches of government, in the British 
case, The Foreign Office and UK Trade & Investment. 
De facto states should be no different in this regard. If states’ must protect 
their economic interests with diplomatic means then a de facto state that has 
somehow managed to make itself economically important could expect more 
diplomatic engagement. Although de facto states have several restrictions on 
large scale trade and investments, they are still integrated into the global 
political economy and have a part to play (Pegg, 1998). And, taking into 
account the aforementioned connections between economy and diplomacy, this 
part can lead to more engagement on political side. 
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There are also suggestions that politics can determine economics. Caspersen 
(2012), (2009) argues, for example, that lack of international recognitions 
affects credit and loan possibilities for de facto states. And this is of course true. 
On the other hand, de facto states can, and do, engage in at least some inter-
national trade (Caspersen, 2012). This raises the question which way does the 
causality go? Caspersen’s first argument does, however, relate only to 
recognition. Other forms of engagement, like having representations, do not 
alter these possibilities whatsoever. Also, Caspersen limits her restrictions to 
loans and other government related activities. Private sector engagement of 
foreign firms does not require recognition.  
This is related to the second argument that de facto states trade with foreign 
countries. If we see that private sector activities do happen regardless of 
recognitions then we can at least assume that if there is causality, it goes from 
economics to politics. And this is the direction we take in this dissertation. As 
our measures for economic condition derive from private sector activities we 
treat causality as going from economy to engagement, including recognition. 
We have chosen three different measures to fill the economic sector – 
exports, foreign direct investment (FDI) and number of trading partners. Export 
is chosen because it gives an indication how much the de facto state is accepted 
as a partner. In case of exports to the de facto states (imports from our 
perspective) there needs to be no political support from the supplier country. De 
facto states’ markets are usually relatively small and poor so exporting nations 
should not pay them too much attention. When the goods originate from a de 
facto entity, foreign businesses are assumed to have a greater role in the trading 
processes as importers. Therefore foreign governments should be more active in 
protecting nations’ economic interests. The second indicator, FDI, gives direct 
reasons to protect business interests in the de facto state. Foreign investors have 
concrete interests there and as foreign governments want to help their 
businesses this could logically lead to closer ties. Using the number of trading 
partners follows the logic that more states want to deal with de facto states 
therefore it could enjoy more widespread engagement. 
For the sake of clear results we will treat economic conditions as two 
different conditions in the following analysis. One treats them as the whole 
which enables us to understand how integration into world economy can 
influence de facto states’ engagement. The second one treats the three indicators 
more loosely and allows us to study whether a particular niche in the world 
economy can be helpful to achieve engagement.  
 
 
1.4.5. Human rights 
The human rights component has two levels of influence in our research. First 
we must establish its relations with democracy and then how democracy could 
influence the international engagement of de facto states. Human rights follow 
our cultural processes element of the international system. Cultural processes 
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can be seen as sharing ideas in cultural interaction and human rights have 
become an idea that nations should follow. And at least on paper they do, if we 
take into account how many human rights instruments have been ratified by 
majority of countries. So the logic goes that de facto states would want to be 
democratic because this idea is well accepted in today’s world. this in turn 
could lead to more engagement. 
The first issue here is whether there exists a connection between democracy 
and human rights. The general belief is that the two are closely connected. 
Davenport and Armstrong (2004) and Bueno de Mesquita et al (2005) have 
confirmed the relationship, although the violations of human rights decrease 
only at the highest levels of democracy.  
The idea that democracy can help to achieve recognition is based on the 
concept of earned sovereignty, which was originally designed as a tool for 
solving sovereignty-based conflict (Williams & Pecci, 2004). It is suggested 
that commitment to democratic government and human rights can help in 
attaining an international status (Scharf, 2003). This idea differs from other 
main justifications that de facto states have followed in their plea to 
recognition – remedial right and national self-determination. When these two 
have a role of appeal in a sense that one should recognise the entity it has 
suffered in the past and exercises the right to self-determination, the concept of 
earned sovereignty suggest that more tolerance will follow. Indeed, it does share 
the appeal qualities with the two other justifications as has been well 
documented in the research of de facto states (see Pegg (1998), Williams 
(2003), Caspersen (2008), (2011), Bolton and Visoka (2010), Isachenko 
(2012)). However, as it is with most other conditions, human rights and 
democracy have been analysed in isolation. There is no insight how human 
rights would affect engagement in combination with other conditions, for 
example economy. This dissertation fills this particular gap.  
Overall there is consensus that democratic government leads to more 
acceptance from confirmed states. And de facto states are eager to transform their 
governments to obey the rules of democracy and human rights. Hence we can 
assume that democratic de facto states can enjoy more widespread engagement. 
The democracy condition is measured by Freedom House’s (FH, 2011) 
evaluations of the relevant entities. ‘Free’ states are considered to be fully in the 
set and ‘Not free’ ones fully out, with ‘Partly free’ countries more out than in. 
The reason for including partly free countries in the set of more not-free than 
free states is the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights. Authors 
like Jack Donnelly consider human rights – and political rights and civil 
liberties are human rights – as holistic and not a list on which one can arbitrarily 
exclude and include some rights (Donnelly, 2003).  
One could also argue that relative level of democratisation compared to 
parent state is more important than an absolute one. Additionally, even the 
context of a region could play a role. These are of course valid arguments but 
are out of the reach of this thesis. There are two issues related to the problem. 
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The first problem comes from the systemic approach of the thesis. Relative 
conditions influence different actors differently; they do not help us to see the 
position of the de facto states in the system. The second problem is methodo-
logical. Measuring differences between democratisation in the de facto state and 
parent state or region would involve a research that is out of this dissertation’s 
focus and volume. The Freedom House scores would not be adequate to reflect 
these differences. 
 
 
1.4.6. Omitted conditions 
With every research there could be conditions or variables that omitted from the 
analysis even though there might be questions whether they would be relevant. 
In the analysis of de facto states mainly two conditions have arise in the 
literature – the strategic position of de facto state (see for example Caspersen 
(2012), Isachenko (2012)); and position of the parent state (already introduced 
by Pegg (1998)). However, there are reasons why they are not included in this 
research. 
Both of these conditions are omitted because theoretical and methodological 
reasons. Methodologically, these conditions are very difficult to operationalise. 
We could devise scales similar to Freedom House’s in human rights but that 
would constitute a work enough for a dissertation of its own. There would be 
abundance of variables that would also be very diverse. One just has to look at 
the methodology implied by the aforementioned Freedom House in devising a 
simple ordinal scale. Similar problems arise with the position of a parent state. 
Even though it might seem simpler to measure it than strategic position one has 
to take into account several variables. These variables include economic 
relations, military relations, political rhetoric, cultural and sports ties. Therefore 
getting meaningful measurements for these conditions are beyond this thesis. 
The theoretical arguments for omitting these conditions stem from the 
systemic approach. The strategic position would entail a further question – 
strategic to whom? This would lead to relative positions as some de facto states 
have different importance to different actors. This obstructs us from analysing 
the position of de facto states in the system as general. The same applies to the 
position of parent state. First, it would introduce the bilateral relations of de 
facto state and its former master into the framework and second, it would force 
us to see whether, how and whom does this position influence. Hence we have 
excluded the relative measures to focus on the system. On similar grounds we 
have omitted some aspects of particular conditions. The interests of the patron 
are mentioned in the respective paragraph, as is the relative democratisation 
discussed in the human rights section.  
We do acknowledge the importance that these conditions or variables may 
have but they do not give us insights as to the de facto state is positioned in the 
international system. Therefore they could be better exploited in further analysis 
that captures a more qualitative perspective on de facto states. 
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2. METHOD AND DATA 
This section will give an overview of the method used and the data analysed. 
The method – fsQCA – is still an emerging, albeit quite powerful, method in the 
social sciences and it needs a little clarification for the reader to completely 
understand the analysis that follows. Still, the few pages that are devoted to the 
main features of QCA do not constitute a comprehensive study of the method 
(see further Ragin (1987) (2000) (2008); Rihoux and Ragin (2009); Schneider 
and Wagemann (2012)). 
This section is particularly important because it helps the reader to 
understand the analysis that follows. As we have to use method-specific 
language in the analysis, it is necessary to make clear what different terms 
mean. The section is illustrated with simple examples from everyday life that 
help to make the basic concepts more comprehensible.  
We will start with the reason why QCA came into being and how fuzzy sets 
were conceptualised. Then the main features of set-theoretic methods in general 
and QCA in particular are discussed. This is followed by reasoning concerning 
why this method is useful in analysing de facto states and how it has been used 
in the field. The section ends with data calibration which is crucial for the 
following analysis.  
 
 
2.1. Introduction to set-theoretic methods 
It is claimed that there is a divide between qualitative and quantitative research 
in the social sciences. The former can also be called case-oriented or intensive 
(meaning deep but not wide research) methods, as opposed to variable-oriented 
or extensive (meaning wide but not very deep) methods (Ragin, 2000). Ragin 
(1987) states that in (comparative) social research, two ends are aimed for, but 
they tend to negate each other: generality, giving explanations to a variety of 
cases; and complexity, which sees social phenomena as complex one and 
renders general explanations partial. In case-oriented research, complexity takes 
precedence over generality, and in variable-oriented research, it is the other way 
round. 
Unfortunately, neither of these approaches manages to grasp the problem of 
causal complexity. The case-oriented method is incapable of dealing with a 
larger number of cases and the variable-oriented approach is ‘incapacitated by 
complex, conjunctural causal arguments’ (Ragin, 1987, p. 69). This void might 
be filled with approaches that have been called configurational comparative 
methods (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) or set-theoretic methods (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). Here we follow Schneider and Wagemann and refer to them 
as set-theoretic because, although the configurational and comparative are 
essential features of these methods, their foundations lie in set-theory. Other 
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fields with which these methods are closely related are formal logic and 
Boolean algebra. 
Before we describe the particular method used in this thesis – Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) – we turn to some of the set-theoretic language 
which will be used in the analysis. Two elements are worth mentioning. First, a 
set is any collection of objects or elements. For example, apples are elements in 
the set of fruits. In our case, these objects are de facto states. They can be 
elements of many sets: in our case, a de facto state can be located in a set of 
‘states with powerful patron’ and in the set of ‘states with high per capita 
exports’. The second feature is that of set relations. Sets can be supersets of 
other sets, which are then subsets of the former. Apples can form a set of their 
own and be a subset of the set fruits, the latter being the superset. Also, these 
relations do not have to be only two-sided: apples can be as superset for a 
particular sort of apple, say the Granny Smith. So, a kind of chain would be 
formed: Granny Smiths → apples → fruits, with the previous being the subset 
of the following and the following a superset of the previous. The simplest 
difference is that a superset includes more than its particular subset. Apples 
include other different types of apples, for example Jonagolds, along with 
Granny Smiths. 
However, this applies only to so-called ‘crisp sets’. A crisp set means, to put 
it simply, that a case is either in the set or out of it; set membership is exclusive. 
An apple is fully in the set of fruits and fully out of the set of vegetables. But 
crisp sets can be viewed as special cases of fuzzy sets. While crisp sets are very 
useful when data can be analysed as dichotomies, most of the data of social 
science cannot be so analysed. In these circumstances, more fine-grained 
information can be obtained by using fuzzy sets. 
Fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic in general was introduced by Lotfi A. Zadeh in 
the 1960s. Zadeh (1965, p. 339) conceptualises fuzzy sets as ‘a ‘class’ with a 
continuum of grades of membership’. This means that an object can be an 
element of a set and an element of a negation of that set at the same time – it 
can simultaneously, to some degree, be in and out of the same set. ‘To some 
degree’ means that an object has membership scores in a set. If it is fully in the 
set, its membership score is ‘1’; if it is fully out of the set, its membership score 
is ‘0’. Everything in between can be described as being ‘more in than out’ or 
‘neither in nor out’. For example, the United States is fully in the set of 
powerful nations but Turkey is not. In crisp sets, the US would be in the set and 
Turkey out. Still, Turkey has some power, therefore its fuzzy set membership 
score in ‘powerful nations’ would be, for example, 0.8. This means that Turkey 
is more in than out of the set of powerful nations, but not fully in.  
There are two aspects that must be taken into account with fuzzy sets. First, 
ordinary or crisp sets are a special case of fuzzy sets. The latter is a more 
general concept, as fuzzy sets also allow membership scores of ‘0’ and ‘1’ but 
are not limited to them. Crisp sets constitute a subset of fuzzy sets. Second, 
even though they might look like them, membership scores are neither ordinal 
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nor ratio scales, nor are they some standardisation of them; they are member-
ship scores. Fuzzy set membership scores resemble ratio scales as they have 
equal intervals, represented by numerical values, but they add a ceiling. This 
can be argued, as Ragin (2000) puts it, to make fuzzy sets an even higher form 
of measurement than ratio scales in a hierarchy which starts with nominal 
scales. This is, of course, debatable, but fuzzy set logic can be useful in social 
research. This idea is elaborated further when we talk about calibration. 
For our analysis, we want to establish the fuzzy set-relations of our con-
ditions and outcome, as set out in Chapter 1.1, where we talk about the 
international system. The conditions and outcome are explained in more detail 
below. To do this, we use the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA). It is considered to be somewhere in between the two major approaches 
of variable- and case-oriented methods. It was created to replicate the 
advantages of both of them (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). One of its main features is 
allowing different causal ‘paths’ to explain a certain outcome. Multiple paths 
may lead to the same outcome and each path may consist of a combination of 
conditions, not just one. This means the approach is conjectural and Ragin 
(2000) labels it ‘diversity-oriented’. 
The method was introduced and developed by Ragin (1987) and it uses set-
theoretic logic rather than correlation logic to analyse social phenomena. 
Correlations are used in quantitative research, set-theoretic notions in quali-
tative, even though most researchers rarely see their work in set-theoretic terms 
(Ragin, 2008). Initially, it was a dichotomous or crisp set analysis, with set 
membership defined only as fully in or out of the set. The branch of QCA for 
this kind of analysis is crsip-set QCA (csQCA). We use a branch called fuzzy 
set QCA (fsQCA). 
 
 
2.2. Main concepts and language of QCA 
When using QCA, and fsQCA in particular, several concepts are necessary to 
understand it. They are also important for understanding the analysis, not only 
for performing it – and this is what is borne in mind in this section. There are 
several technical notions like the process of creating truth tables, prime 
implicants or Boolean minimisation that are the core of QCA. But just to 
understand the analysis they are not needed. Therefore, we will not go deeply 
into QCA technicalities and show just some concepts that are deemed necessary 
to understand the analysis part of the dissertation. The concepts that will be 
discussed shortly are: 
 Conditions, outcome and solution 
 Logical operators  
 Necessity and sufficiency 
 Causal complexity 
 Equifinality 
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 Conjunctural causation 
 Asymmetry 
 Parameters of fit 
 Consistency 
 Coverage 
 Limited diversity 
 Calibration 
 
 
2.2.1. Conditions, outcome and solution 
To start with, we will briefly explain the terms that are of importance for 
understanding any research using QCA. Three terms are of special importance 
because every result in QCA is explained by them. These terms are condition, 
outcome and solution. 
Conditions are in a sense similar to independent variables. They are the 
reasons why an outcome occurs. What is different to variables is that conditions 
in set-theoretic methods do not vary quantitatively. They have only two states of 
being, both in crisp and fuzzy sets. In crisp sets, they are either present or 
absent. In fuzzy sets, they have a membership score of say n in a set (which 
corresponds to being present) and a score of 1-n out of the set (which 
corresponds to being absent). Additionally, the change in the condition does not 
mean that there is a change in the outcome. 
Outcome (also referred to as the outcome condition) is therefore the 
equivalent of the dependent variable. Again, the variation in the outcome is not 
important; what matters is its presence or absence. To give an easy crisp set 
example, ‘air and food facilitates being alive’. This means that the presence of 
two conditions, ‘air’ and ‘food,’ facilitates the presence of outcome, ‘being 
alive’. In formal terms, we present this formula as ‘air*food → being alive’. 
The whole formula is called the solution or the solution term. In the analysis, 
there are three different solution terms that will be discussed along with limited 
diversity below. These solution terms are most complex, intermediate and most 
parsimonious solution terms. 
Additionally, solutions can consist of several paths. For example, we could 
have a causal path ‘diet’ → ‘losing weight’ and also ‘training’ → ‘losing 
weight’. This indicates that there are two independent ways to achieve the 
outcome. This is elaborated further when we talk about causal complexity. 
From the example above, we can see that we have used certain symbols to 
indicate relationships. The arrow symbol (‘→’) shows what conditions lead to 
the outcome, the asterisk symbol (‘*’) represents one of the logical operators. 
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2.2.2. Logical operators 
Three logical operations are important in using QCA: AND, OR and NOT. In 
different fields they are designated differently, even though the meaning is 
similar. In formal logic, these operators are conjunction, disjunction and 
complement respectively; in Boolean algebra, they are multiplication, addition 
and negation; and in set-theory, intersection, union and negative set. In the text 
they will be notated with capital letters to distinguish them from ordinary text 
where the terms ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’ are used. This is to emphasise the parti-
cular operation that is used.  
Starting with the logical AND, it is represented by the symbol ‘*’ and means 
that a case must show at least two conditions. For example, football is in the 
sets of ‘team sport’ and ‘Olympic sport,’ therefore it is also in the conjunction 
(or intersection) of these sets created using the logical AND operator. Cricket, 
on the other hand, is a team sport but not an Olympic one; therefore, it is out of 
the conjunction of Olympic team sports. In the following analysis, we use term 
conjunction or refer to the logical AND operator. 
However, cricket is in the set if we use logical OR operator to combine these 
sets. This is because the logical OR operator gives us an option to choose. 
Cricket is in the set of ‘team sports’ and out of the set of ‘Olympic sports’, but it 
is at least in one of them; therefore, it is in the disjunction of these sets. 
Similarly, swimming is in the disjunction because, although not a team sport, it 
is in the set of Olympic sports. Additionally, football is also in the disjunction, 
because it is in at least one of the two sets. The fact that is actually a member of 
both sets in our example does not matter; the logical OR operator is not 
exclusive in the sense of ordinary language like ‘it’s raining or it’s not’. The 
operator is indicated with the ‘+’ symbol, hence our formula would look like 
‘team sport + Olympic sport’. 
The logical NOT operator is indicated with the ‘~’ symbol and it means the 
negation of the set. To put it simply, the negation is the absence of a condition. 
The ‘~football’ would mean not-football and this set includes both ‘cricket’ and 
‘swimming,’ but also ‘reading a book’ and everything else that is not football.  
When using these operators in fsQCA, the meaning of the operators and their 
notations is a little different. The logical AND operation gives us the lowest 
fuzzy set membership score of a case in the two sets. For example, if Turkey 
has a membership score of 0.8 in a set of powerful nations and 1 in a set of 
former empires, then its score in the conjunction would be 0.8 (set of powerful 
nations with former empires). The logical OR, on the other hand, gives us the 
highest score. In the previous example, using the logical OR, the result would 
have been 1. The logical NOT is a subtraction of the original fuzzy membership 
score from 1. Continuing with Turkey, its membership score in a set of not 
powerful nations would be 1minus 0.8 which makes 0.2. For a more complex 
overview of the logical operators, see Schneider and Wagemann (2012, pp. 42–
55) or Rihoux and Ragin (2009, pp. 94–99). 
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2.2.3. Necessity and sufficiency 
Having established the set-membership and the difference between the con-
ditions and outcome, we now look at the relations between the latter two. These 
are analysed using the notions of necessity and sufficiency, which make use of 
the subset-superset relations. Here we present only a few paragraphs on the 
topic; this may therefore be too little to grasp everything about the notions. For 
a comprehensive overview, see the textbook by Schneider and Wagemann 
(2012, pp. 56–76).  
Those conditions are necessary without which the outcome is not present. 
That is, when there is outcome, there is always a necessary condition, but the 
condition can be present when the outcome is not. For example, elections are 
necessary for democracy. There cannot be democracy without elections. But 
there can be elections without democracy. In set-theoretic language, this is read 
as ‘the outcome is a subset of the condition’ or ‘the condition is the superset of 
the outcome’. In the example above, democracy is the subset of elections. The 
subset-superset relations are best illustrated on a Venn diagram. Figure 3 shows 
two sets ‘democracy’ and ‘elections’, with the former represented by a smaller 
and the latter by a larger circle. ‘Elections’ is a superset of ‘democracy’ and 
‘democracy’ is a subset of ‘elections’.  
 
 
Figure 3: Subset-superset relations of democracy and elections on a Venn diagram 
 
In crisp set logic, we are interested in cases where both the outcome and the 
condition are present. Cases where the outcome is present and the condition is 
absent (democracy without elections) contradict the statement of necessity, and 
if these kinds of cases exist we cannot speak about the condition being 
necessary. Additionally, cases where the outcome is absent, i.e. non-
democracies, are not of interest. If the outcome is not present, then there can be 
democracy
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no subset relations between the outcome and the condition. However, these 
cases do not contradict the statement of necessity and are therefore of no 
interest. The subset principle also holds for fuzzy sets, but the establishment of 
a subset relation is a little different. A condition is necessary when its fuzzy set 
membership scores in all cases are greater or equal to those of the outcome 
scores in the same cases. This is further elaborated when we speak about the 
parameters of fit.  
When the condition is always present while the outcome is present, it is a 
sufficient condition. In this case, the outcome may be present without this 
condition, as there might be several causes for it, but once the sufficient 
condition is present, then there is always the outcome. To put this in set-
theoretic terms, ‘the condition is a subset of the outcome’. To illustrate this with 
an example, consider again the democracy-elections relationship shown in 
Figure 3. If we switch the causality, we can speak of democracy being sufficient 
for elections, because when democracy occurs, elections are also always 
present. In reality, this kind of symmetry is rare and our causal line must be 
theoretically justified, but as a simplified example this will do. The need for 
theoretical justifications is also emphasised by the mathematical formulas for 
necessity and sufficiency: they are mirror images of each other. Theory helps us 
to give different substantial interpretations of mathematically similar formulas. 
In crisp set analysis, we are again interested in cases that show the presence 
of both the condition and the outcome and not interested in cases that show no 
condition. These do not contradict the statement of sufficiency and are not 
relevant. The cases that do contradict the statement of sufficiency are those that 
show the presence of the condition and the absence of the outcome (again, 
democracy without elections – remembering that we switched causality). In 
fuzzy sets, to confirm this subset relation (where the condition is the subset of 
the outcome), we need the outcome’s fuzzy set membership to be greater or 
equal to that of the condition.  
A condition can also be both necessary and sufficient. In the case of crisp 
sets, the only allowed and relevant cases are those that show membership in 
both the condition and the outcome. Cases that are only members in one of them 
would contradict the statement of necessity and sufficiency. Cases that show 
membership in neither the condition nor the outcome are irrelevant. With fuzzy 
sets, the condition and the outcome must show equal set membership values for 
each case. Necessity and sufficiency can also be analysed graphically. With 
crisp sets, the tool is a two-by-two table and with fuzzy sets, an XY plot.  
 
 
2.2.4. Parameters of fit 
When we establish subset-superset relations, we might find that they are 
imperfect. More often than not this is the case in the social sciences. To 
confront this problem, two parameters of fit exist to help find necessary and 
sufficient conditions or combinations of conditions: consistency and coverage. 
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According to Ragin (2006, p. 292), ‘set-theoretic consistency assesses the 
degree to which the cases sharing a given condition or combination of 
conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question’. And Ragin defines 
coverage ‘as the degree to which a cause or causal combination ‘accounts for’ 
instances of an outcome’.  
To put it simply, consistency is an indication of whether our conditions and 
outcomes form perfect subset-superset relations or not; and coverage indicates 
how much of the outcome is covered by a particular condition. Illustrations of 
consistency and coverage scores can be seen on Venn diagrams in Figure 4: 
 
 
Figure 4: Examples of consistency and coverage 
 
Example A on Figure 4 shows perfect consistency and high coverage. For per-
fect coverage, the two circles should be identical. Example B shows high 
coverage and high but not perfect consistency. Example C shows perfect 
consistency but low coverage, while example D shows both low coverage and 
less-than-perfect consistency. 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, pp. 119–150) differentiate between the 
consistency and coverage scores of necessary and sufficient conditions. Starting 
with the latter, consistency of sufficient conditions gives us an indication of 
how much ‘the empirical information deviates from perfect subset relations’ 
(p. 129). It gives us a numerical value between 0 and 1 where 1 indicates the 
perfect subset.  
Coverage of sufficient conditions indicates ‘how much of the outcome is 
explained by the condition in question’ (p. 139). It also ranges between 0 and 1. 
Further, one can differentiate between raw and unique coverage of a particular 
path and solution coverage of the entire solution term. Raw coverage shows 
how much one particular path in the solution covers of the outcome. When there 
are several paths, there may be some overlap between them. Unique coverage 
indicates that the coverage of a single path is not overlapped by other paths. 
The consistency score of the necessary condition ‘assesses the degree to 
which the empirical information at hand is in line with the statement of 
necessity’ (p. 143). This reveals the subset-relations between outcome (subset) 
and condition (superset). Coverage scores of necessary conditions are ‘better 
interpreted as a measure of relevance of the condition’ (p. 147). They show 
A B C D
101 
whether the condition is trivial or not. For necessary conditions, raw and unique 
coverage are usually not calculated. 
 
 
2.2.5. Limited diversity 
To explain limited diversity, we must start with truth tables. A truth table is a 
table of all possible combinations organised into rows. When connected to the 
outcome, these rows are interpreted as sufficient conditions. For example, if we 
have data about American presidents and we use two conditions to describe 
them – sex and race – we can construct the following truth table: 
 
Table 3: Example of a truth table 
Conditions Number of Cases President 
male  white 43 Yes 
male  non-white 1 Yes 
female white 0 No 
female non-white 0 No 
 
There have been presidents who are male and white (conjunction), and also 
those who are male and non-white. However, there have been no female 
presidents yet, neither white nor non-white. Here, of course, we are not 
establishing causality. In cases where we do, like the following analysis of de 
facto states, the truth table rows form causal paths that lead to the outcome.  
As we can see, there can be rows that are logically possible but do not have 
any cases (female president). This situation is called limited diversity and these 
particular rows are called logical reminders. The number of truth table rows is 
determined by the number of conditions – for k conditions there are 2k rows. In 
our analysis, we use four conditions, so we have 24=16 truth table rows. 
However, as we have less than 16 cases, some rows are destined to be void of 
cases.  
In fuzzy sets, we initially do not have the truth table of crisp sets. Fuzzy sets 
operate with k-dimensional vector space, where corners of this space represent 
full set membership. Cases are therefore ‘floating’ in this space based on their 
scores in the conditions. However, one should not be intimidated by this, as the 
vector space is convertible into an ordinary truth table. The main thing is that 
there are 2k vector space corners and limited diversity occurs when some of 
these corners have no cases close enough to them. 
Still, these rows will be used in the analysis using counterfactuals. As 
mentioned earlier, there are three types of solution terms: most complex, 
intermediate and most parsimonious. The most complex solution is the one that 
takes into account only empirical information; empty truth table rows are 
ignored. The most parsimonious solution takes into account all empty rows that 
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contribute to parsimony. These are called difficult counterfactuals because they 
are not theory-laden. Only two criteria apply: they must contribute to the 
parsimony; and the results must not contradict the most complex solution term. 
The intermediate solution term uses empty truth table rows but with the help of 
directional expectations. These are theoretical expectations of how a particular 
condition should influence the outcome. They can also be called easy 
counterfactuals or simplifying assumptions. In our case, for example, having a 
powerful patron should contribute to more representations in a de facto state.  
As we have observed, there are some differences between crisp sets and 
fuzzy sets. While performing the analysis, these differences are important but 
the results obtained are similar. A truth table algorithm turns fuzzy values into a 
truth table that helps us to discover sufficient paths that lead to the outcome. 
The eventual results look very much the same for both sets.  
 
 
2.2.6. Causal complexity 
What is exactly the same for both kinds of analysis, both crisp set and fuzzy set, 
is the causal complexity. This is a group of assumptions in set-theoretic 
approaches that are closely related to logical operators and the analysis of 
necessity and sufficiency. Causal complexity comes in three forms: equifinality; 
conjunctural causality; and asymmetry.  
Equifinality is the assumption that an outcome can be explained by several 
conditions that are not mutually exclusive. Equifinality is achieved when the 
logical OR operator is used. It shows that several paths are possible for the 
outcome. From earlier examples, there are two paths to losing weight, ‘diet’ and 
‘training’. When they independently lead to the outcome, we can speak of 
equifinality. 
Conjunctural causation means that conditions on their own are not sufficient 
for the result but their combinations are. This is achieved when the logical AND 
operator is used and only a combination of conditions is sufficient for the 
outcome to be present. Conjunctural causation occurs if, for example, diet and 
training in combination lead to losing weight. Alone, they would not be 
sufficient, but together they would cause one to lose weight.  
Asymmetry is related to the logical NOT operator and is a direct con-
sequence of the analysis of necessity and sufficiency. Asymmetry means that 
the negations of the conditions that lead to the outcome are not the conditions 
that lead to the negation of the outcome. When analysing necessity or suffi-
ciency, some cases are relevant for the analysis and some are not, as shown 
above. When we start analysing the condition for the absence of the outcome, 
some cases that were relevant become irrelevant and some cases that would 
contradict the statements about necessity and/or sufficiency cease to do so. 
Therefore, different cases become important for the analysis and might produce 
different results. This, in turn, leads to the asymmetry assumption and to one 
practical implication – one must test the conditions for both the presence and 
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absence of the outcome. Continuing with the fitness example, asymmetry 
occurs if training leads to losing weight but not training does not lead to not 
losing weight.  
There are two special conditions that are worth mentioning at this point: 
INUS and SUIN. Both are common results in QCA solution formulas. INUS 
stands for ‘insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself 
unnecessary but sufficient’. SUIN stands for ‘sufficient but unnecessary part of 
a condition that is insufficient but necessary’. Both definitions are given by 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 79), who refer to earlier authors. For a more 
detailed overview of causal complexity, see the textbooks referred to above by 
Schneider and Wagemann (pp. 76–83) and Rihoux and Ragin. 
Finally, it is important to note that causal complexity can be reduced; 
furthermore, it should be reduced in some circumstances. This is called logical 
minimisation and it creates more parsimonious solution terms where appro-
priate. For example, if we have two combinations of conditions that lead to the 
outcome, we have equifinality. In the example of democracy, let us say that 
these two combinations consist of elections, free media and wealthy society, on 
the one hand, and elections, free media and non-wealthy society, on the other. 
In this case, we have a condition (wealthy society) and its negation (non-
wealthy society) in combination with the same conditions (elections and free 
media). Hence, we can drop the wealthy society condition overall, because its 
presence and absence both contribute to democracy in similar circumstances. 
Elections and free media are sufficient conditions for democracy. We have 
logically eliminated (non)wealthy society and also equifinality but gained a 
more parsimonious solution. 
We can use logical minimisation only when the difference between two 
causal paths consists of one condition. If we had combinations of elections, free 
media and wealthy society and elections, non-free media and non-wealthy 
society, we could not minimise the combinations.  
 
 
2.3. QCA and de facto states 
QCA has rarely been used in the study of de facto states in particular or 
international relations in general. Regarding de facto states, only Ishiyama and 
Batta (2012) present a known case of applied QCA. In other fields of social 
science, the method is gaining prominence. Topics analysed using QCA are 
very different, including, for example, strategies for an ageing society (Kim & 
Lee, 2008), the role of independent regulatory agencies in policy-making 
(Maggetti, 2009) and EU constitutionalization (Schimmelfennig, Rittberger, 
Bürgin, & Schwellnus, 2006).  
There are several reasons why QCA could be the best possible method for 
the study of de facto states. One is that it is suitable for small-n analysis, where 
traditional statistical approaches fall short. In this regard, the analysis of de 
104 
facto states is suitable as the number of them is not large. However, that should 
not be the main, and definitely not the only, reason for applying QCA. Set-
theoretic methods are also suitable for large-n analysis. With regard to this 
method, it does not matter whether there are ten cases or a thousand cases. 
Furthermore, the more cases, the less limited diversity there can be. A large 
number of cases rules out the possibility of mathematical limited diversity, 
where there are simply not enough cases to fill all possible combinations of 
conditions. Unlike statistical approaches, QCA enables the use of formalised 
analysis for small-n data, but it is definitely not limited to this. 
Away from the n-question, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) stress the set-
theoretical nature of theory. This means that the phenomena analysed should 
not be approached as correlations but as conditions. To put it simply, there 
should be no ‘more A is more B’ approach, but rather a ‘A is a condition for B’ 
approach. And the current literature on de facto states supports this approach. 
Caspersen and Isachenko, for example, have structured their work according 
to different aspects of de facto states – economic and political issues, the 
question of an external patron, etc. The research has been primarily qualitative. 
A few attempts at statistical research have focused on the inner dynamics of the 
entities, as well as the analysis of popular opinion in Abkhazia (Bakke, 
O’Loughlin, & Ward, 2011) and in divided Cyprus (Berg & Toomla, 2013). 
One reason for this is, of course, the lack of cases and relative difficulties in 
obtaining data compared to confirmed states. 
There are also suggestions of causal complexity in the literature. Pegg 
devotes two chapters of International Society and the De facto State to several 
macro- and micro-level factors that are involved in the birth of de facto states. 
Macro-level factors are applicable to de facto states in general, while micro-
level factors pertain to particular cases. Pegg acknowledges that these factors 
are possible neither necessary nor sufficient on their own as ‘multiple factors 
are likely to be involved in each case’ (Pegg, 1998, p. 171). One can only 
assume that theses multiple factors might also be involved in different cases of 
international attitudes towards de facto states. Several combinations of condi-
tions might lead to the different positions of contested entities in the inter-
national system. Therefore, the analysis of de facto states fits two requirements 
for QCA. It has a set-theoretic nature and causal complexity is, if not assumed, 
then at least admitted.  
 
 
2.4. Calibration 
Another important element of fuzzy set research is calibration. In order to apply 
set-theoretic logic to measured data, one has to calibrate the data to show 
degrees of membership in a particular set for particular cases. Calibration 
assigns cases to sets while ‘un-calibrated measures show positions of cases 
relative to each other’ (Ragin, 2008, p. 72). Calibration helps us to relate cases 
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to some external standard or context. Calibrated data is no scale of cases, but 
shows the degree of set-membership of these cases in a given set. 
The easiest way of calibrating ordinal or interval/ratio scale data to set-
membership scores is to establish three anchor points. The first point is a 
threshold which indicates full membership in the set (a membership score of 1); 
the second shows maximum ambiguity (a score of 0.5); and the third is a 
threshold for full non-membership (a score of 0). Cases that pass the full-
membership threshold are considered fully in the set, no matter what the 
differences between them might be. Those cases that fall short of full non-
membership threshold are considered to be out of the set. As for crisp sets, the 
important aspect is the 0.5 threshold. In this case, it is the only anchor point to 
be identified, as cases above it are fully in the set (1) and cases below fully out 
of a set (0). To continue with examples from everyday life, a person over two 
meters tall is fully in the set of ‘tall persons’, while one under 1.4 meters is fully 
out. Persons in between have different membership scores, but are neither fully 
in nor out of the set. 
The main thing that one has to bear in mind when assessing the three anchor 
points is that they should be external to the data. In an ideal world, set-
membership is determined by theory. If that is not possible, then empirical 
thresholds are certainly not something to be afraid of. However, there are some 
things that one should not do when calibrating set-membership scores. 
Schneider and Wagemann(2012, pp. 32–41) stress that one should definitely not 
turn interval scale data into set-membership scores, with the largest score being 
fully in and smallest being fully out. A paper that does make this mistake, 
however, is one of the few dealing with de facto states using fsQCA by 
Ishiyama and Batta (2012). For example, they calibrate their outcome (domi-
nant party system) using an index where ‘the full membership score was set at 
700, the highest possible score from our index, and the non-membership score 
was set at 1, the lowest possible score in our index’ (Ishiyama & Batta, 2012, 
p. 128). Such ‘[analysed] data driven calibration strategies are fundamentally 
flawed’ (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 33). The calibration must be based 
on indicators external to the data that is used in the analysis. 
Another mistake would be to rely on means and medians, as they are 
properties of particular data. Outliers can significantly alter the means and 
therefore leave out cases that, conceptually, could be in a particular set. Again, 
this mistake is made by Ishiyama and Batta, who put median points as their 0.5 
anchors.  
We do use data to establish anchors, the reason being the lack of relevant 
theory. However, we use data external to our own dataset to establish whether a 
state is powerful or whether there is a lot of economic activity. In this way, our 
own data does not influence the calibration. The thresholds are given in  
Table 4. 
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Table 4: Thresholds for calibration 
 
Conditions 
Thresholds
0 0.5 1 
Patron 1 (0.001) 5 (0.005) 18.9 (0.0189) 
Partners 0 0.5 1 
FDI 10 123 692 
Secession  0 0.5 1 
Freedom 0 0.5 1 
Exports 166 1287 10301 
Representations 0 1.5 25 
International Organisations 0 0.5 1 
Formal recognition 0 1.5 127 
 
The thresholds have been set taking into account information external to the 
dataset itself. Unfortunately, there is no coherent theory as to where exactly the 
three anchor points should be; therefore, they have been established empirically.  
The easiest conditions to deal with are secession and freedom, because both 
are measured on small scales. Secession is dichotomous and setting its 
thresholds is easy: non-secessionist entities are fully out of the set (0) and 
secessionist entities are fully in (1). The crossover point (0.5) is set at 0.5, but it 
could be anywhere between ‘0’ and ‘1’. Freedom is a bit more complicated 
because of the ‘partly free’ status of some countries. As stated earlier, these 
entities are considered to be more out of the set of ‘free states’ than in, and their 
score is 0.33. ‘Not free’ cases are assigned the score ‘0,’ which means they are 
fully out of the set; ‘free’ cases are fully in with a score of ‘1’. The crossover 
point is again set at 0.5. 
The economic conditions of exports and FDI are also rather straightforward. 
Again, as there is no theory that indicates which states might be in the set of 
‘countries with high exports’ or ‘countries with high FDI’, the three anchor 
points have been established empirically. The data used is not connected to de 
facto state, though. Data from 192 countries and territories has been divided 
into sextiles, with the highest sextile being countries fully in the set and the 
lowest, countries fully out of the set. The crossover point is the median. One 
may recall that the use of the median is not encouraged in setting thresholds. 
The difference here is that the analysed data itself has not been used in 
establishing the anchor point. External data has. 
The points of exports are at 166 USD per capita for being fully out of the set; 
10,301 USD for being fully in; and 1287 USD as the crossover point of 0.5. The 
respective cases which showed these measures are the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Hungary and Brazil respectively. For FDI, these numbers are 10, 692 
and 123 USD respectively, and the cases are Mali, Canada and Bahrain. The 
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data comes from the World Bank website (for FDI and population) and the CIA 
World Factbook (for exports). There is an issue of time, though. The World 
Bank data is from 2010 and the CIA data is estimated for 2011. The difference 
between the years is not large, however, and should not alter the analysis, 
especially when taking into account that the data is used to establish set 
membership scores, not for the analysis. 
In determining the fuzzy set membership for the number of export partners 
of the de facto states, three scores have been established. Fully in the set (1) are 
states that have multiple partners with no dominant partner (the latter meaning a 
trade partner making up over 50 per cent of turnover). Fully out of the set (0) 
are states that have one dominant partner with a share of 90 per cent of the de 
facto state’s exports. Finally, those states that have no trade partners are fully 
out of the set. This may seem contradictory, but the set is labelled ‘states with 
multiple trade partners’. Therefore, if a state does not have multiple trade 
partners, it is fully out of the set. And having no trade partners at all also means 
not having multiple trade partners. The situation is similar with patrons, as we 
will see below. The crossover point is set at 0.5. 
It can be argued that there could be cases between these two extremes, and 
this is indeed the case. Those countries with multiple partners of which one is 
dominant are rated as being more in the set than out of it and have been 
assigned a score of 0.66. 
Coming to patrons, the set is labelled ‘de facto states with powerful patron’. 
This condition ranges from no powerful patron (fully out of the set) to great 
power as a patron (fully in the set). The Correlates of War project’s composite 
Index of National Capability (CINC) has been used in determining the set 
membership scores. The great powers are determined to be those which lie 
above the least powerful UN Security Council member state, including also that 
state. In this ranking, the least powerful SC member is France, in tenth place 
with a CINC score of 0.018924. Therefore, ten states could be patrons of de 
facto states which would be fully in the set.  
The setting of a crossover point and a threshold for being fully out of the set 
are more complicated. As mentioned above, similar logic applies in determining 
that de facto states with no patron at all are fully out of the set. But the question 
remains as to where to place the threshold for those entities that have a patron 
which is not powerful. We have set it to ‘1’, or 0.001 in the original CINC 
scaling. Therefore, states that have a CINC score of less than 0.001 are 
considered not powerful. The first not to qualify is Zimbabwe, with a score of 
0.000994. And the crossover point would be set at 0.005, which leaves 
Argentina just under the 0.5 mark with a CINC score of 0.004721. The reasons 
behind these thresholds are that the world is comprised mostly of non-powerful 
states. So, we have excluded around half of states as being fully out of the set. 
The top fifth of states are included as more in the set than out, so the threshold 
has been set around that mark. The reason for an inexact quintile is to place the 
threshold to the nearest clear number. 
108 
Coming to outcome conditions, the most straightforward is formal re-
cognition. An entity is fully out of the set when it has no recognitions at all and 
fully in when it has 127 recognitions. The latter derives from the definition of 
de facto state given earlier. As one may recall, UN non-membership was set as 
a criterion for being non-recognised. And 127 is the two thirds of the General 
Assembly that is needed for UN membership. The other criterion, recognition 
by a Security Council member, is dropped because there is no qualitative 
difference between instances of recognition. Thus, when we want to operate 
with the number of recognitions a de facto state has, it does not matter whether 
the recognition comes from the United States or Vanuatu. The crossover point is 
set at 1.5, mainly because it limits the role of the patron’s possible recognition. 
Similar logic has been applied when setting the minimum threshold and the 
crossover point for the number of representations. When there are no represen-
tations, the entity is fully out of the set and when it has more than one, it is more 
in than out. The crossover point is set at 1.5 to minimise the effect of a possible 
patron. The threshold for full set-membership is a trickier matter, however. 
Unlike recognition, establishing a representative office is resource-consuming. 
Empirically, most states do not have representations in most other states; 
therefore, the threshold should be significantly lower than that for recognition. 
We have set this threshold at 23 using a benchmark, which is the smallest 
number of embassies in a European Union country. Luxembourg and Malta are 
the particular cases. 
In the case of international organisation membership, the calibration is a 
little different. With representations and formal recognitions we use a 
‘continuous’ fuzzy set membership type, but here we apply a five-value fuzzy 
set type (see Ragin(2000, p. 156)). Instead of just setting three thresholds for 
full membership, full not-membership and a crossover point, we add two values 
for ‘more out than in’ and ‘more in than out’. In this case, we assign set-
membership scores to cases rather than calculating them based on three anchor 
points. 
To determine which cases could fall into which set-membership scores, we 
take the simple classification of international organisations by Kegley and 
Blanton (2010) as a starting point. They propose two dimensions of such 
organisations: purpose and geographic scope. The former is divided into 
multiple and single purpose organisations, and the latter into global and not-
global (inter-, sub- and simply regional) organisations.  
Fully in are those de facto states that are members of some intergovern-
mental organisation. More in than out are those which have some observer or 
similar status in a multi-purpose or global organisation. More out than in are 
those which have some observer or similar status in a regional and single 
purpose organisation. And, finally, fully out of the set are those entities which 
are neither full nor observer members of any organisations. 
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2.4.1. Applying calibration to data 
To present the calibrated data, we must present the actual data first. The data is 
presented in table 5 below: 
Table 5: Cases and data 
Id FDI 
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Taiwan 
2010 2143 118564 15 0 US 1 766 
23 WTO7 
TRNC 6448 2699 0.610 1 Turkey 1 611 
1 OIC12 
(observer) 
Kosovo 22813 58114 115 1 US 0.4 2716 88 IMF
17 
Abkhazia 23118 32419 0.620 1 Russia 0.4 121 6 None 
Taiwan 
198022 2623 110724 125 0 US 0.4 7026 
2327 ADB28 
Palestine 6429 13930 031 0 None 0 3732 
122 Arab 
League33 
PMR 534 109635 136 1 Russia 0 137 0 None 
NKR 12738 52139 040 1 Armenia 0 0 0 None 
Ossetia 141 142 043 1 Russia 0 144 6 None 
Somali-
land 1445 6646 147 1 None 0.4 248 
0 None 
SADR49 1 1 0 0 Algeria 0 050 81 AU
51 
 
There are two important aspects that must be clarified: Taiwan’s inclusion 
twice; and the dates of the data. We will start with the first aspect, Taiwan.  
The inclusion of Taiwan as two separate cases has no theoretical 
justification. However, there are no theoretical objections to it either, so we will 
concentrate on empirical and methodological matters. Empirically, we can see 
the differences between the two Taiwans, mostly in economic conditions and in 
the matter of freedom. Economically, these two cases are different because of 
the political events of the 1970s; in particular, the switching of recognition to 
the People’s Republic affected the Taiwanese economy, creating the need for 
reforms. In 1980, basic reforms had not yet had a major effect, but by 2010 they 
definitely had. Therefore, using the two cases of Taiwan helps us to see whether 
different economies have any effect on the international status of a de facto 
state. Additionally, the political reforms of the 1980s have changed Taiwan’s 
28
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human rights record, making it freer. This helps us to evaluate whether 
democratic governance increases the acceptance of de facto states. There can be 
questions raised about whether human rights had the same effect during the 
Cold War? And of course does the same apply to other conditions? As for 
human rights we can point to the policies of the United States and President 
Carter that did emphasise the importance of them. So, if not exactly similar, the 
importance of human rights had emerged in international politics by 1980. The 
other three conditions seem to be more stable and there is no need to 
differentiate between 1980 and 2010.  
These differences allow us to treat Taiwan in 1980 and in 2010 as different 
cases. Whether this inclusion is justified is a methodological issue, and in the 
case of QCA it is related to the possibility of temporal analysis. The issue of 
temporal analysis can be approached in several ways; one of them is to use 
cases from different dates. Rihoux and Ragin (2009) assert that, in this situation, 
the cases should be clearly differentiated from each other. We are not engaged 
in temporal analysis, but the empirical differences between Taiwan in 1980 and 
in 2010 make them clearly distinct. As the temporal dimension does not surface 
in the analysis itself, but in the interpretation of its results, we can approach the 
result in the ordinary way, i.e., by not searching for temporal effects. The 
distance in time in our case and the substantial differences observed above 
justify the use of two Taiwans. Hence, we can use the same case several times, 
if they can be clearly differentiated, and we can – though we do not have to – 
interpret them for temporal analysis. We will treat Taiwan in 1980 just like any 
other case. 
Finally, the need for Taiwan’s inclusion in this manner is purely practical. 
Our universe of cases is small but the number of conditions is rather large. 
Therefore, we face the threat of limited diversity: our conclusions are to a large 
extent based on logical reminders. To reduce this threat, there are two options. 
First, we could reduce the number of conditions, which will be targeted below 
when calibrating the data. Second, we could increase the number of cases, if 
possible, and the inclusion of the ‘older’ Taiwan does just that.  
The second aspect of the data that must be clarified concerns the dates. As 
we can observe from the previous paragraphs and Table 5, Taiwan 2010 
indicates that the year 2010 is the point in time from which the data has been 
taken. However, there are some deviations from this date. In this context, we 
will look at the conditions separately. 
The power of the patron is taken from the CINC database and is dated 2007. 
This is a few years earlier, but its substantive effect should not be worrying. 
Due to the set-theoretic nature of our approach, slight changes in actual data do 
not alter the set-membership scores and changes in states’ power are not very 
large in such a short span. Therefore, there is no reason not to use the data from 
2007. Another very concrete condition is the evaluation by Freedom House 
where 2011 reports are used (1981 for Taiwan 1980). Secession is the clearest 
of the conditions, as it is dichotomous and lasting.  
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The main issues arise with economy, but they are manageable. Where 
available, data from 2010 is used. In some cases there is a small difference, and 
data from 2009 or 2008 is used. The biggest differences come from Northern 
Cyprus, where available data for FDI is from 2005 and Somaliland, where the 
FDI had to be estimated based on several sources. However, neither temporal 
nor actual differences in data influence the results for several reasons. First, the 
time lags are not extremely large; therefore, we can assume that the changes in 
the data are not too large either. Second, building on the previous point, the set-
theoretic approach gives us a cushion where we do not have exact data. This is 
because of the calibration. For example, if a person earns €10,000 a week, she 
can be considered to be in the set of ‘well-earning people’. But so can a person 
who earns €1,000,000. The differences between them, though large, do not 
matter in a possible set-theoretic analysis. Similarly, if there are differences in 
data, they matter only when they result in the case moving over the 0.5 
crossover point in either direction. In our analysis, there are no such 
movements.  
Based on this data and the thresholds set above, we obtain the calibrated 
data. The calibration was performed with fsQCA 2.5 and the results are 
presented in Table 6: 
 
Table 6: Calibrated data 
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Taiwan 
2010 1 1 0,62 0 1 1 0,62
1
1 
0,63 1 
TRNC 0,87 0,65 0,94 1 1 0,06 0,06 0.94 0,65 0,27 0,65 
Kosovo 1 1 0,63 1 0,35 0,13 0,13 1 1 0,89 1 
Abkhazia 1 0,65 0,64 1 0,35 0,07 0,07 0.65 0,27 0,53 0 
Taiwan 
1980 1 1 0,07 0 0,35 0,38 0,07
1
1 
0,63 1 
Palestine 0,75 0 0,17 0 0 0 0 0.17 1 0.95 1 
PMR 1 1 0 1 0 0,37 0 1 0,27 0 0 
NKR 0,06 0 0,51 1 0 0,11 0 0.51 0 0 0 
Ossetia 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,27 0,53 0 
Somaliland 0 1 0,05 1 0,35 0 0 1 0,52 0 0 
SADR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,87 1 
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As one can observe, there are some dissimilarities between the two tables. 
Indeed, two additional conditions have emerged: ‘economy’ and ‘economyor’. 
These are combinations of our economic conditions – FDI, exports and trade 
partners. There are two reasons why this has been done. First, there is a need to 
reduce limited diversity, as mentioned above. If we were to use all of the 
economic conditions, we would have 27=128 vector space corners (and truth 
table rows) for the maximum of eleven cases. This would leave a lot of corners 
void of cases and our analysis would be very much an exercise in 
counterfactuals. So, to reduce this to 16 possible vector space corners, we 
combine economic conditions.  
Secondly, there are two such conditions because different logical operators 
have been used. The condition ‘economy’ has been created using the logical 
AND operator; it is a conjunction of the conditions. ‘Economyor’ has been 
created using the logical OR operator; it is a disjunction of the conditions. 
Obviously, these two conditions will not be used in the same analysis. The 
reason behind this kind of division is that we can discover the effects of 
economy as a whole and economic niches separately. When using ‘economy,’ 
we can see the effects of a de facto state’s position in the international economy 
as whole. If a state has multiple partners, active foreign trade and invites foreign 
investment, we could hypothesize that it is integrated into the world economy 
which could lead to political acceptance. However, exports and FDI, for 
example, are not logically bound and a de facto state could occupy a niche that 
could result in international acceptance. The ‘economyor’ condition allows us to 
analyse if one of the economic conditions, any of them, could lead to our 
outcomes – representations, recognitions and involvement in international 
organisations. Eventually, we will test four conditions at the time – secession, 
patron, freedom and one of the economic combinations. 
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3. ANALYSIS PROPER 
3.1. Introduction 
We will start with some methodological clarifications. This is necessary 
because we will use a rather limited dataset to show the largest number of 
possible solutions that can be achieved. Three aspects are of importance: two 
different datasets; three different solution terms; and two different consistency 
thresholds. This is in addition to three different outcome conditions and the 
analysis for the presence and absence of the outcome. The latter results from the 
assumption of asymmetry. 
Two different datasets mean that we will start with the smaller one and add 
cases as we progress. First, we conclude the analysis with nine cases. These are 
the cases that fit into our working definition without problems, as established in 
Chapter 1.3 (where we discussed the cases). After that, we add the borderline 
cases of Palestine and Western Sahara. As one may recall, there were some 
issues of governmental control that led us to classify them as borderline. They 
do possess most traits of de facto states, however, and therefore it is useful to 
include them in the analysis and to compare the results with those from the 
dataset of ‘pure’ de facto states.  
Three different solution terms were briefly explained in the method chapter 
(specifically, section 2.2.5 about limited diversity). We will report the most 
complex, most parsimonious and intermediate results. The most complex 
solution term is achieved with data only; limited diversity is not taken into 
account at all. As we have 9 and 11 cases in the respective datasets, and we 
operate with four conditions, the limited diversity is greater in the first and 
smaller in the second dataset. The four conditions mean that we have 24 possible 
combinations of conditions. Or, in fuzzy logic terms, 24 possible vector space 
corners. So, we have 16 corners to fill with only 9 or 11 cases. In this regard, 
the complex solution term might fall a little short.  
The most parsimonious solution term, in contrast, takes into account all the 
vacant combinations. But the solution must remain a superset of the complex 
solution term. This means that however the empty combinations are treated, 
they will not contradict the most complex solution term. 
Between the most complex and most parsimonious solution term is the 
intermediate solution term. This also takes into account the empty combinations 
of conditions, but with simplifying assumptions (theoretical expectations). This 
means that conditions are assumed to have an effect on the outcome when they 
are present, absent or there is no difference. In our data, the presence of the 
economic condition, powerful patron and freedom should contribute to the 
presence of representations, involvement in international organisations and 
formal recognition, as described in the Chapter 1.1. Secession, on the other 
hand, has a negative impact on our outcome conditions, and therefore its 
absence is assumed in the intermediate solution term. For the absence of 
outcomes, the reverse applies. The conditions assumed to be present are 
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assumed to be absent and vice versa. This does not violate the asymmetry 
notion of set-theoretic methods because the results might not be asymmetric. 
And, finally, the intermediate solution term is a subset of the most parsimonious 
and superset of the most complex solution terms. The intermediate solution 
term is the one that forms the core of the analysis. 
The final differentiation that is important to elucidate is that of consistency 
thresholds. This was introduced in the methods chapter (specifically, section 
2.2.5 about the parameters of fit). As social science data seldom shows perfect 
subset-superset relations, we have to introduce some probabilistic logic. 
Therefore, we have set two thresholds of 1 and 0.8 for the analysis. The 
threshold of ‘1’ would show only perfect set relations, if they exist. As this 
might not always be the case, then this threshold is occasionally used as an 
illustration. The threshold of ‘0.8’ is somewhat arbitrary, but recommended as 
the lowest threshold for use. In the following analysis, we will use both 
thresholds but, in drawing conclusion, we will use the 0.8 threshold. The higher 
threshold serves a more illustrative function. 
We have explained how we are going to perform the analysis, now we will 
look at what we are going to analyse. There are two dimensions to the analysis, 
each consisting of two aspects; therefore, a total of four analyses will be 
performed. The first dimension is the presence or absence of the outcome. We 
will start with the analysis of the presence of the outcome followed by the 
absence. As for the outcome condition, for example for representations, the 
presence is represented with ‘representations’ and the absence with 
‘~representations’. The ‘~’ sign is used whenever we talk about the absence of a 
condition, not only the outcome.  
The second dimension is related to economy. We start by treating the 
economic conditions as a whole, combining them with the logical AND ope-
rator. This gives us information about the de facto states’ position in the world 
economy in general. Here economic conditions are represented by ‘economy’. 
Then we will divide the economic conditions, to see whether individual 
components have some influence. However, we will not look at each compo-
nent separately, but combine them in disjunction instead of conjunction. This 
means using the logical OR operator and the condition will be represented by 
‘economyor’. If a case has a high score in one of the three components of the 
economic condition – FDI, exports or multiple trade partners – then the 
disjunction will also have a high score. For the conjunction, all components 
must have a high score for the combination to have a high score too. We will 
start with the conjunction followed by the disjunction.  
So, the final sequence of analysis is first that of representations, followed by 
involvement in international organisations and formal recognition. Each 
analysis of different outcome conditions is in turn divided into different 
sections. Taking representations as an example, we will analyse the conditions 
that lead to representations and conditions that lead to no representations. Both 
analyses are again divided in two. First, we use economic conditions as a whole, 
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then we use them separately. Additionally, we have two datasets and we begin 
with the dataset of nine, followed by a brief comparison with the dataset of 11. 
The internal structure of each component of the analysis is the following. We 
will start with the truth table, followed by the analysis of sufficiency and end 
with the analysis of necessity. Results will be given in table format and in 
figures. Tables include the truth table and tables where we present the 
consistency and coverage scores of particular paths. Both formats give us a 
general picture. Even though cases are presented, and tied to a particular path, 
tables show us tendencies. Figures are twofold. First, there are Venn-diagrams 
that illustrate the results shown in tables. Second, there are XY-plots that give 
us the positions of particular cases. 
 
 
3.2. Representations 
To begin, we take a look at the foreign representations in de facto states. These 
are considered as an example of bilateral relations between confirmed states and 
non-recognised entities. We will start with the analysis of the presence of 
representations in the de facto state, and continue with the analysis of the 
absence of these representations. As stated earlier, the reason for this 
differentiation is that the two can be different and asymmetrical. In both cases, 
the analysis of sufficient conditions is followed by the analysis of necessity. As 
for the consistency thresholds of sufficient conditions, we will start with the 
largest – ‘1’ – and reduce the threshold as we progress. The main emphasis is 
placed on the analysis with the ‘0.8’ consistency threshold. With the three 
different datasets, we will start with the smallest and end up with the largest. 
 
3.2.1. Analysis with the economy as a whole 
3.2.1.1. What leads to having foreign representations? 
First, we introduce the truth table. It gives us combinations that have cases in 
them; unreported rows do not do so. The truth table is presented in Table 7: 
 
Table 7: Truth table for outcome condition ‘representations’ 
eco- 
nomy 
seces-
sion 
pat-
ron 
free-
dom 
number 
of cases
cases represen-
tations 
consistency 
1 0 1 1 1 Taiwan 2010 1 1.000000 
0 0 1 0 1 Taiwan 1980 1 1.000000 
0 1 1 1 1 TRNC 1 0.826087 
0 1 1 0 4 
PMR; Abkhazia; 
South Ossetia; 
Kosovo 
0 0.489736 
0 1 0 0 2 NKR; Somaliland 0 0.375758 
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The scores of ‘0’ and ‘1’ under our four conditions indicate the particular 
logical AND combination which has been created from the positions of cases in 
vector space. In fuzzy set-theory, every case has a membership larger than 0.51 
only in one of the corners of the vector space. In our case, there are 16 corners 
(24) and five of them are filled with cases. These corners correspond to truth 
table rows. The ‘number’ column indicates how many cases there are in the 
row. The ‘representations’ column demonstrates which rows show the presence 
(indicated by ‘1’) or absence (indicated by ‘0’) of the outcome. The ‘con-
sistency’ row shows how consistent this particular combination of conditions is 
with the presence of representations. As we can see, the rows with ‘1’ in the 
‘representations’ column are the most complex solution terms in the following 
analysis. The number column in the table indicates how many cases fall in the 
particular truth table row. To put it simply, it illustrates how many cases show 
the particular combination of conditions, plus whether they have representations 
or not. 
 
3.2.1.1.1 Sufficient conditions for representations in de facto states 
We will start with the results from the analysis of sufficiency with a consistency 
threshold of one. This is the case where perfect subset-superset relations are 
shown. The solution terms are given in Table 8: 
 
Table 8: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for representations 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.317 1 
~economy*~secession 
*patron*~freedom 0.203 0.122 1   
economy*~secession*patron
*freedom 0.195 0.114 1   
Parsimonious solution 0.452 1 
~secession 0.452 0.452 1
Intermediate solution 0.444 1 
patron*~secession  0.444 0.444 1
Notes: consistency threshold 1; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
Although these results show perfect set relations, the main focus of this study is 
on the analysis with a consistency threshold of 0.8. There are two reasons for 
this. First, we have to take into account the data. Even though the dataset is 
relatively small, and in this case a higher consistency threshold is 
recommended, there are at least two objections to this.  
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First, our calibration is not entirely theory-guided. In ideal circumstances, 
one would use theory as a guide to calibration. The theory of de facto states on 
whole is not coherent, mainly due to the relatively short time that it has had to 
develop. It has only been a decade and a half since Scott Pegg’s pioneering 
work on de facto states was published. In the current literature, several aspects 
of the internal and external dynamics of de facto states are analysed, in some 
cases very deeply, but there is no grand theory of the entities. Our theoretical 
expectations used in the intermediate solution terms are independent of each 
other. 
Therefore, our anchor points are established according to theory where 
possible, but, with some conditions, they are based on empirical evidence. This 
is definitely not the wrong approach, especially as the data used in calibration is 
external to the data analysed. But as we do not have clear theoretical 
expectations, it is reasonable to use lower consistency thresholds. We do not 
need perfectly precise measurements for calibration that does not have a perfect 
theoretical background. 
The second reason for a lower consistency threshold is practical. As we can 
observe from Table 8 above, the coverage scores of the solution terms are rather 
weak, all under 0.5. This means that these causal paths together explain less 
than half of why there are representations in de facto states; over 50 per cent of 
this must then be explained by some other phenomena. When reducing the 
consistency threshold, we can obtain results that, while not perfectly consistent, 
can add these other phenomena to our solutions. So, we may expect more 
substantial explanations from lower consistency, with some acceptable loss of 
accuracy. 
Before lowering the threshold, we can still look at the results. As we can see 
from the most parsimonious solution term in Table 8, entities that are non-
secessionist (‘~secession’) are expected to have more foreign representations on 
their soil. However, this result is obtained using difficult counterfactuals. It does 
not take into account our theoretical expectations, set out in chapters 1.1 and 
1.4. When we add these expectations, we obtain the intermediate solution. In 
this case, non-secessionist entities that also have a powerful patron 
(patron*~secession) are more alluring to foreign representations. The dif-
ferences between the most parsimonious and intermediate solutions are 
explained in the method chapter and will be repeated in sections of detailed 
analysis. 
Taking into account everything stated above, we can now lower the 
consistency threshold from ‘1’ to ‘0.8’. The obtained results are presented in 
Table 9.  
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Table 9: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for representations 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.54 0.894 
~economy*~secession 
*patron*~freedom 0.203 0.116 1   
economy*~secession*patron
*freedom 0.195 0.114 1   
~economy*secession*patron
*freedom  0.305 0.223 0.826   
Parsimonious solution 0.735 0.904 
~secession 0.452 0.12 1
freedom 0.614 0.283 0.887
Intermediate solution 0.667 0.912 
patron*~secession  0.444 0.12 1
freedom*patron 0.546 0.223 0.895
Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
Here, compared to the previous section, we will be more thorough in reading 
the table and commenting on it. For example, the table reports five different 
scores – solution consistency, path consistency, solution coverage, path raw 
coverage and path unique coverage – most of which were ignored in the 
previous section. In this section, these indicators will be analysed. 
To start with, as seen in the table, the most complex solution term leads to 
three different paths to representations. They all differ from each other in two 
conditions, therefore they cannot be logically minimised. But as only five out of 
16 possible combinations were filled with cases, these results are not easy to 
generalise about. We would still have to take into consideration that 11 truth 
table rows constitute logical reminders.  
The most parsimonious solution term is the result of taking the limited 
diversity into account. However, the algorithm uses so called difficult counter-
factuals. As described earlier, these are assumptions, sometimes called simpli-
fying assumptions, about how empty truth table rows would contribute to the 
outcome if there were some cases in them. This means that every empty truth 
table row contributes to the outcome or the absence of the outcome in a way 
that does not contradict the most complex solution term, but does contribute to 
parsimony. To put it simply, we treat the empty rows as if they had cases in 
them and see how these hypothetical de facto states would behave. As we know, 
the most parsimonious solution is a superset of the most complex, so there can 
be no elements in the former that do not exist in the latter. The main problem 
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with difficult counterfactuals is that they have no theoretical backing. The non-
contradicting complex solution and the contribution to parsimony are the only 
criteria that are followed.  
The intermediate solution term does have a theoretical background. This 
algorithm uses what is called easy counterfactuals. They are also simplifying 
assumptions that do not contradict the most complex solution term and 
contribute to the parsimony, but include directional expectations. Again, we use 
hypothetical cases (empty cells) but this time we expect them to behave in a 
certain way, and these expectations are set out in Chapter 1.1. Additionally, the 
intermediate solution term has set-relations with other solution terms. It is a 
superset of the most complex and a subset of most parsimonious solution terms. 
As we may recall from section 1.1.3, where we discussed the concept of the 
international system, its components and the conditions with which to fill these 
components, we introduced directional expectations about economy, secession, 
a patron and freedom. These expectations were also shown in Figure 1. Our 
directional expectations were that the presence of freedom, presence of a 
powerful patron and presence of foreign economic relations, as well as the 
absence of secession, contribute to the presence of outcomes, in this case, 
foreign representations in the de facto state. The intermediate solution term 
offers, then, the most interpretable results because it takes into account the 
logical reminders, which yields more parsimony than the most complex 
solution, and uses these reminders as set in theory, giving us more accurate 
results than the most parsimonious solution. Therefore, as briefly mentioned in 
chapter 2.2, this solution term will be the basis of our interpretation. 
As mentioned above, Table 9 has five columns, two for consistency and 
three for coverage. The solution consistency column (with the intermediate 
score 0.912) indicates how much the particular solution term is consistent with 
the statement of sufficiency. This shows to what degree the empirical data is in 
line with subset relations. For sufficiency, the outcome is the superset of the 
condition. Our consistency score of around 0.9 does not, however, mean that 
around nine out of ten cases would show perfect set relations and one would 
show none. It is a set-level characteristic that shows how much the subset-
superset relation deviates from perfection.  
The solution coverage shows, quite literally, how much of the outcome is 
covered by the solution. The score 0.667 shows that our intermediate solution 
term covers around two thirds of the representations. Around one third, then, 
could be covered by other solutions that, however, are not consistent with the 
statement of sufficiency; therefore, other explanations must be found. These 
parameters of set relations are best illustrated on the Venn diagram in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5: Venn diagram showing the coverage of the intermediate solution term from 
Table 9 
 
If there were perfect subset-superset relations between the conditions and 
outcome, the red circle would be fully within the black one. At the moment, 
roughly one tenth of it lies outside the black circle because of its consistency 
score. The conditions, the red circle, cover around two thirds of the outcome, as 
indicated by its coverage score. Based on this, we can say that our intermediate 
solution term is fairly sufficient for the outcome, but that it covers only two 
thirds of the latter. For one third, we must seek other explanations. We cannot, 
however, interpret this as ‘one case out of nine does not contribute to the 
statement of sufficiency’ because of the reasons explained above in the Method 
chapter (2.2).  
As we can see from Table 9 (above), the intermediate solution term consists 
of two paths that have their own particular indicators. What is particularly of 
interest is that this means that the solution term is equifinal: there are different 
possible paths that lead to foreign representation in a de facto state. Moreover, 
there is conjunctural causation, as the paths consist of two conditions. This is in 
line with the expectations of this thesis that fsQCA would be useful in analysing 
de facto states. 
The consistency scores of both paths are similar to solution consistency and 
show the set-relations with the outcome. As we can observe, the path 
‘patron*~secession’ (presence of a powerful patron AND absence of secession) 
is a perfect subset of representations. The raw coverage of the path means the 
percentage of the outcome that this particular path on its own covers. While the 
intermediate solution term has coverage of 0.667, the path of powerful patron 
and no secession (‘patron*~secession’) alone has coverage of 0.444. Alone, it 
would then explain around 45 per cent of the reasons why there are foreign 
representations in de facto states; around 55 per cent would be covered by other 
explanations.  
Outcome
0.33
0.09
Intermediate solu? on term
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With the two paths, there is some overlap. The indicator that shows this 
overlap is unique coverage, which demonstrates how much of the outcome is 
covered by the path alone and only alone. For the path of powerful patron and 
no secession (‘patron*~secession’), it is only 0.12. This indicates that out of the 
raw coverage of 0.44, about 0.32 is also covered by the other path of freedom 
and powerful patron (‘freedom*patron’). As one can observe, the sum of one 
path’s raw coverage and the other path’s unique coverage is the total coverage 
of the solution term. The relationship between the two paths and the equifinality 
of the solution term is again best illustrated on a Venn diagram in Figure 6: 
 
 
Figure 6: Venn diagram showing the coverage of the paths ‘patron*~secession’ and 
‘freedom*patron’ from Table 9 
 
The three circles represent the foreign representations in a de facto state 
(outcome; black), the path of powerful patron and no secession 
(‘patron*~secession’; red), and the path where the de facto state is democratic 
and has a powerful patron (‘freedom*patron’; blue). As with the whole 
intermediate solution term, these two paths together cover around two thirds of 
the outcome. This Venn diagram, however, illustrates the differences between 
the two paths. As one can observe, the ‘patron*~secession’ path is fully in the 
outcome circle, indicating full subset relations. The path ‘freedom*patron’, on 
the other hand, has an area outside the black circle; this is indicated by the 
consistency score 0.1. There is also an overlap between the two paths shown on 
the diagram, with ‘patron*~secession’ (the red circle) covering 0.12 of the 
outcome without the overlap and ‘freedom*patron’ (the blue circle) covering 
0.22 of the black circle.  
With powerful patron being a component in both causal paths, it could be 
argued that the condition is necessary. The analysis of necessity is performed a 
little later to confirm whether this is indeed the case. Until now, we have looked 
Outcome
0.33
0.12
‘patron*~secession’
‘freedom*patron’
0.22
0.1
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at the results as if they were somewhat anonymous – just relationships between 
conditions presented in table format and on Venn diagrams. Even though the 
results have been obtained using empirical data, there is an element of limited 
diversity here and the directional expectations have been used to get the 
solutions. Granted that using these expectations must not contradict the 
empirical evidence, it is still necessary to look at how the cases are positioned in 
the solution.  
The best way to illustrate the cases is an XY-plot. On the x-axis, we have the 
combination of causes that leads to an outcome in the intermediate solution 
term and, on the y-axis, we have the outcome. As it is a fuzzy set analysis, both 
axes range from zero to one.  
In Figure 6, there is an XY-plot of the path where the de facto state has a 
powerful patron and is non-secessionist (‘patron*~secession’): 
 
Figure 7: Cases of the path ‘patron*~secession’ against representations from Table 9  
 
As we know already, the path is fully consistent as a sufficient condition for 
representations. On an XY-plot, this is expressed when all the cases fall above 
the main diagonal. As we can see from the graph, this is indeed the case. There 
are no cases that show a smaller score in the outcome than in the causal path.  
As secession was operationalised as a dichotomy, it is not surprising that the 
cases are concentrated on the sides of the plot. And one must not ignore that it is 
the absence of secession that is the condition in the conjuncture. With Taiwan 
being the only case (or cases, as the entity is used twice in the data) that did not 
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secede from the parent-state, it is the only one showing a large score in the path. 
And Taiwan has had the support of the United States since it was ‘downgraded’ 
to a de facto state. Therefore, it enjoys high scores in both conditions and also in 
a combination created using the logical AND operator. 
The other cases, by contrast, show high scores in secession and low scores in 
its compliment. Again, as this is a logical AND combination, meaning the 
lowest score of the two conditions matters and the score in the set of powerful 
patron does not alter the overall score. The cases in the left column are, from the 
top: Kosovo; TRNC; Somaliland; Abkhazia, Ossetia and PMR (all under the 
same data-point); and NKR in the lower left corner. 
One important thing to note on the graph is the absence of truly contra-
dictory cases. Even though they do not matter as much in fuzzy set QCA as they 
do in the crisp set version, this is a welcome fact. It is illustrated by the lower 
right-hand corner of the plot being empty. Contradictory cases would therefore 
be those that show high scores in the condition but low scores in the outcome. 
The absence of this kind of case of course contributes to the consistency score. 
The other conjuncture, the path of ‘freedom*patron’ (presence of freedom 
AND presence of powerful patron) does not show this kind of consistency, 
although it is acceptably high. As for the whole intermediate solution term, the 
cases that fall out of the black circle in Figure 6 above are those that are in this 
particular path. The cases in this path are shown on Figure 8: 
  
 
Figure 8: Cases of the path ‘freedom*patron’ against representations from Table 9 
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As one can observe, the pattern of cases is different from the path 
‘patron*~secession’, although not entirely so. The freedom condition was 
operationalised in a threefold manner – fully in for free states, fully out for not-
free states and more out than in for partly free states. So, there is an extra 
possibility for cases to slot in than just in a dichotomy.  
Compared to the ‘patron*~secession’ path, the ‘freedom*patron’ con-
juncture does not show perfect consistency with representations. There are two 
cases that fall below the main diagonal. These cases are, from the left, Abkhazia 
and TRNC. First of all, it must be mentioned that these are not contradictory 
cases. Abkhazia’s scores in both condition and outcome are below the 0.5 
crossover point, while TRNC’s scores are both above it. The reason they are 
under the main diagonal is that their scores in the set of representations are 
lower than their scores in the path of freedom and powerful patron. For a 
condition or a path to be fully consistent, all cases must show scores in the 
outcome at least equal to those in the conditions. This situation would show 
perfect fuzzy subset-superset relations. Still, in the case of ‘freedom*patron,’ 
the consistency score of 0.895 is acceptable, taking into account our data.  
Away from slight differences, there is one major similarity between the two 
paths: namely, the absence of contradictory cases. Again, no case shows a score 
over 0.5 in the condition and score under that threshold in the outcome. This is 
definitely a strength of the intermediate solution term and gives us an 
opportunity to generalise, albeit cautiously. 
The cases are distributed on the graph as follows. On the left-hand column, 
from top to bottom, come: Somaliland; Ossetia and PMR (under the same data-
point); and Nagorno-Karabakh in the lower left corner. In the middle column, 
again from top to bottom, there are: Taiwan (1980); Kosovo; and Abkhazia. 
And, in the right-hand column, there are Taiwan (2010) and TRNC.  
 
3.2.1.1.2. Necessary conditions 
Necessary conditions have their own consistency and coverage scores inde-
pendently of the sufficient conditions. Therefore, the following analysis is 
applicable to all sufficiency analysis, no matter what the threshold is. 
Having established sufficient combinations of conditions, and discovered 
that one condition – the presence of a powerful patron – figures in both of them, 
it might be tempting to consider it as necessary too. The tests for necessary 
conditions are given in Table 10: 
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Table 10: Necessary conditions for the outcome ‘representations’. 
Condition Consistency Coverage
secession 0.616466 0.454815 
~secession 0.451807 1
patron 0.897590 0.644092 
~patron 0.138554 0.334951 
freedom 0.614458 0.886956 
~freedom 0.558233 0.500901 
economy  0.222892 1
~economy  0.843373 0.532319
Notes: created using fsQCA 2.5 programme; ‘~’ indicates absence of condition 
 
As one can observe, the consistency score for the condition ‘patron’ is rather 
high at 0.898. Again, the question of too much accuracy arises, so rounding up 
does not lose much information. In the literature about QCA, however, higher 
consistency scores are recommended: a minimum of 0.9 rather than the 0.8 
minimum for sufficient conditions. The score for ‘patron’ is close enough to this 
threshold to warrant further analysis. And the best way to do this is to take a 
look at the XY-plot, given in Figure 9. 
The consistency score of necessary conditions is mathematically identical to 
the coverage score of sufficient conditions. And the coverage score is 
mathematically identical to the consistency score of sufficient conditions, for 
that matter. This is because of the different set relations between sufficient and 
necessary conditions, on the one side, and the outcome, on the other. Sufficient 
conditions are subsets of the outcome; necessary conditions are supersets of the 
outcome. This was explained briefly in the chapter 2.2. On an XY-plot, this is 
expressed in the need for cases to be under the main diagonal for consistent 
necessary conditions. For a condition to be necessary and sufficient, all cases 
must be on the main diagonal, i.e., the scores for condition and outcome must 
be equal in every case. On a Venn diagram, the two circles must be identical. 
In Figure 9, we can see that majority of the cases are under the main 
diagonal, with one exception. This exception is also the reason why the 
consistency score is not one. But there is one additional aspect to this case. As 
one can observe from the graph, its score in the outcome is slightly over the 0.5 
crossover point. However, the score in the condition is very low, making it a 
logically contradictory case. Even though, as pointed out previously, 
contradictory cases do not matter as much in fuzzy sets as they do in crisp ones, 
this still makes its mark on the interpretation of ‘patron’ as a necessary 
condition.  
The contradictory case is Somaliland. Here, one aspect that contributes to the 
patron not being necessary is the operationalisation. As we may recall, the 
crossover point for representations was two. If one were to raise the threshold, 
32
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then this one case would cease to be contradictory and ‘patron’ could be 
interpreted as a necessary condition.  
Still, taking everything into account, both pros and cons, we must be very 
careful in interpreting ‘patron’ as a necessary condition and the safer option 
would be not to do so.  
 
 
Figure 9: Cases showing scores of ‘patron’ against representations from Table 10 
 
Additionally, the coverage score for ‘patron’ is not particularly high at 0.64, 
which shows that the necessary condition is not especially relevant. This means 
that, in addition to the problems with consistency, around one third of outcomes 
occur without ‘patron’ present. Nevertheless, the score is above 0.5 and to some 
extent we can talk about a necessary condition.  
 
3.2.1.2. What leads to no represenatations? 
The analysis of the presence of representations confirmed two ideas tested in 
this study. First, there is equifinality, as there are two different causal paths that 
lead to the outcome. Secondly, there is conjunctural causation, as those paths 
are not single conditions but combinations of conditions. This section tries to 
test asymmetry. Does the analysis of no-representations yield results that are not 
merely complements of those achieved with the presence of the outcome?  
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We will start with the truth table that is shown in Table 11: 
 
Table 11: Truth table for the absence of outcome condition ‘representations’ 
eco-
nomy 
seces-
sion 
pat-
ron 
free-
dom 
num-
ber 
cases ~represen-
tations 
consistency 
0 1 0 0 2 NKR; Somaliland 1 0.896970 
0 1 1 0 4 
PMR; Abkhazia; 
South Ossetia; 
Kosovo 0 0.662757 
0 1 1 1 1 TRNC 0 0.494565 
0 0 1 0 1 Taiwan 1980 0 0.297030 
1 0 1 1 1 Taiwan 2010 0 0.278351 
 
Two things must be noted in the truth table. First, the low consistency scores of 
the sufficient conditions. The truth table row that shows the presence of the 
outcome, the not-representations (which would, rather confusingly, be the 
presence of the absence of the outcome), has a consistency score of 0.897, 
therefore falling short of perfect subset-superset relations. This score also rules 
out any solution terms with a consistency score of higher than 0.899, which 
means that there can be no analysis with a threshold of one or even 0.9. Here, 
the 0.8 threshold is the only possible solution. 
The second thing to be noted in the truth table is that the sufficient truth table 
row is fully in line with our theoretical expectations, where the presence of 
secession and the absence of all other conditions contribute to the de facto state 
not having foreign representations (‘~representations’). As we may recall from 
the analysis of the presence of representations, there was a truth table row that 
led to the outcome and possessed exactly opposite scores. Therefore, at least in 
the complex solution, there is symmetry in some cases but it is not complete. 
There were other combinations that led to ‘representations’ that are not 
represented in their mirror image in the case of ‘~representations’. Because of 
this, we cannot speak about symmetry in results for the outcome and its 
complement; at least with results based on the truth table and the most complex 
solution term. 
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3.2.1.2.1 Sufficient conditions 
The three different solution terms are presented in Table 12:  
 
Table 12: Solution terms of sufficient conditions for the absence of representations 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.368 0.897 
~freedom*~patron*secession
*~economy 0.368 0.368 0.897   
Parsimonious solution 0.386 0.752 
~patron 0.386 0.386 0.752 
Intermediate solution 0.368 0.897 
~freedom*~patron*secession
*~economy 0.368 0.368 0.897   
Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
As one can observe, there are several things that differ here compared to Table 
9 covering the sufficient conditions of the analysis focusing on the presence of 
representations. First, all of the solution terms share the same coverage score. 
As each solution term consists of only one causal path, the raw and unique 
coverage of each path are exactly the same too. Second, which follows from 
this, there is no equifinality. When all solution terms express only one path, 
then there are no alternative ways of reaching the outcome; therefore, the 
solutions are not equifinal. Third, the most complex solution term and the most 
parsimonious solution term are the same. The reason for this is, as mentioned in 
the analysis of the truth table, that this particular causal path is fully in line with 
our directional expectations. And, as there is no equifinality, simplifying 
assumptions do not add to parsimony. Difficult counterfactuals, however, add to 
parsimony and reduce the causal path to a single condition: ~patron.  
Before we look at the cases in intermediate and complex solution terms, 
there are a few important aspects to the most parsimonious solution that should 
be noted. We start with the consistency score, and at 0.752 it is well below the 
accepted minimum of 0.8. It is included because, at this threshold for the 
complex solution, there cannot be any more parsimonious solutions with higher 
consistency.  
Secondly, ‘~patron’ might suggest that there is some symmetry in the 
conditions for presence and absence of representations, because ‘~patron’ also 
figures in conjunctures leading to the presence of the outcome. There are two 
clear objections to this. First of all, here ‘~patron’ is a sufficient condition, or at 
least would be if not for a consistency score that is too low. In the previous 
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analysis, ‘patron’ was, albeit debatably, a necessary condition. Second, the most 
parsimonious solution in the previous analysis was not, and did not include, the 
condition ‘patron’. As one may recall, the most parsimonious solution was 
‘~secession’ OR ‘freedom’.  
The intermediate and complex solution terms, being identical, are more 
consistent in their subset-superset relations with the outcome. Again, there are 
two aspects of importance with these solutions. First, the coverage score is as 
low as the most parsimonious solution, therefore neither of the solutions covers 
much of the outcome. Over 60 per cent is left for other explanations.  
The second aspect is the cases that can be seen in Figure 10 below: 
 
Figure 10: Cases of the path ‘~freedom*~patron*secession*~economy’ against the 
absence of representations from Table 12 
 
There is one case that does not contribute to consistency and this is Somaliland. 
Furthermore, it is a logically contradictory case, albeit only just. Somaliland has 
a score higher than 0.5 in the conjuncture but it just misses this score in the 
outcome. The score in the ‘~representations’ is 0.48.  
Elsewhere the cases of Abkhazia, Ossetia and PMR share the top left data-
point; followed by, from top to bottom: TRNC; Kosovo; and Taiwan in 1980 
and 2010 (sharing the data-point). In the upper right corner is NKR. 
Overall, there are problems with sufficiency in the case of ‘~represen-
tations’. The consistency score indicates that the complex solution fits the bill, 
but its coverage score is low, leaving too much room for other explanations. 
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There is also the problem of Somaliland, which is logically contradictory. So, 
compared to the analysis of the presence of representations, the analysis of their 
absence produces less clearly interpretable results. 
 
3.2.1.2.2. Necessary conditions 
The analysis of necessary conditions also contradicts the respective analysis for 
‘representations’. The results are presented in Table 13, which shows that there 
are several conditions that pass the consistency threshold of 0.9. 
 
Table 13: Necessary conditions for the outcome ‘~representations’ 
Condition Consistency Coverage
economy 0.082090 0.297297 
~economy 1 0.509506 
secession 1 0.595556 
~secession 0.084577 0.151111 
patron 0.659204 0.381844 
~patron 0.385572 0.752427 
freedom 0.310945 0.362319 
~freedom 0.902985 0.654054 
Notes: ‘~’ indicates the absence of the condition 
 
The conditions of ‘~economy’, ‘secession’ and ‘~freedom’ can all be con-
sidered necessary, the former two expressing a consistency score of one. This 
means that there is a perfect subset-superset relation between these conditions 
and the outcome. With necessary conditions, the outcome is the subset and the 
condition is the superset. When there are perfect subset-superset relations, one 
does not have to worry about contradictory cases. This worry remains with less-
than-one consistency scores.  
However, there is a problem with ‘~economy’ as a necessary condition. If 
we recall Table 10, we see that its consistency score in the analysis of the 
presence of representations was rather high at 0.84. Even though it is below the 
0.9 threshold, and we did not consider ‘~economy’ to be necessary for 
‘representations’, it is still reasonably high to cause contradictory statements. 
This means that ‘~economy’ could be consistent with the statement of necessity 
in both cases, where there are representations and where there are not, and 
therefore we cannot strictly speak about necessity. 
The results for ‘~freedom’ as a necessary condition are shown in Figure 11 
below. To be fully consistent with the statement of necessity, all cases must 
have a score in the outcome that is higher or equal to the score in the condition. 
This would lead to all cases being on or under the main diagonal. There are two 
cases above the main diagonal, though, which lower the consistency score. 
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These cases are TRNC on the left and Abkhazia on the right. TRNC shows 
scores of 0 and 0.36, and Abkhazia 0.65 and 0.73. Even though they reduce the 
consistency score, they are not logically contradictory cases. In the case of 
TRNC, both scores are under the 0.5 crossover point and for Abkhazia they are 
both above it. Therefore, the statement of necessity holds for ‘~freedom’.  
The second parameter of fit, coverage, displays a lower number than 
consistency. The coverage score indicates whether the necessary condition is 
relevant or trivial. The higher the score, the more relevant the condition. The 
coverage score for ‘~economy’ and ‘secession’ is just over 0.5; for ‘~freedom,’ 
it is slightly higher at 0.65. As with ‘patron,’ when we analysed the presence of 
foreign representations, we can also talk about a necessary condition here.  
 
Figure 11: Cases showing no freedom (~freedom) against no representations from 
Table 13  
Overall, we can speak about three necessary conditions, although those that 
show high consistency can be interpreted as not especially relevant. Conditions 
that lack consistency are more relevant. Comparing the results with the analysis 
of ‘representations,’ we have a different solution, as we did with the sufficient 
conditions. Instead of one necessary condition with a logically contradictory 
case, we have three and no contradictions. The asymmetry is also retained, as 
the complement of ‘patron’ is not among the necessary conditions here. In fact, 
the consistency score of ‘~patron’ is very low at 0.39. 
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Also, the economic condition has come into play as it was present neither in 
the intermediate solution term nor among the necessary conditions for 
‘representations’. This shows that economic matters do have some importance 
in foreign relations of de facto states and in the acceptance of these entities. 
 
 
3.2.2. Dismantling the economy –  
analysis with different economic conditions 
Until now we have treated the economic condition as a logical AND combi-
nation to find out whether foreign economic relations as a whole influence the 
number of foreign representations in a de facto state. However, the economic 
conditions might have an influence of their own, separate from the others. 
Hence we will perform the analysis with the three economic conditions – FDI, 
exports and trade partners – combined with the logical OR operator. We will 
swap the conjunction for the disjunction. This analysis will highlight whether 
the de facto state has a niche in foreign economy and is therefore more accepted 
by confirmed states.  
Technically, the condition ‘economy’ has been replaced with the condition 
‘economyor’ to emphasise the disjunction, i.e. the logical OR operator. 
 
3.2.2.1 What leads to representations? 
3.2.2.1.1. Sufficient conditions 
As we did previously, we will start with the truth table to see if there are any 
differences to the complex solution term. The truth table is given in Table 14: 
 
Table 14: Truth table for outcome condition ‘representations’ with disjunction of 
economic conditions 
eco-
nomyor 
seces-
sion 
pat-
ron 
free-
dom 
num-
ber 
cases represen-
tations consistency 
1 0 1 0 1 Taiwan 1980 1 1.000000 
1 0 1 1 1 Taiwan 2010 1 1.000000 
1 1 1 1 1 TRNC 1 0.826087 
1 1 1 0 3 PMR; Abkhazia; Kosovo 0 0.577689 
0 1 1 0 1 South Ossetia 0 0.522013 
1 1 0 0 2 NKR; Somaliland 0 0.512397 
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As we can see from the table, there are three sufficient paths to the outcome, as 
was the case with ‘economy’. The main difference is that the ‘economyor’ 
condition is represented in all paths; previously, economic conditions did not 
have such influence. To see the exact influence that different economic 
variables can have, we have to look at the results. These are presented in Table 
15: 
 
Table 15: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for representations with disjunction 
of economic conditions 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.667 0.912 
economyor*~secession 
*patron 0.444 0.120 1   
economyor*patron*freedom 0.546 0.223 0.895 
Parsimonious solution 0.735 0.904 
~secession  0.452 0.120 1 
freedom  0.614 0.283 0.887 
Intermediate solution 0.667 0.912 
patron*~secession 
*economyor 0.444 0.120 1   
freedom*patron*economyor 0.546 0.223 0.895 
Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
There are several things of note in the table. First of all, the complex solution 
term is not identical to the truth table rows with outcome. This, as one may 
recall, was the case when economic conditions were tied together with the 
logical AND operator. Here the complex solution term is available for logical 
minimisation using the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. Therefore, we get two 
results but both include three conditions rather than four, as in the truth table. 
Secondly, the intermediate and complex solution terms are identical, consisting 
of the same conjunctures. The same was the case with the analysis of the 
absence of outcome. Thirdly, the economic condition is on a par with the patron 
condition in the sense that it is present in both combinations. That was not the 
case with the conjunction. Fourth, the most parsimonious solution is exactly the 
same as it was with the conjunction of economic conditions. This shows that, 
when taking into account difficult counterfactuals, the results are not influenced 
by economic conditions. There is no difference whether we treat them as one or 
give each component a weight. 
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The whole intermediate solution covers around two thirds of the outcome, 
therefore around one third must be explained by some other reasons. This is 
similar to the result obtained with the conjunction of economy. The solution 
consistency is over 0.9, which means that we can quite confidently speak about 
sufficiency here. And it is also slightly higher than the analysis with economy 
conjunction.  
Coming to independent paths, ‘patron*~secession*economyor’ has a con-
sistency score of ‘1,’ therefore there is no need to check for possible contra-
dictory cases. The statement of sufficiency holds; all cases would be above the 
main diagonal on an XY-plot. However, the coverage of this path is under 0.5 
and its unique coverage a very low 0.12. The reason for this is, first, that the 
solution coverage itself is not very high and, second, there are two conditions 
that overlap in both paths. Their unique coverage has to be rather low because 
of this overlap. 
The path ‘freedom*patron*economyor’ has a better coverage score of 0.546, 
but overall it is also not very impressive. Its unique coverage score is almost 
twice that of ‘patron*~secession*economyor’ at 0.223, but the overlap effect is 
still there. The difference between the two paths must come from the different 
condition and we can say that ‘freedom’ seems to have more coverage on the 
outcome than ‘~secession’.  
The consistency score of ‘freedom*patron*economyor’ is just under 0.9. 
This does not prevent us from considering the path to be sufficient for the 
outcome because the consistency score is still relatively high. However, with no 
perfect subset-superset relations, we have to check which cases contribute to the 
lowering of the consistency score and whether there are logically contradictory 
cases. The results are shown in Figure 12 below. 
As we can see, there are two data-points below the main diagonal. They 
represent two cases – Abkhazia on the lower left side and TRNC on the upper 
right side. Even though they contribute to the low consistency score, they are 
not logically contradictory cases. To be that, a case must have a score higher 
than 0.5 in the condition and lower than 0.5 in the outcome. Here, Abkhazia has 
scores (0.35, 0.27) which are both below 0.5 and TRNC has scores (0.88, 0.64) 
which are both above 0.5. Hence, even though the consistency does not reflect 
perfect subset-superset relations, we can say that the statement of sufficiency 
holds because there are no logically contradicting cases.  
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Figure 12: Cases of the path ‘freedom*patron*economyor’ against representations from 
Table 15 
 
3.2.2.1.2. Necessary conditions 
The analysis of necessity has to confirm or disconfirm the hunch that both 
conditions which featured in both paths in the intermediate solution term are 
necessary conditions. Furthermore, as there was logical minimisation involved 
in the calculation of the most complex solution term, there might be conditions 
that are redundant as sufficient conditions yet still necessary. However, the truth 
table shows that the possibility of this is small. The analysis of necessity is 
presented in Table 16 below. 
over the threshold of 0.9 or very close 
to it. And these conditions are exactly those that figure in both causal paths in 
complex and intermediate solution terms: ‘patron’ and ‘economyor’. As one can 
observe, the results for ‘patron’ are exactly the same as they were in the 
previous analysis. This is certainly logical, because nothing has changed in the 
relation between ‘patron’ and the outcome. Therefore, everything that was said 
earlier about the statement of necessity still applies. This means the slightly 
lower consistency score than recommended in the literature and the logically 
contradictory case of Somaliland reduce the possibility of ‘patron’ being a 
necessary condition. 
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    As we can see, two conditions are either 
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Table 16: Necessary conditions for the outcome ‘representations’ with disjunction of 
economic conditions 
Condition Consistency Coverage
secession 0.616466 0.454815 
~secession 0.451807 1
patron 0.897590 0.644092 
~patron 0.138554 0.334951 
freedom 0.614458 0.886956 
~freedom 0.558233 0.500901 
economyor 0.937751 0.674855 
~economyor 0.176707 0.423077 
 
The other condition ‘economyor’ has a consistency score of 0.94, which is 
comfortably above the recommended threshold but still some way short of 
perfect subset-superset relations. As we may recall, with necessity the con-
ditions were the superset and the outcome was the subset. With sufficiency it is 
the other way round. To identify the cases that deviate from perfect set-
relations, we use the XY-plot which is presented in Figure 13:  
 
 
Figure 13: Cases of disjunction of economic conditions (‘economyor) against 
representations from Table 16 
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The XY-plot shows us one case that is not consistent with the statement of 
necessity. It is located on the lower left corner of the plot and is South Ossetia. 
There are three cases in the upper right corner that also seem to be above the 
main diagonal, but their scores in both the condition and the outcome are very 
high, so they do not influence the overall score too much. The main case which 
does so is South Ossetia with its scores of (0.05, 0.27). 
Still, with this score, it is not a logically contradictory case. For necessity, 
the contradiction would be a higher than 0.5 score in the outcome but a lower 
than 0.5 score in the condition. On the XY-plot, the upper left corner should be 
empty, and in the case of ‘economyor’ it is. Therefore, we can state that ‘eco-
nomyor’ is a necessary condition for the outcome. Compared to the conjunction 
‘economy’ this gives the economic conditions a more prominent role in the 
acceptance of de facto states. To view economic conditions separately adds to 
our knowledge about de facto states in the international system. 
Overall, for the outcome ‘representations’ or the presence of representations, 
the use of economic conditions separately gave a different insight. Next we will 
see if the same applies to ‘~representations’. 
 
3.2.2.2. What leads to no representations? 
3.2.2.2.1. Sufficient conditions 
As always, we will start with the truth table to identify sufficient conjunctures 
that have cases in them. And, as the previous section taught us, they show the 
raw conjunctures that, when possible, are subject to logical minimisation. This 
leads to the differences between the truth table rows and the most complex 
solution term after using the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. The truth table is 
presented in Table 17: 
 
Table 17: Truth table for outcome condition ‘~representations’ with disjunction of 
economic conditions 
eco-
nomyor 
seces-
sion 
pat-
ron 
free-
dom 
num-
ber 
cases ~represen-
tations consistency 
1 1 0 0 2 NKR; Somaliland 1 0.859504 
0 1 1 0 1 South Ossetia 1 0.805032 
1 1 1 0 3 PMR; Abkhazia; Kosovo 0 0.629482 
1 1 1 1 1 TRNC 0 0.494565 
1 0 1 0 1 Taiwan 1980 0 0.297030 
1 0 1 1 1 Taiwan 2010 0 0.186335 
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As with the conjunction of economic conditions, the truth table does not 
produce perfectly consistent rows. Therefore, we cannot speak about perfect 
subset-superset relations. Unlike the earlier analysis, one more row with 
‘~representations’ has been added to the table, otherwise the two are rather 
similar. For the analysis of sufficiency, the results of the solution terms are 
presented in Table 18: 
 
Table 18: Solution terms of sufficient conditions for ‘~representations’ with disjunction 
of economic conditions 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.55 0.822 
economyor*secession 
*~patron*~freedom  0.259 0.231 0.86   
~economyor*secession 
*patron*~freedom  0.318 0.291 0.805   
Parsimonious solution 0.677 0.768 
~patron 0.386 0.236 0.752 
~economyor 0.440 0.291 0.851 
Intermediate solution 0.659 0.847 
~freedom*secession 
*~economyor 0.438 0.291 0.85   
~freedom*~patron*secession 0.368 0.221 0.897 
Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
There are several differences as well as similarities between the analyses with 
the conjunction and disjunction of economic conditions. To start with 
differences, there are two paths in the most complex solution term and they do 
not correspond to directional expectations as they did earlier. This leads to the 
intermediate solution being different from the most complex solution. The 
directional expectations, or simplifying assumptions, or easy counterfactuals as 
they are called, do lead to parsimony and also to higher consistency score. 
Additionally, there are also two different paths in both the intermediate and 
most parsimonious solution term. This means that by using ‘economyor’ instead 
of ‘economy’ we get equifinal results that were absent in the earlier analysis.  
The main similarity is that the most parsimonious solution term does not 
reach the consistency score of 0.8. This is due to the condition ‘~patron’ that 
also figured earlier. The additional path of ‘~economyor’ does reach 0.8, but 
this is not sufficient to increase the overall consistency score of the solution 
term. 
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When analysing the sufficiency of intermediate solution terms, we again turn 
to XY-plots to determine whether there are any logically contradictory cases 
and which cases contribute to the reduction of the consistency score. The XY-
plot for the path of no freedom, no powerful patron and secession 
(‘~freedom*~patron*secession’) is presented in Figure 14 below. As we can 
see, there is only one case that lies under the main diagonal and that affects the 
consistency score. This case is Somaliland. Unfortunately, it is also a logically 
contradictory case and reduces our confidence in claiming that this particular 
path is sufficient for the outcome.  
 
 
Figure 14: Cases of the path ‘~freedom*~patron*secession’ against no representations 
from Table 18 
 
The second path of no freedom, secession and no foreign economy 
(‘~freedom*secession*~economyor’) gives us a very interesting result. As we 
can see in Figure 15 below, it is a mirror image of Figure 13 above. As we may 
recall, that figure was for the analysis of necessity for the representations with 
the condition ‘economyor’. This means that in our path ‘~freedom*seces-
sion*~economyor’ the conditions ‘~freedom’ and ‘secession’ are redundant and 
the most parsimonious solution term of ‘~economyor’ is fully in line with easy 
counterfactuals. As we can see, their consistency and coverage scores are also 
very similar. Therefore, we can say that the absence of economic conditions is 
sufficient for the outcome ‘~representations’. 
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Figure 15: Cases of the path ‘~freedom*secession*economyor’ against the absence of 
representations from Table 18 
 
3.2.2.2.2. Necessary conditions 
The analysis of necessity shows very much the same results as with the 
condition ‘economy’. These results are presented in Table 19: 
 
Table 19: Necessary condition for the outcome ‘~representations’ with disjunction of 
economic conditions 
Condition Consistency Coverage
secession 1 0.595556 
~secession 0.084577 0.151111 
patron 0.659204 0.381844 
~patron 0.385572 0.752427 
freedom 0.310945 0.362319 
~freedom 0.902985 0.654054 
economyor 0.701493 0.407514 
~economyor 0.440299 0.850962 
 
Both necessary conditions from the earlier analysis, ‘secession’ and ‘~freedom,’ 
retain their respective scores and everything shown earlier applies. The 
condition ‘~economyor’ does not exceed the threshold of 0.9, therefore not 
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becoming a sufficient and necessary condition. As we may recall from section 
3.2.1.2.2, ‘economy’ showed a high consistency score, although it had several 
problems. Therefore, this is the only change that occurs when we switch from 
taking economic conditions as a whole to taking them separately. 
 
 
3.2.3. Adding borderline cases 
Now we will add the borderline cases of Palestine and Western Sahara to the 
dataset and see whether they make substantial differences to the analysis already 
undertaken. Here, we also take a look at different forms of analysis, as we did 
with the nine cases. Specifically, we will conduct three different analyses and 
compare them to what has already been done. These three differentiations are: the 
analysis of sufficiency and necessity; the analysis of the presence and absence of 
outcome; and the analysis with foreign economic conditions as a whole and 
separately. The latter is again expressed as the conjunction and disjunction of 
economic conditions respectively. We will not add any tables, but merely 
comment on the changes, if there are any, to the tables already presented.  
 
3.2.3.1. Sufficient conditions 
Starting with the presence of the outcome and economic conjunction (Table 9), 
the addition of two borderline cases alters all three solution terms. Starting with 
the complex one, there were three sufficient paths in the term but with 
borderline cases there are two. The path ‘~economy*~secession*patron 
*~freedom’ has been lost. This also influences the intermediate solution term 
where instead of two paths only ‘freedom*patron’ survive. With the most 
parsimonious solution, ‘~secession’ is dropped and only ‘freedom’ remains. 
The consistency and coverage scores are not altered much though and are very 
similar to the ones reported in Table 9.  
The main implication that borderline cases have is the loss of relevance of the 
absence of secessionism. Even though both cases score high on the condition, i.e. 
neither is considered to be secessionist; the different scores in the outcome con-
dition mean that the consistency of ‘~secession’ decreases. Hence it is no longer 
an independent path in the most parsimonious solution term nor does it figure in 
the intermediate one. Otherwise the results are the same as with nine cases. 
Turning to the analysis of no representations with economic conjunction 
there are no major differences to report. The most complex and intermediate 
solution terms are the same as with nine cases (Table 12), there are only very 
minor changes in consistency and coverage scores. This means that the analysis 
does not produce equifinal results, as all solution terms consist of one path. In 
the case of the most complex and intermediate solutions, conjunctural causation 
remains In case of the most parsimonious solution condition ‘secession’ has 
been added to the ‘~patron’ condition. The rise in the importance of 
secessionism can be attributed to the case of Palestine which is not secessionist 
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but does have representations on its soil. Here we see that in the case of no 
representations, the influence of added cases and their non-secessionist creation 
does not have the same effect as it did with the presence of representations. This 
can be explained by the larger number of de facto states not having 
representations so the additional cases have less influence. 
Overall, when treating economic conditions as a conjunction i.e. combined 
using the logical AND operator, adding borderline cases does not alter the 
results much, even though there are some changes. The most noteworthy change 
is the decreased relevance of the absence of secessionism for representations 
because the added cases have different scores in the outcome. Otherwise, the 
sufficient combinations are not altered, although there are cosmetic changes to 
the consistency and coverage scores. 
When we substitute the conjunction of economic conditions with a dis-
junction, the changes are still small and irrelevant. Starting with the presence of 
the outcome, in comparison with the results presented in Table 15, there are no 
changes most complex and intermediate solution terms, par cosmetic changes in 
coverage scores. There are two substantial changes in the most parsimonious 
solution. First, again ‘patron’ is added to ‘~secession’. Second, and entire row is 
added consisting of ‘~secession’ and ‘economyor’. Of course, it could be the 
other way round with ‘economyor’ added and patron creating a new path. 
Coming to the analysis of no representations, there are again no substantial 
changes to report. Most complex and intermediate solution terms are exactly the 
same as reported in Table 18 with only minor adjustments in coverage scores. 
Still, there are several changes to the most parsimonious solution term. As we 
recall from Table 18, most parsimonious solution consisted of two paths, both 
themselves consisting of only one condition each. These paths were ‘~patron’ 
and ‘~economyor’. Adding borderline cases gives us four different paths: 
‘secession*~patron’; ‘secession*~economyor’; ‘economyor*~patron’; and 
‘~economyor*patron’. However, the unique coverage scores of these paths are 
extremely low. This is because they overlap quite extensively. This also brings 
down the scores of solution consistency and coverage. Hence we should not 
look too deeply into these results. 
To sum up the analysis with the disjunction of economic conditions, the 
addition of two borderline cases does not influence results to any substantial 
effect. Indeed, the alterations are smaller than in the case of the conjunction of 
economy. And the changes are mostly in the most parsimonious solution terms. 
Overall we can say that adding borderline cases does not have an influence on the 
sufficient conditions if foreign representations are analysed. It does give fewer 
options for the presence of outcome though. This could be due to the different 
nature of SADR and Palestine in terms of representations. Even though they are 
quite similar in the conditions and differ only in respect of having a patron, 
Palestine has foreign representations on its soil and Western Sahara does not. 
Therefore we add two rather similar cases to the mix that have effect on both the 
presence and absence of outcome and therefore cancel each other out to an extent. 
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3.2.3.2. Necessary conditions 
The changes in necessary conditions among all four types (presence and 
absence of outcome and conjunction and disjunction of economic conditions) 
are also mild. No new necessary conditions are introduced, although some have 
lost their consistency. In the case of the analysis of the presence of represen-
tations and conjunction of economy (Table 10), the main change is the loss of 
relevance of ‘patron’. Otherwise there are only slight changes in scores. 
Everything that was said earlier still applies and we still have a contradictory 
case in Somaliland. The lower consistency scores for ‘patron’ are down to 
Palestine having foreign representations but lacking a patron. The analysis of 
the absence of representations (Table 13) is slightly changed, as ‘secession’ is 
no longer a necessary condition. Non-secessionist Western Sahara contributes 
to this, while having a high score in the outcome ‘~representations’. On an XY-
plot, this case would fall into the upper left corner, thus not only reducing the 
consistency score but being logically contradictory to the statement of necessity. 
In the case of the disjunction of economic conditions and the presence of 
representations (Table 16), there are two changes. The first change is that 
‘economyor’ is no longer a necessary condition. The reason for this is Palestine, 
which shows a high score in the outcome but a low score in the condition. 
Palestine, as we said previously, is also behind of dropping ‘patron’ as a 
necessary condition. In the case of the no representations (Table 19), the con-
dition ‘secession’ has lost its status as necessary, mainly due to Western Sahara 
being non-secessionist but still showing a high score in ‘~representations’. 
Overall, the necessary conditions have been altered because of two factors. 
First is the nature of the added borderline cases. Three aspects can be identified 
that could affect the results. First, neither of the new cases is secessionist; 
second neither of them is economically active; and third, they differ in having a 
patron. Also, they have different scores in the outcome ‘representations,’ which 
complicates the analysis. However, the changes are not dramatic. The second 
factor is that the analysis with the disjunction of economic conditions is affected 
more than the analysis with the conjunction. This is because most of the cases 
show low scores in economy as a whole, but might have a high score in one of 
the three conditions. Adding two cases with also low score in the whole 
economy (conjunction) does not alter things much, but adding them to a more 
diverse disjunction does.  
Even though there are some changes to necessary conditions, we can say that 
in terms of representations adding borderline cases makes no difference. In 
sufficient conditions the changes take place in most parsimonious solution term 
which itself is the most difficult to interpret. It does take into account logical 
reminders but does not follow any theoretical inputs. For necessary conditions 
we see the decrease in the role of powerful patron for the presence of 
representations mainly because of the influence of Palestine. 
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3.2.4. Conclusions on representations 
In this section, we will sum up what the previous analysis has revealed. We will 
start with more general conclusions on the whole approach, followed by the 
results of the analysis, and finish with the comparisons of different datasets. 
The approach we have taken is useful because it emphasises three aspects of 
social research. These aspects are equifinality, conjuntural causation and 
asymmetry between the paths towards both there being and there not being 
foreign representations in de facto states. Equifinality means that there are 
several independent paths towards an outcome; it can be reached through 
different conditions. Our analysis has shown that in most cases this applies to 
the analysis of de facto states. We reach equifinal results with three of our four 
analyses: in the case of the analysis where there are foreign representations in 
the de facto state, the results were equifinal, no matter whether we treated the 
economic conditions as a whole or took them separately. Only the analysis of 
conditions that lead to no representations where economic conditions were 
treated as a whole did not show equifinal results. 
This is due to the fact that the analysis of no representations yielded less 
clear results overall. When consistency scores of the conjunctures (different 
causal paths) in the analysis of the representations reached one, meaning perfect 
subset-superset relations between the conditions and the outcome, the analysis 
of no representations gave us consistency scores just over the minimum 
threshold of 0.8. Admittedly, the analysis of the absence of outcome was more 
difficult to perform because more cases showed high values in 
‘~representations’ than ‘representations’. And with more cases, especially in the 
arguably very diverse universe of de facto states, the parsimonious results are 
much harder to obtain. 
As for necessary conditions, the opposite is true. Our analysis shows that 
with the analysis of no representations, more conditions are consistent with the 
statement of necessity. In the analysis of the presence of representations with 
‘economy’, only ‘patron’ can be interpreted as a necessary condition, but this 
interpretation gives rise to many controversies. The logically contradictory case 
of Somaliland and consistency scores lower than 0.9 need a very free and wide 
interpretation to consider ‘patron’ necessary. But with the analysis of the 
absence of outcome, there are several conditions that are fully consistent with 
the statement of necessity. 
Additionally, we must not forget that the condition ‘economyor’ is also an 
example of equifinality because of the logical OR operator. And this condition 
appeared to be necessary in some cases. 
The second aspect, conjunctural causation, is also widely represented. This 
means that conditions on their own are not sufficient for the outcome to occur, 
but need to appear in combination with other conditions. All our complex and 
intermediate solution terms show conjunctural causation because none of the 
paths is filled only with a single condition. This is not the case with the most 
parsimonious solution terms. When taking into account all simplifying assump-
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tions, including difficult counterfactuals, we obtain results where a single 
condition leads to the outcome; indeed, most of these results have only one 
condition. Only adding two borderline cases alters this pattern. 
Among intermediate solution terms, we discovered only one instance where 
the parsimonious solution was in reality identical to the former. This was in the 
analysis of no representations with a disjunction of economic conditions. As we 
may recall, the sufficient path of no freedom, secession and no economic 
conditions (‘~freedom*secession*~economyor’) created an XY-plot (Figure 15) 
that was a mirror image of the XY-plot (Figure 13) for the analysis of necessity 
where only condition – ‘economyor’ – was plotted against ‘representations’. 
This led to the conclusion that the other conditions ‘~freedom’ and ‘secession’ 
are redundant in the causal path and ‘~economyor’ on its own is sufficient for 
the outcome ‘~representations’. Therefore, this was the only case where there 
was no conjunctural causation. 
As for necessity, the conjuncture of two or more conditions is consistent if 
and only if all the conditions are necessary. This comes from the logical AND 
operator that leaves the lowest score of conditions as the final result. This 
means that if one condition in the combination does not show a high con-
sistency score, then neither does the combination. So, basically we can create 
conjunctions of necessary conditions in the analysis of the absence of outcome, 
but this exercise would be irrelevant. 
Conjunctural causation and equifinality lead to INUS conditions. This 
acronym stands for, roughly, insufficient but necessary condition that is part of 
an unnecessary but sufficient combination. In our analysis the condition 
‘economyor’ in the analysis of the presence of outcome with the disjunction of 
economy is an INUS condition. It is part of both sufficient combinations and is 
consistent with the statement of necessity. As other conditions – ‘patron’, 
‘freedom’ and ‘~secession’ – that feature in the combinations have low 
consistency scores for necessity, ‘economyor’ is an INUS condition. 
The third feature of the approach is asymmetry between conditions leading 
to the presence of outcome and the absence of it. This means that if, for 
example, ‘patron’ leads to the outcome, ‘~patron’ would not lead to the 
~outcome. Again, the notion of asymmetry holds in our analysis. There are no 
conditions or combinations of conditions that have a presence in the analysis of 
representations and have the complement in the analysis of the no 
representations. Clearly, some conditions feature in the causal paths for 
presence of representations with their negations in the paths for absence of 
them, but there are no fully reversed solutions. There are always additional 
conditions in respective combinations, so we can claim that asymmetry holds. 
One case that might lead to suspicions is ‘~economyor’ being sufficient for 
‘~representations’ and ‘economyor’ being necessary for ‘representations’. This 
comes from the mathematical similarities between the calculations of con-
sistency for sufficiency and necessity. If a single condition is sufficient for the 
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outcome, its complement is necessary for the same outcome. This does not have 
anything to do with the notion asymmetry, however. 
Overall, the use of fsQCA has been justified because all three notions that 
are so common in social analysis are also present among de facto states. Next, 
we will take a closer look at the substantial results and what they add to our 
knowledge about the non-recognised entities. 
There are several things we can conclude from the results. First of all, 
though, it must be stressed that these results are not presented as the absolute 
truth. The relatively small number of cases and the diversity among them makes 
it very difficult to draw definitive conclusions. Still, there are some findings that 
are of importance. 
First, our results do not contradict the existing literature but add to it. As 
explained earlier in this thesis, our conditions have been selected based on 
theoretical knowledge, and the directional expectations that fill these conditions 
are also discussed in the literature. The contribution of this work is finding the 
interactions between the conditions. We have discovered that having a powerful 
patron is important for the de facto state, as it helps the entity in a material way 
and gives it a ‘window’ to the world. But a patron on its own is not enough to 
engage in bilateral relations with confirmed states; there are additional 
conditions needed.  
As we saw, the presence of a powerful patron is a component in all paths 
that make up the intermediate solution term and lead to the presence of 
outcome. With economy considered as whole, the absence of ‘secession’ and 
presence of ‘freedom’ also play a role, but ‘powerful patron’ is the condition 
that creates the overlap in the causal paths’ coverage. At first sight, this result 
might be a little surprising because absence of ‘secession’ might somewhat 
predictably be the most important condition but, on the other hand, patrons do 
have a role to play in the literature, as stated above. The power of the patron is 
also important. For example, Armenia might be useful in protecting the interests 
of Nagorno-Karabakh vis-à-vis its parent state Azerbaijan, but it lacks the 
power to press Karabakh’s agenda on a global scale.  
However, these conjunctures lead us to ask what these results might mean to 
future de facto states. First, we must emphasise the building of democratic 
credentials and respect for political rights and civil liberties. On its own, this has 
also been a recurring theme in the literature, but our analysis shows that the 
combination of powerful patron and freedom is the most realistic sufficient 
condition for bilateral relations between de facto states and confirmed states. 
Secondly, de facto states must deal with secession. Non-secessionism was part 
of the combination that led to representations. However, the absence of 
secession is practically impossible to achieve in today’s world because any 
potential new state is a result of a secessionist movement. So, any potential de 
facto state should exploit all possibilities to show some justifications for their 
independence. In short, they should convince confirmed states that their 
independence is not a new ideal, but based on some historical event. For 
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example, Somaliland wants the world to think that it is not seceding from 
Somalia, but restoring its brief independence from the 1960s. Were this to be 
successful, based on our analysis, the chances of more foreign representations 
would be larger. 
Secondly, economic conditions have much more importance when viewed as 
a disjunction than as a conjunction. This leads to the conclusion that a de facto 
state does not have to be active on many fronts in international economy to 
achieve success in bilateral relations. It is enough to find a niche, if we may put 
it that way, in the international economy. This means that when a de facto state 
is trading with several partners, they could be tolerated by more nations; that 
again might lead to more widespread acceptance. Or, when the quantity of 
exports is high, confirmed states might consider having relations with the entity. 
The same applies to higher levels of foreign direct investment. 
Indeed, the logical OR combination of economic conditions led to the 
disjunction being a necessary condition for having foreign representations. So, 
in addition to granting freedoms, de facto states should establish foreign 
economic relations in order for political relations to follow. 
Additionally, the absence of economy was the only condition that was 
consistent with the statement of sufficiency in case there were no foreign 
representations in a de facto state. This means that the lack of economic ties has 
an even bigger effect on de facto states’ foreign relations. To put it simply, 
those entities that have no economic ties are generally not accepted. 
Third, the analysis of conditions that lead to no representations appeared to 
be more difficult. The results were less parsimonious and directional expec-
tations were of less help. This is probably down to the fact that more cases 
showed the absence of representations than their presence. And, as the case 
universe is quite diverse, it was harder to establish simple causal paths. 
We have on several occasions mentioned that the universe of cases of de 
facto states is diverse. In a separate analysis, we made it even more so by 
adding two cases that in the literature are sometimes considered to be de facto 
states and sometimes not. With Palestine and Western Sahara in the mix, the 
results were a little, but not very, different.  
The behaviour of the two conditions was where differences were detected. 
First, the borderline cases influenced the ‘economyor’ condition. This is 
because, as stated earlier, the effects of low economic relationships are more 
visible when there are more high scores among cases. In the case of the 
conjunction ‘economy,’ most of the cases achieved low scores and Palestine 
and SADR fitted in well. Where the components of the disjunction ‘economyor’ 
played a more important role, Palestine’s and SADR’s low scores altered the 
results. 
The second condition the influence of which was altered was ‘secession’. 
This is because neither Palestine nor SADR are secessionist entities but show 
different scores in the outcome. Therefore, the condition ‘secession’ lost its 
position as a necessary condition for ‘~representations’. 
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3.3. Recognitions 
3.3.1. The economy as a whole 
3.3.1.1. What leads to recognitions 
3.3.1.1.1. Sufficiency 
As with representations, we will start with a truth table to show how the data 
fits our conditions. The truth table is given in Table 20: 
 
Table 20: Truth table for outcome condition ‘recognitions’ 
eco-
nomy 
seces-
sion 
pat-
ron 
fre-
edom 
num-
ber 
cases recogni-
tions consistency 
1 0 1 1 1 Taiwan 2010 1 1.000000 
0 0 1 0 1 Taiwan 1980 1 0.980198 
0 1 1 1 1 TRNC 0 0.668478 
0 1 1 0 4 
PMR; Abkhazia; 
South Ossetia; 
Kosovo 0 0.577713 
0 1 0 0 2 NKR; Somaliland 0 0.090909 
 
As we can see, there are two conjunctures that have cases with a score higher 
than 0.5 in the outcome. These two rows of the truth table are also the most 
complex solution terms that we will analyse shortly. The cases that represent 
these lines are the two Taiwans in our data. In the first row, Taiwan in 2010 is 
the case that does have enough recognitions to pass our 0.5 cross-over point and 
be consistent with the truth table row. In the second row, the case is Taiwan in 
1980. 
There are, of course, other cases that show scores over 0.5 in ‘recognitions’. 
However, due to the characteristics of fuzzy set theory, we look for 
combinations of conditions which have cases that show lower or equal scores in 
these combinations than in the outcome. In this way, we find combinations of 
conditions that are consistent with the statement of sufficiency, even though we 
have cases that show high scores in the outcome and low scores in the 
conditions. 
Adding logical minimisation to the truth table, we can get results for the 
most parsimonious and intermediate solution terms. The first thing that we can 
see is that the empirical evidence does not show much difference between the 
outcome conditions ‘representations’ and ‘recognition’. As shown in Table 21 
below, the solution terms overlap significantly.  
 
 
149 
Table 21: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for recognitions 
Consistency and
coverage
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.43 0.987 
~economy*~secession 
*patron*~freedom 0.272 0.162 0.98   
economy*~secession*patron
*freedom 0.267 0.157 1   
Parsimonious solution 0.444 0.716 
~secession 0.444 0.444 0.716 
Intermediate solution 0.433 0.71 
patron*~secession  0.433 0.433 0.71 
Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
The two paths of the most complex solution term shown in the table are also 
present with ‘representations’ when we use the same threshold of 0.8. 
Moreover, the paths of the most parsimonious and intermediate solutions are 
identical. Concerning the latter, though, there is also one difference: the lack of 
condition ‘freedom’. As we may recall (Table 9), ‘freedom’ was one path in the 
most parsimonious solution and part of a conjunction of freedom and powerful 
patron (‘freedom*patron’) in the intermediate solution for ‘representations’. 
Here, it is not represented.  
The reason behind this is logical minimisation. We have two paths out of 
which one contains ‘freedom’ and the other its complement (‘~freedom’). The 
same applies to the economic conditions. Because of this, the Quine-McCluskey 
algorithm has not taken these conditions into account when performing logical 
minimisations. One additional sufficient truth table row we had for 
‘representations’ allowed this minimisation. 
The second important aspect of Table 21 is the low scores of the parsi-
monious and intermediate solution terms. They fall short of the 0.8 threshold. 
The reasons for this are not the recognitions of secessionist entities like 
Abkhazia and Ossetia, but the lack of recognitions for non-secessionist Taiwan. 
These cases show high scores in the conditions (‘~secession’ and 
‘patron*~secession’), but their scores in the outcome are lower. Therefore, these 
paths are not consistent with the statement of sufficiency to the level we would 
expect. This makes the interpretation of these results more difficult. This is 
expounded in the conclusion section of this chapter. 
One mechanism to increase the consistency scores of the intermediate and 
parsimonious solutions is to increase the overall threshold to one. If we do this, 
then the path ‘~economy*~secession*patron*~freedom’ would not be included 
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because of its (slightly) lower consistency score. Indeed, the results with the 
higher threshold have some effects on the results.  
As already mentioned, and can also be seen in Table 21 above, the only path 
that would survive the rising of the threshold would be ‘economy*~secession* 
patron*freedom’. This has two implications. First, it corresponds perfectly with 
our theoretical expectations, where secessionism is said to have a negative 
effect on the presence of the outcome and all other conditions have a positive 
effect. The distribution of cases is presented in Figure 16: 
 
 
Figure 16: Cases of the path ‘economy*~secession*patron*freedom’ against re-
cognitions from Table 21. 
 
Secondly, it affects the most parsimonious and intermediate results. The 
intermediate result is the same as the most complex one because it already 
satisfies our directional expectations. The most parsimonious result consists of 
two paths: ‘economy’ and ‘~secession*freedom’. Therefore, if we do not take 
our expectations into account, using limited diversity still gives us results that 
are in line with the theory. There is only one major problem with these results: 
the cases. Both paths are represented by only one case, Taiwan in 2010. This is 
also visible in Figure 16 above. There are, of course, cases that have high scores 
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in outcome, but not in our solution terms. This makes the consistency of the 
results high, but coverage low. The scores are best seen in Table 22: 
 
Table 22: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for recognitions 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.267 1 
economy*~secession*patron
*freedom 0.267 0.267 1   
Parsimonious solution 0.397 0.818 
economy  0.306 0.03 1
~secession*freedom 0.366 0.09 0.806
Intermediate solution 0.267 1 
economy*~secession*patron
*freedom 0.267 0.267 1   
Notes: consistency threshold 1; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
As we can see, the unique coverage for both paths in the most parsimonious 
solution term is very low. There is a significant overlap which is hidden by the 
minimisation process. Taking into account the limited diversity can produce two 
different results with no common conditions, but still a huge overlap. 
Overall, the raising of the threshold to one has given us more consistent 
intermediate results but with the sacrifice of parsimony. And we must take into 
account that the coverage scores of the results – due to the lack of cases in truth 
table rows – are rather low. 
 
3.3.1.2.2. Analysis of necessity  
Our search for sufficiency has led to quite similar results to those we achieved 
with ‘representations’. The results are shown in Table 23: 
 
Table 23: Necessary conditions for the outcome ‘recognitions’ 
Conditions Consistency Coverage
economy  0.305785 1
~economy  0.925620 0.425856
secession  0.680441 0.365926
~secession 0.443526 0.715556
patron 0.988981 0.517291
~patron 0.060606 0.106796
freedom  0.592287 0.623188
~freedom 0.713499 0.466667
152 
As we can see, two of the conditions, ‘~economy’ and ‘patron,’ pass the 0.9 
consistency threshold. However, they both have coverage scores in the middle 
of the scale; therefore, the trivialness tag is not removed from them. These 
coverage scores indicate that, even though the conditions may be necessary, 
there are other conditions that are too.  
With consistency, there are different problems, however – namely with 
‘~economy’. As with the outcome ‘representations’, the condition scores high in 
both cases, the presence and absence of ‘recognitions’. We will see later that the 
consistency scores are also higher for both. The other condition over the 0.9 
threshold, ‘patron,’ had a logically contradictory case of Somaliland with 
‘representations’ that made the statement of necessity weaker. In this case, there 
is no contradiction, as seen in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17: Cases of the condition ‘patron’ against recognition from Table 23 
 
For necessary conditions, it is important to avoid cases with a high score in the 
outcome and a low score in the condition, i.e., the upper left corner of the XY-
plot should remain void of cases. As seen in Figure 17, this is exactly the case. 
The statement of necessity is not fully consistent because of the two cases 
slightly above the main diagonal: Somaliland and Nagorno-Karabakh. There are 
also two cases that mainly contribute to the reduction of the coverage score: 
TRNC and Transnistria in the lower right corner of the plot, with TRNC slightly 
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further up and right of the corner. The cases that have scores over 0.5 in both 
the condition and outcome are: Kosovo; Taiwan 1980 and 2010 (sharing the 
data-point); and Abkhazia and Ossetia (also sharing the data-point). Lying 
under the main diagonal, they contribute to the consistency but, having higher 
scores in the condition than in the outcome, also contribute to the lower 
coverage score. 
Nevertheless, unlike with ‘representations,’ we can confidently say that 
‘patron’ is a necessary condition for the outcome. It has a high consistency 
score, no logically contradictory cases and, notwithstanding low coverage, a 
score over 0.5 in the latter. As with ‘representations’, ‘economy’ has high 
consistency to support the statement of necessity, but its contradictory nature, 
observed also in the high consistency score with ‘~recognitions,’ does not allow 
us to consider the condition necessary. Overall, the main difference from the 
analysis of necessity for ‘representations’ is that we have a solid, although 
perhaps somewhat trivial, necessary condition to report. 
 
3.3.1.2. The absence of the outcome 
3.3.1.2.1. Sufficiency 
Again, we will begin by looking at the truth table. In Table 24, there are two 
things of note. First, there is only one row that corresponds to the outcome and 
it has a consistency score of one, indicating perfect subset-superset relations. 
Other rows do not even exceed the common threshold of 0.8, and therefore we 
will continue with the threshold of 1. Second, this row corresponds to our 
theoretical expectations concerning the absence of all conditions except 
secession. 
 
Table 24: Truth table for the outcome condition ‘~recognitions’ 
eco-
nomy 
seces-
sion 
pat-
ron 
free-
dom 
num-
ber 
cases ~recog-
nitions 
consistency 
0 1 0 0 2 NKR; Somaliland 1 1.000000 
0 1 1 1 1 TRNC 0 0.788043 
1 0 1 1 1 Taiwan 2010 0 0.742268 
0 0 1 0 1 Taiwan 1980 0 0.722772 
0 1 1 0 4 
PMR; Abkhazia; 
South Ossetia; 
Kosovo 0 0.648094 
 
When compared to the results obtained with the outcome ‘representations,’ we 
have exactly the same result but with a lower consistency score. With 
‘representations,’ we could not perform the analysis with the threshold of 1, but 
only with 0.8; here, they are identical. Additionally, the consistency and 
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coverage scores are the only differences between the analysis of representations 
and recognitions. Due to the mathematically opposing formulas between 
consistency and coverage, an increase in the former usually involves a decrease 
in the latter if the same conditions are tested. And, in our case, this applies. We 
have increased the consistency scores for all solution terms, but the coverage 
has decreased for all. 
As we may recall from Table 12 (subsection 3.2.1.2.1), the most complex 
and intermediate solution terms were identical to the first row of the truth table 
above, and the most parsimonious solution consisted only of one condition, that 
of ‘~patron’. This condition’s consistency score has increased from 0.75 to 
0.98, however, its coverage has decreased only by 0.1 points. The scores for the 
intermediate and complex solution terms have also changed from 0.89 to 1 for 
consistency and from 0.386 to 0.307 for coverage. These changes are due to 
cases that show different scores for ‘~recognitions’ than they did for 
‘~representations’. The cases are shown in Figure 18: 
 
 
Figure 18: Cases of the path ‘~economy*secession*~patron*~freedom’ against no 
recognitions 
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The figure shows that two cases have high scores in both the condition and the 
outcome. These cases are Nagorno-Karabakh (in the upper right corner) and 
Somaliland (a little left of the corner). There are also two cases that show 
presence in the outcome, but not in the condition; these are Transnistria (upper 
left corner) and TRNC (below PMR). Other cases show scores higher than 0.5 
in neither the outcome nor the condition.  
Unlike with ‘~representations,’ we have no logically contradictory cases, 
which is of course manifested in the perfect consistency score.  
To conclude, the results of the analysis of the sufficiency of ‘~recognitions’ 
show many similarities with the analysis of ‘~representations’. So much so, in 
fact, that one could ask whether they themselves form perfect or near-perfect 
subset-superset relations. In fact, if we take ‘~recognitions’ as an outcome 
(superset) and ‘~representations’ as a condition (subset), then the set-relation 
between them is quite consistent, with a score of 0.87. However, we obtain two 
logically contradictory cases: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They show high 
value in the condition, but low value in the outcome. Even with high con-
sistency value, two cases out of nine make us doubt whether ‘~representations’ 
is sufficient for ‘~recognitions’. 
Away from similarities, there are only two differences between the results 
from ‘~representations’ and ‘~recognitions’. The first is the difference in 
consistency and coverage scores; however, these are not drastic. Consistency 
has increased and coverage has decreased according to mathematical logic. The 
second difference is the lack of logically contradictory cases in the analysis of 
‘~recognitions’.  
 
3.3.1.2.2. Necessary conditions 
As mentioned previously, there is a problem with one necessary condition: 
‘~economy’. To show this problem in numbers, we present the consistency and 
coverage scores for the necessary condition in Table 25: 
 
Table 25: Necessary conditions for the outcome ‘~recognitions’ 
Conditions Consistency Coverage
economy 0.156425 0.756757
~economy  1 0.680608
secession 0.880819 0.700741
~secession 0.202980 0.484445
patron 0.657356 0.508646
~patron 0.376164 0.980583
freedom 0.448790 0.698551
~freedom  0.757914 0.733333
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As we can see, ‘~economy’ is the only condition to pass the 0.9 threshold, but, 
as shown in Table 23, it also does so for the presence of outcome. Therefore, we 
cannot speak of ‘~economy’ as a necessary condition for either the presence or 
absence of outcome. So, taken alone, no condition is consistent enough with the 
statement of necessity. If we apply conjunction to any of the conditions, these 
combinations also show no consistency with necessity. This is because in 
conjunctures, the minimum of all the conditions is given as the score and only a 
conjuncture of two individual necessary conditions can also be necessary. The 
only possible necessary combinations are disjunctions.  
Combining the conditions that are theoretically relevant and excluding 
‘~economy’ from the list, we get two combinations that pass the 0.9 threshold. 
These are ‘secession+~freedom’ and ‘secession+~freedom+~patron’. As the 
latter is a subset of the former, and is therefore covered by it, we can conclude 
that the only possible logical OR combination that can be seen as necessary is 
‘secession+~freedom’. Being secessionist or lacking in civil liberties and 
political rights, or both, can be seen as necessary for ‘~recognitions’. 
 
 
3.3.2. Analysis with the economic OR 
3.3.2.1. What leads to recognition? 
3.3.2.1.1. Sufficient conditions 
As usual, we start with the truth table. We will see that it has several differences 
compared to that in which we used the logical AND operator to combine 
economic conditions. The truth table is presented in Table 26: 
 
Table 26: Truth table for the outcome condition ‘recognitions’ with disjunction of the 
economic conditions 
eco-
nomyor 
seces-
sion 
pat-
ron 
free-
dom 
num-
ber 
cases recogni-
tions consistency 
1 0 1 0 1 Taiwan 1980 1 0.980198 
1 0 1 1 1 Taiwan 2010 1 0.801242 
0 1 1 0 1 South Ossetia 0 0.735849 
1 1 1 1 1 TRNC 0 0.668478 
1 1 1 0 3 
PMR; Abkhazia; 
Kosovo 0 0.593625 
1 1 0 0 2 NKR; Somaliland 0 0.123967 
 
First, there are no perfect subset relations between conditions and outcome. The 
closest is the combination ‘economyor*~secession*patron*~freedom’ with a 
consistency score of 0.98. What is more, this is not the combination that 
corresponds with our theoretical expectations. The truth table does show the 
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latter, but with a consistency score of just over 0.8. One can observe that the 
only difference between the two rows is the freedom condition. In the first row, 
it is absent and, in the second, it is present. This leads to the possibility that the 
most complex solution term is not represented in the truth table, but can be 
achieved through logical minimisation. The freedom component seems to be 
redundant, as it is the only difference between the rows. And when a condition’s 
absence and presence are in otherwise identical combinations, we can leave this 
condition aside because it does not contribute to the set-relations. 
This comes at a price, though. As seen in Table 27 below, the increase in 
parsimony drastically decreases the consistency score of the most complex 
solution term. This means that, although ‘freedom’ and ‘~freedom’ are logically 
redundant and can be dropped from the equations, they do create two different 
paths that are more consistent with the statement of sufficiency than the 
minimised path. 
 
Table 27: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for recognitions with disjunction of 
economic conditions 
Consistency and
coverage
Conditions 
Raw
coverage
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.433 0.71 
economyor*~secession*patron 0.433 0.433 0.71   
Parsimonious solution 0.444 0.71 
~secession  0.444 0.444 0.71   
Intermediate solution 0.433 0.71 
economyor*~secession*patron 0.433 0.433 0.71   
Notes: consistency threshold 0.8. ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
Furthermore, if we observe the consistency column (and solution consistency 
column), we see that all the solution terms give identical scores. With the most 
complex and intermediate solutions being identical, we can conclude that the 
conditions ‘economyor’ and ‘patron’ do not contribute to the consistency. 
Without taking theoretical expectations into account, the logical minimisation 
with limited diversity has given us the most parsimonious result, which happens 
to accord with these expectations.  
The only problem that remains is the low consistency score for all the 
results. Compared to the corresponding scores for ‘representations’ (Table 15; 
section 3.2.2.1.1), we can see that there has been a significant decrease in the 
consistency values and also in equifinality. In the case of ‘representations,’ we 
had several paths in all solution terms; here, we have only one in each.  
On the substantial side, with ‘representations,’ we had three truth table rows 
showing the outcome; here, we have two. This results in the earlier results being 
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more consistent because logical minimisation had more possibilities to start with. 
Here, we have to remove one condition and the consistency score decreases. 
Overall, the results we achieved from the analysis of the sufficiency of 
‘recognitions’ where the disjunction of economic conditions is used are difficult 
to interpret. We do achieve parsimony, but at the price of consistency. 
Therefore, we have to go back to the truth table and consider the first two rows 
to be the best results. This leaves us with a contradiction in the freedom 
component, however.  
 
3.3.2.1.2. Analysis of necessity 
Away from the controversy of sufficiency, we now look at the necessary 
conditions and the possible changes that occur in comparison with ‘represen-
tations’ and the use of ‘economy’ above. The results are shown in Table 28: 
 
Table 28: Necessary conditions for outcome ‘recognitions’ with disjunction of 
economic conditions 
  Consistency Coverage
economyor 0.867769 0.455202
~economyor 0.336088 0.586538
secession 0.680441 0.365926
~secession 0.443526 0.715556
patron 0.988981 0.517291
~patron 0.060606 0.106796
freedom 0.592287 0.623188
~freedom 0.713499 0.466667
 
Compared to Table 25 above, there is only one possible change and that is the 
impact of ‘economyor’ and its complement instead of ‘economy’ and its 
complement. As we can see, the consistency score for ‘economyor’ is higher 
than that of ‘economy,’ and the score of ‘~economyor’ is lower than that of 
‘~economy’. This is logical and also happened with ‘representations’. When we 
use the logical OR operator, the cases can ‘choose’ between different economic 
conditions and, if one of them shows high scores, then the entire disjunction 
does the same. The chances of at least one economic condition showing a 
higher score are therefore larger than the chances of the conjunction does the 
same. This explains why economic conditions play different roles with the logi-
cal OR. However, ‘economyor’ does not pass the 0.9 threshold for being 
considered necessary. The same happened with ‘representations’.  
There are two differences with the latter. First, ‘patron’ has a high consistency 
score and no logically contradictory cases. Second, with ‘representations,’ 
‘economyor’ did pass the 0.9 threshold. However, these changes are not too large. 
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3.3.2.2. The absence of outcome 
Starting with the truth table, we can see that the results are somewhat different 
to those obtained with both the different outcome and different logical operator 
combining economic conditions. Compared to the similar analysis with ‘re-
presentations,’ we have one sufficient row less with one case less, too. How-
ever, this table shows a row with perfect subset-superset relations, having a 
consistency score of one. Compared to section 3.3.1.2 of this chapter, we see 
the different status of economic conditions. As shown in Table 29 below, 
‘economyor’ has a presence in the sufficient row. This goes against our direc-
tional expectations. 
 
Table 29: Truth table for outcome condition ‘~recognitions’ with disjunction of eco-
nomic conditions 
eco-
nomyor 
pat-
ron 
seces-
sion 
free-
dom 
num-
ber 
cases ~recog-
nitions 
consistency 
1 0 1 0 2 NKR; Somaliland 1 1.000000 
1 1 1 1 1 TRNC 0 0.788043 
1 1 0 0 1 Taiwan 1980 0 0.722772 
1 1 1 0 3 
PMR; Abkhazia; 
Kosovo 0 0.713147 
0 1 1 0 1 South Ossetia 0 0.698113 
1 1 0 1 1 Taiwan 2010 0 0.639752 
 
Additionally, because we have only one, the most complex solution term is not 
minimised and stays as the truth table row. The different solution terms are 
presented in Table 30: 
 
Table 30: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for no recognitions with 
disjunction of economic conditions 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.225 1 
economyor*~patron*secessi
on*~freedom  0.225 0.225 1   
Parsimonious soultion 0.376 0.98 
~patron  0.376 0.376 0.98
Intermediate solution 0.307 1 
~freedom*secession*~patron 0.307 0.307 1
Notes: consistency threshold 1; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
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These results are very much the same as with ‘economy’. The only difference is 
that in the complex solution term, ‘~economy’ is replaced with ‘economyor’ 
and the latter is dropped from the most intermediate solution. Of interest might 
be the fact that the absence of ‘economy’ is replaced with the presence of 
‘economyor’. This is again down to the larger number of possibilities for 
‘economyor’ to be present, as explained earlier.  
When compared to the similar analysis with ‘representations,’ the results are 
very different (see Table 18 from section 3.2.2.2). This indicates that using 
disjunction in the analysis of recognition results in far less change than with 
representations. This might result from the different nature of recognition and is 
explained in the discussion section (Chapter 3.5). 
For the analysis of necessity, the same applies. Although ‘economyor’ did 
not pass the 0.9 threshold in either the analysis of ‘recognitions’ or that of 
‘~recognitions’, it still has high enough consistency scores in both (0.87 and 
0.84 respectively) for us to be suspicious about it as a necessary condition. 
Other conditions alone did not pass the threshold either, and therefore we are 
left with the same disjunctions as with ‘economy’. 
 
 
3.3.3. Adding borderline cases 
Adding the Palestinian and Western Saharan cases should give extra weight to 
‘~secession,’ because neither is a secessionist entity but the level of 
recognitions is quite high. We will start with the analysis of sufficiency for the 
economic conjunction and compare the result to those obtained with nine cases 
and to those obtained with ‘representations’. In the latter case, we discovered 
that adding borderline cases does not alter the results much; with ‘recognitions,’ 
our expectations are somewhat different. 
Starting with the presence of outcome and comparison to the analysis of nine 
cases, we see two slight differences in the intermediate solution term. As we 
may recall from Table 21, the intermediate solution was ‘patron*~secession’. 
With 11 cases, the importance of ‘patron’ is reduced and the solution is the 
same as the most parsimonious solution in Table 21: only ‘~secession’. The 
second change is in the consistency scores, and this is positive from our point of 
view. The low consistency score of 0.71 is replaced with a more respectable 
score of 0.83.  
This corresponds to our expectation that ‘~secession’ has an impact when we 
add Palestine and SADR to our data. As stated earlier, both are non-secessionist 
and, for different reasons, are recognised by many governments. The impact of 
‘~secession’ can be seen in Figure 19 below. 
As the figure shows, there are no logically contradictory cases that show 
presence in the condition and absence in the outcome (the lower right corner of 
the XY-plot). The ‘secession’ condition is measured as a dichotomy and it 
appears on the plot. The non secessionist entities (Palestine, SADR and Taiwan 
in 1980&2010) all have high scores in the outcome, therefore making the 
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condition sufficient. Some cases that show high outcome scores are seces-
sionist, but this does not influence the statement of sufficiency. These cases are 
Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the latter two sharing a data-point. 
However, there is a major issue with these results. Namely, it does not help us 
with future de facto states in the real world. They cannot be non-secessionist. 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Cases of the absence of secession (~secession) against recognitions 
 
The analysis of necessary conditions shows similar results to that with nine 
cases. ‘~economy’ shows a high consistency score but, as earlier, it also does so 
for the outcome ‘~recognitions,’ therefore we cannot consider it necessary. The 
changes are that ‘patron’ does not have a high score, so no single condition is 
necessary. However, tested logical OR combinations of all theoretically 
expected conditions show a result. Namely, a combination ‘patron+~secession’ 
does cave a consistency score of one. The lower value for ‘patron’ is explained 
by the fact that Palestine has no patron therefore lowering the consistency score. 
But being in the set of having a patron or being non-secessionist (or both) is 
necessary for the recognitions. This is explained similarly to the sufficient 
conditions, both new cases being non-secessionist adding to the ‘patron’ having 
a high consistency score before.  
A similar problem is faced when analysing the conditions for the absence of 
the outcome: ‘~recognitions’. As both added cases are rather well recognised, 
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the reasons for non-recognition remain the same. The analysis of sufficiency 
shows nearly identical results to those presented in the truth table (Table 24). 
Theoretically expected conditions remain the most complex and intermediate 
solution terms. The main difference from the analysis of representations is that 
the consistency score of most complex and intermediate solution terms has risen 
from 0.9 to 1; also the coverage scores change slightly.  
With necessary conditions, nothing changes either. The ‘~economy’ 
condition remains controversial because it is a necessary condition for both the 
presence and the absence of the outcome. As for logical OR combinations as 
necessary conditions, the same results from nine cases apply. 
Continuing with the analysis, we now look at results with the disjunction of 
economic conditions rather than the conjunction which we applied above. Here, 
we recognise some differences compared to the nine-case analysis. As we may 
recall from Table 27, results for the presence of outcome were not consistent 
enough with the statement of sufficiency. With 11 cases, we have higher 
consistency scores and also some equifinality, which we lacked earlier. The 
results are shown in Table 31: 
 
Table 31: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for recognitions with disjunction of 
economic conditions 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.607 0.821 
~economyor*~secession 
*~freedom 0.391 0.306 0.964   
economyor*~secession 
*patron 0.3 0.217 0.72   
Parsimonious soultion 0.629 0.827 
~secession 0.629 0.629 0.827
Intermediate solution 0.629 0.827 
~secession 0.629 0.629 0.827
Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
As we can see, the consistency scores for each solution term are higher than our 
threshold of 0.8 and there are two paths in the most complex solution term. The 
solution ‘~economyor*~secession*~freedom’ is the result of the added cases, 
because they are the cases that make it sufficient for the outcome. As we can 
observe, the existing path that includes Taiwanese cases is still under the 0.8 
consistency threshold. The second change that occurs is that the intermediate 
solution term consists of only one condition, ‘~secession’. With ‘economy,’ it 
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was the same as the complex solution term; now, it is the result of logical 
minimisation. However, the same problem arises: the model is not useful. 
As for the necessary conditions, no single variable is consistent enough with 
the statement. With ‘economy,’ we had ‘patron’ as a necessary condition, but 
the addition of two cases that show the outcome but score lower in the ‘patron’ 
condition has an effect. However, two combinations of conditions are consistent 
with the statement of necessity. These are ‘~secession+patron’ with a 
consistency score of one, showing perfect superset-subset relations, and 
‘~secession+economyor,’ with a score of 0.91. As we can see, ‘~secession’ is 
present in both combinations, which, on the one hand, emphasises its 
importance to ‘recognition’ but, on the other, makes the results practically 
irrelevant. 
The last section analyses the absence of the outcome with ‘economyor’. In 
the analysis of sufficiency, the results are very much the same as with nine 
cases. This is to be expected, because the two additional cases do not possess 
the outcome condition ‘~recognitions,’ therefore all they can do is change the 
consistency and coverage scores or create logically contradictory cases. They do 
neither, however, as the consistency score of the intermediate solution is one. 
As this shows perfect subset-superset relations, there can be no logically 
contradictory cases. 
The necessary conditions show similar results to those for ‘representations,’ 
outlined a few paragraphs previously. There are no single conditions that pass 
the 0.9 threshold. Of logical OR combinations, only ‘secession+~freedom’ 
passed the threshold, with a score of 0.94. This result is more useful than the 
previous results with the presence of outcome. It shows that secession alone is 
not necessary for being non-recognised, except in combination with the absence 
of freedom. Therefore, future secessionist entities should develop their 
democratic credentials. 
 
 
3.3.4. Conclusions on recognition  
There are two main points to conclude from the analysis of recognitions. The first 
is connected with the obtained results. We will start with the analysis of suffi-
ciency. For one thing, they do not show much equifinality. Of all the tests we per-
formed, only a few have several paths in the most complex solution term. The 
complex terms are usually quite literally complex, involving all conditions. This 
shows that empirical data cannot be logically minimised easily; only the help of 
limited diversity and directional expectations, difficult and easy counterfactuals 
respectively, can achieve this. This is more a problem of the analysis of the 
absence of outcome. Another aspect of the results is the occasionally low consis-
tency scores. This is especially evident in the analysis of the presence of outcome.  
The analysis of necessary conditions shows similar ambiguity in results. 
There are occasions when no single condition is necessary, only disjunctions of 
conditions are. The reason for this is exactly the same as with sufficient 
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conditions. The empirical evidence is so complex that it is hard to find single 
conditions that are consistent enough with the statement of necessity. The 
diversity of cases that show higher scores in the outcome, especially in the 
presence of outcome, is quite large. On one side, there is Taiwan which has 
been recognised because it used to be recognised. The twenty-plus recognitions 
that the island state enjoys are mostly those of states which declined to switch 
their recognition to the People’s Republic in the 1970s and ‘80s. On the other 
side, there are patron-supported cases like Kosovo and the Georgian breakaway 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They are recognised by many (Kosovo) 
or some (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) because of the support they have 
received from outside. In Kosovo’s case, the recognising states are mostly what 
we can call Western states with their allies (like Japan and South Korea) and a 
number of African, Asian and Caribbean states. For the Caucasus states, they 
include Russia and a few differently motivated states. Venezuela and 
Nicaragua, for example, might display anti-American behaviour, while some 
other states might have economic incentives. On the third side, there are the 
borderline cases of Palestine and Western Sahara. They have achieved their 
recognition through the decolonisation process. The Palestinian state was 
created by the UN and subsequent wars have reduced it to de facto status. 
Western Sahara was occupied by neighbouring countries after the former 
colonial power, Spain withdrew.  
So we can see three different motivations for states to recognise de facto 
entities. This makes recognition more political than representations. The latter 
can be established for pure practical reasons, like trade or support for human 
rights. Additionally, representations take some effort. A state needs to man the 
mission, find all necessary resources and be in direct contact with the host. For 
recognition, all that is required is a declaration. Therefore, the motivations for 
recognition can be broader than for representations. This, of course, does not 
rule out political reasons for representations; representations simply need more 
calculation and a more practical approach than recognition.  
Another aspect that shows the political nature of recognition is that different 
countries recognise different entities. If we look at the recognitions of Kosovo 
and Palestine, for example, we see that they form almost mirror images on the 
map. As stated earlier, Kosovo is supported by Western nations, though not by 
all of them, Palestine, on the other hand, is supported by all the rest. There are 
overlaps, of course, but a general trend is visible. And the reason is different 
political motivations. Therefore, it is harder to analyse recognition, and to find 
sufficient and necessary conditions for it, than it is representations.  
The lack of equifinality gives us intermediate solution terms that are not 
always consistent enough to draw strong conclusions. Moreover, as we can see 
in Table 21 (section 3.3.1.1.1), the equifinal complex solution term still leads to 
a non-consistent intermediate solution. The differences among cases are the 
reason for this. 
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On the substantial side of the results, the condition ‘~secession’ dominates in 
the analysis of the presence of outcome, being part of the intermediate solution 
term in all cases. ‘Secession’ was also part of the intermediate solution term 
with the absence of outcome. We can detect some symmetry in these results, 
especially if we add the ‘patron’ condition to the mix. The absence of patron 
was quite relevant in the absence of outcome, and the presence of patron in the 
presence of outcome. Some asymmetry was injected by freedom and economic 
conditions. The absence of freedom had a role in the analysis of the absence of 
outcome. It was part of the intermediate solution term in most cases. This 
corresponds to our theoretical expectations, which is not fully the case with 
economic conditions. When the conjunction ‘economy’ was used, the condition 
was part of the intermediate solution, but when we change to the disjunction 
‘economyor’, the absence of the condition led to the presence of the outcome. 
This can again be explained by the diversity of cases and the discussion above. 
Palestine and SADR, for example, are not as economically developed or 
integrated into the world economy as some other cases, but show high numbers 
in recognition. So, their aggregate economic conditions cannot contribute to the 
presence of the outcome. Taiwan, on the other hand, is very much part of the 
international economy and it is also responsible for the presence of the 
‘economy’ condition. 
 
 
3.4. International organisations 
This section contains fewer tables and figures than the previous two outcomes. 
There are two reasons for this. First, unlike previously, we will not start with 
truth tables. The reason for this is that most results show high enough 
consistency for complex and intermediate solution terms. Out of the four 
analyses performed, three show perfect consistency of the subset-superset 
relations between conditions and outcome. This yields our second reason for 
less tabular material: we do not have to look for irregularities and logically 
contradictory cases. So we start with the analysis of membership in inter-
national organisations with the economic conjunction. The results are shown in 
Table 32 below.  
Both paths in the most complex solution term are fully consistent with the 
statement of sufficiency, as are the other solutions. The cases for the most 
complex solutions are Taiwanese, one for each, and both contribute to the 
intermediate solution term. As we can see, the ‘usual suspects’ are at work 
again, with ‘~secession’ and ‘patron’ constituting the intermediate solution 
term. This shows no difference to the analysis of ‘representations’ and ‘re-
cognitions,’ therefore this combination could be considered the sufficient 
condition for engagement in the international system. However, the problems 
remain because this model is not applicable to future de facto states and is only 
a reflection of the current empirical situation.  
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Table 32: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for involvement in international 
organisations 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.421 1 
~economy*~secession 
*patron*~freedom 0.269 0.163 1   
economy*~secession*patron
*freedom 0.259 0.152 1   
Parsimonious solution 0.6 1 
~secession  0.6 0.6 1
Intermediate solution 0.589 1 
patron*~secession 0.589 0.589 1
Notes: consistency threshold 1; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
This is further confirmed with the analysis of necessity, which shows similar 
results to the earlier analysis. We have one single necessary condition, and it is 
‘patron’ with a consistency score of 0.99. But this deviation from perfect 
superset-subset relations is so small that it does not allow for any contradictory 
cases. In fact, the cases (Somaliland and Nagorno-Karabakh) that are presented 
as deviating from the main diagonal do it in such a minor manner that it can be 
written off as a calculation error, and we can speak of the ‘patron’ as a perfect 
necessary condition. 
If we substitute the conjunction ‘economy’ with the disjunction ‘eco-
nomyor,’ the results are a little different. Treating economic conditions separa-
tely, we can see that they have an influence that ‘economy’ did not. The results 
are shown in Table 33 below. 
As we can see, the main differences involve the loss of equifinality but a 
more parsimonious complex solution that also includes ‘economyor’. 
Elsewhere, the most parsimonious solution term stays the same, as do the 
consistency scores. One thing worth noting is that the consistency and coverage 
scores of the intermediate solution terms are exactly the same. This means that, 
although included in the formula, ‘economyor’ does not add anything except the 
possibility to logically minimise the most complex solution term.  
Therefore, in the analysis of sufficiency, we see no substantial differences no 
matter how we treat the economic conditions. However, these differences are 
apparent when we analyse the necessary conditions. The possible changes can 
only affect economic conditions, as everything else stays the same. And 
‘economyor’ has a consistency score of one, which means that it can be con-
sidered necessary for the outcome. As we may recall, with ‘economy’ the only 
necessary condition was ‘patron’; here, then, we have added ‘economyor’. 
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Table 33: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for involvement in international 
organisations with disjunction of economic conditions 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.589 1 
economyor*~secession 
*patron  0.589 0.589 1   
Parsimonious solution 0.6 1 
~secession  0.6 0.6 1
Intermediate solution 0.589 1 
economyor*~secession 
*patron  0.589 0.589 1   
Notes: consistency threshold 1; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
Compared to other outcome conditions, ‘representations’ and ‘recognitions’, the 
results obtained here are more similar to those of ‘representations’. In that case, 
‘economyor’ also added to parsimony and was part of the same causal path that 
constitutes the intermediate solution in Table 33. The consistency scores were 
also higher than those obtained with ‘recognitions’. Finally, with ‘represen-
tations’ and ‘organisations’, ‘economyor’ was consistent with the statement of 
necessity, while that is not the case with ‘recognitions’. 
Moving on to the analysis of the absence of outcome, we initially revert to 
‘economy’. The results are presented in Table 34: 
 
Table 34: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for no involvement in international 
organisations 
Consistency and 
coverage
Conditions 
Raw
coverage
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.829 0.879 
~economy*secession*~freedom 0.829 0.829 0.879
Parsimonious solution 0.829 0.879 
secession*~freedom  0.829 0.829 0.879
Intermediate solution 0.829 0.879 
~economy*secession*~freedom 0.829 0.829 0.879
Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
 
The first notable aspect of Table 34 is that all the solution terms share the same 
consistency and coverage scores with no perfect set-relations. This does not 
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mean that there are no such combinations of conditions, just that logical 
minimisation has produced these particular results. In fact, there is a causal path 
that does show perfect subset-superset relations and it corresponds to our 
theoretical expectations: ‘~economy*secession*~patron*~freedom’. The possi-
bility of logical minimisation yielded a more parsimonious solution that is 
consistent with the statement of sufficiency based on the 0.8 threshold. 
Additionally, because of the identical consistency and coverage scores, the most 
parsimonious and intermediate solutions are the same, as is the most complex 
solution. Therefore, the condition ‘~economy’ does not add to the results; it is 
simply in line with theoretical expectations. But, as we see, taking limited 
diversity into account without easy counterfactuals leads to the same result. 
The most notable aspect, however, is the importance of ‘~freedom’ rather 
than ‘~patron’. With previous outcomes, ‘~patron’ was prominent, constituting 
the most parsimonious solution term in both instances. 
With necessary conditions, we find ourselves in a similar situation to the 
analysis with ‘economyor’ a few paragraphs previously. While ‘~economy’ has 
no effect on the consistency and coverage scores of the sufficiency, it can be 
considered a necessary condition. With ‘secession,’ it has a high consistency 
score, and therefore we have two necessary conditions. These results are similar 
to those obtained with ‘representations’ and ‘recognitions,’ and without 
contradictions, as in the case of the latter. 
The final analysis combines the absence of outcome and the disjunction of 
economy. The results are presented in Table 35: 
 
Table 35: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for no involvement in international 
organisations with disjunction of economic conditions 
Consistency and 
coverage 
Conditions 
Raw
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Solution  
cove-
rage 
Solution  
con-
sistency 
Complex solution 0.513 1 
economyor*secession 
*~patron*~freedom 0.23 0.21 1   
~economyor*secession 
*patron*~freedom 0.303 0.282 1   
Parsimonious solution 0.667 0.98 
~patron  0.385 0.27 0.98
~economyor 0.396 0.282 1
Intermediate solution 0.596 1 
~freedom*secession 
*~economyor  0.394 0.282 1   
~freedom*~patron*secession 0.314 0.202 1
Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition 
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This analysis gives us more equifinal results, as the intermediate solution term 
has two different paths to the outcome. Furthermore, there is no secession in the 
most parsimonious solution term. This means that using ‘economyor’ has some 
effect in creating several potentially sufficient paths. However, if we compare 
the results to the analysis with other outcomes, they are almost identical. With 
‘representations,’ we had exactly the same solutions; only consistency and 
coverage scores were different. With ‘recognitions,’ the effect of ‘economyor’ 
was not so visible and it did not feature in the most parsimonious and inter-
mediate solutions.  
The necessary conditions are also unsurprising, with ‘secession’ being the 
only condition to pass the 0.9 consistency threshold. This is slightly different to 
the other outcomes because with ‘~representations’ we also had ‘~freedom’ as a 
necessary condition, but with ‘~recognitions’ no single condition was consistent 
enough: we had disjunctions of conditions that could be considered necessary 
for the outcome. 
Finally, we test the same combinations with the addition of borderline cases. 
As with ‘recognitions,’ we expect ‘~secession’ to have a more important role in 
explaining the outcome, while the absence of outcome should yield similar 
results to those outlined above. This is because both added cases, Palestine and 
SADR, score highly in the outcome, being full members of international 
organisations and not being secessionist. 
And our expectations prove to be correct. With the presence of outcome, the 
intermediate results consist only of one path which is made of a single 
condition: ‘~secession’. The different handling of economic conditions does not 
matter. Additionally, the consistency score of the results is one which indicates 
perfect subset-superset relations in both cases. The coverage score is also the 
same for both analyses, at a quite high 0.73. This shows that the empirical 
evidence is very much in line with the results.  
As for the absence of outcome, the results in most complex and intermediate 
solution terms are the same as with nine cases. The only differences are 
minimal changes in consistency and coverage scores. The former changes only 
in the case of ‘economy,’ while, similarly to the nine cases, there are no perfect 
subset-superset relations.  
 
 
3.5. Discussion on the results 
As the previous analysis was multi-faceted, with different outcome conditions, 
two treatments of economy and two datasets, there are several things that we 
need to cover in this section. We will start with the hypotheses and see whether 
they are confirmed or refuted. We had two kinds of hypotheses: those which 
assumed causal complexity and those which tested the conditions. Our hypo-
thesis concerns only sufficient conditions, however. The impact of necessary 
conditions is also discussed, as it has several important aspects in its own right. 
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The section concludes with a brief critique of the analysis showing its 
limitations. 
To start with the conclusions on our analysis, we must go back to the 
hypothesis set at the beginning of this dissertation. Mostly, we were interested 
in causal complexity manifested in equifinality, conjunctural causality and 
asymmetry. In an nutshell, these hypotheses have been mostly confirmed. All 
the results presented in Chapters 3.2–3.4 show some of these traits. The 
hypotheses are mostly confirmed because the presence of causal complexity is 
not absolute. There are some cases where at least one of the indicators of causal 
complexity is missing. On the other hand, our analysis does not show any 
outcome condition that is without all three.  
Most visibly present is conjunctural causation. All our tested outcome con-
ditions (foreign representations, formal recognitions and involvement in inter-
national organisations) show conjunctural causation. Therefore, we can claim 
that different conditions and their particular direction of impact (whether having 
positive or negative impact on the presence of the outcome) have an effect in 
combinations. There are two aspects that are worth mentioning regarding 
conjunctural causation. First, it is present in the most complex and intermediate 
solution terms, but almost absent in the most parsimonious solution term. Only 
in the analysis of what leads to no formal recognitions did the intermediate 
solution term show a single cause. And this was when we had added the 
borderline cases of Palestine and Western Sahara and also treated the economic 
conditions as a disjunction. As for the most parsimonious solutions, the only 
case of conjunctural causality was with the analysis of no involvement in 
international organisations. The most parsimonious solution term took into 
account all possibilities of limited diversity (the ‘empty cells’ – possible 
combinations with no cases to show), but did not contradict the empirical data. 
This shows that there is a possibility for wide generalisations and for picking 
out single conditions as sufficient for the acceptance of de facto states in the 
international system. At the moment, though, this is only a possibility because 
of the small number of cases. Therefore, even if the most parsimonious solu-
tions show us which conditions might be more important, limited diversity sets 
its boundaries. Intermediate solutions are better for interpretation. 
The second aspect of conjunctural causation is that, in many cases, the most 
complex solution term showed all conditions and, occasionally (for example, 
the analysis of no representations with the economy taken as a whole), the latter 
and the intermediate solution term were identical. The usage of all conditions 
can be attributed to the complex nature of de facto states. We must admit that 
the universe of cases is very diverse and different cases have different historical 
backgrounds that have contributed to achieving (or in some cases, settling for) 
de facto statehood. As we may recall, the most complex solution term takes into 
account the empirical data at hand, so the complexity of the latter is apparent. 
However, there are occasions when even the most complex solution has been 
minimised. When we analysed the presence of foreign representations in de 
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facto states with economic conditions taken separately (as a disjunction), we 
achieved two different paths which did not consist of all conditions. Similarly, 
this was achieved during the analysis of the entities’ involvement in inter-
national organisations. The main implication of these results is that, although 
rather diverse, there is a possibility of some form of generalisation. This means 
that on some occasions de facto states are treated similarly in the international 
system.  
This leads us to another point that was established, namely, that occasionally 
the most complex and intermediate solution terms showed identical results. In 
these cases, the directional expectations did not help in minimising the 
intermediate solution’s formula. But, on the other hand, the majority of analyses 
performed showed different results for these two solution terms. Again, this 
emphasises the possibility of generalisation and that using directional expec-
tations yields more parsimonious results. Overall, the results that show 
conjunctural causation tell us that combinations of conditions are sufficient for 
the outcomes to occur; that the empirical data and especially the theory-guided 
directional expectations allow for generalisations in the very diverse universe of 
de facto states; and that there is a possibility of further generalisations which, 
due to the small number of cases and hence limited diversity, must (as the most 
parsimonious results) be treated very carefully. 
The second aspect of complex causality – equifinality – does not find as 
much support as conjunctural causation. Of course, there are outcome 
conditions that show different causal paths, but this is not absolute. In many 
instances, there is only a single path to the outcome. And at least one analysis 
performed with every outcome condition shows equifinality. Therefore, we can 
also confirm the second hypothesis: that the same outcome can be achieved 
using different paths. One thing to note about equifinality is that there seems to 
no pattern as to when we have several paths and when we have only one. 
Obviously, if there is only one case that shows value in the outcome condition, 
then equifinality is logically impossible. However, we cannot say that one 
particular outcome condition has one particular path to it. All outcomes 
occasionally show equifinal results but occasionally do not.  
The third aspect of causal complexity – asymmetry – is also present. Even 
though our directional expectations are asymmetrical, the results are not. No 
analysis shows the exact negation of the combinations that were sufficient for 
the outcome to be sufficient for the negation of the outcome. To make this clear, 
we will give an example. To acquire foreign representations, a de facto state 
must display one of the foreign economic indicators, a powerful patron and no 
secession (economyor*patron*~secession). This being an equifinal result, the 
other path consists of economic conditions, powerful patron and freedom 
(economyor*patron*freedom). An asymmetrical result would be that to have no 
representations, there must be no economic ties, no patron and secession 
(~economyor*~patron*secession), or no economy, no patron and no freedom 
(~economyor*~patron*~freedom). However, this is not the case. The results 
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show that for no representations, no freedom, no economy and secession 
(~freedom*~economyor*secession), or no freedom, no patron and secession 
(~freedom*~patron*secession) are needed. As we can see, these combinations 
are not those that symmetric results would show. Therefore, our directional 
expectations might be negations for the negation of the outcome, but the causal 
combinations they form to show us the sufficient paths are not. Conditions 
combine differently for the absence of outcome. 
Everything stated above is about sufficient conditions. To get the full picture 
of the impact of different conditions, we must also take a look at necessary 
conditions. Mostly because of the diversity of the universe of de facto states, the 
sufficient combinations consist of many conditions. Necessary conditions are 
usually singlular, but there can also be combinations. Unlike the combinations 
above, these are bound together using the logical OR operator: they are 
disjunctions. Because of this relative clarity, necessary conditions can give us 
even more substantial insights into the acceptance of de facto states in the 
international system.  
Firstly, then, we take a look at how the conditions confirm the statement of 
necessity. There are several aspects to this. First, all conditions have some capa-
city as necessary conditions – for different outcomes, of course. For example, 
secessionism is necessary for having neither representations, recognitions nor 
involvement in international organisations. Having a powerful patron is 
necessary for having recognitions. The absence of freedom is necessary for not 
having representations, while economic conditions give us two distinct results. 
When taken as a conjunction, the absence of economy seems to be necessary for 
the absence of both representations and recognitions. As a disjunction, eco-
nomic conditions are necessary for the presence of representations. The phrase 
‘seems,’ when describing the impact of economy as a necessary conditions, 
leads us to the second aforementioned aspect. This is that, although a condition 
has to have a high consistency score to be considered necessary, one of two 
problems arises. The first is that there exists at least one logically contradictory 
case. For example, the presence of a powerful patron as a necessary condition 
for representations is weakened by a logically contradictory case. The second 
possibility is that the same condition shows a high consistency score for both 
the presence and the absence of the outcome. This would mean that one 
particular condition is responsible for both the occurrence and non-occurrence 
of a particular phenomenon. This is the case with economic conditions taken as 
a conjunction, where high consistency scores for both the absence and presence 
of representations, as well recognitions, are evident. Therefore, we cannot take 
economy as necessary for these outcome conditions. 
The third aspect of necessity is the possibility of combinations. Until now, 
we have spoken about a single condition being necessary, but there may be 
combinations. This is especially important in cases where no single condition 
shows consistency with the statement of necessity. For the combination to be a 
conjunction, all of the included conditions must be necessary on their own. If no 
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conditions are consistent enough, we can try disjunction. And, in our case, we 
found that a disjunction of conditions is necessary in the analysis of recognition, 
where we applied the disjunction of economic conditions. We had two 
necessary combinations; both included the absence of secession combined with 
a powerful patron and economic conditions, respectively. 
The fourth and final aspect of necessary conditions is that they provide 
different options for interpretation to those of our sufficient paths. Because of 
the limited number of cases and their relative diversity, the combinations we 
obtained are quite difficult to interpret. We have confirmed that theoretical 
knowledge about de facto states holds, and that different conditions have 
different impacts on the acceptance of these entities in the international system.  
For necessary conditions, we can see the impact each condition has in the 
combinations. This is an INUS situation: a condition which is itself an 
insufficient but necessary condition is part of an unnecessary but sufficient 
combination. We have established that there are several conditions that are 
necessary if a de facto state is to be more thoroughly engaged in the inter-
national system. Here, some differences between types of engagement emerge. 
For the absence of representations, the absence of freedom is necessary. Respect 
for human rights has been discussed in the literature. The concept of earned 
sovereignty has been developed and used in analysing de facto states, but the 
importance of the conditions seems to be in reverse. A good human rights 
record is itself not necessary for engagement, but its absence is necessary for no 
engagement. For recognition, a powerful patron is necessary, and this again 
emphasises the political nature of recognition. For involvement in international 
organisations, a patron was accompanied by the disjunction of economic 
conditions. Therefore, the main difference between our outcome conditions is 
that representations are less dependent on a powerful patron as a necessary 
condition, and the absence of representations is a result of more aspects than 
just a patron or secession. 
Next, we take a look at similarities and differences between the three dimen-
sions of our analysis: different outcome conditions; treating economic con-
ditions differently; and adding borderline cases. The first important insight we 
gain from our analysis concerns whether there are any differences between 
different types of engagement. If we look at the sufficient paths, then the short 
answer is negative. Even though there are slight differences in the intermediate 
solution terms, most paths overlap quite significantly. For example, the path 
consisting of a powerful patron and absence of secession (patron*~secession) is 
present with all three outcome conditions (analysis with conjunction of 
economy and nine cases). Similar trends can be observed with the absence of 
outcomes. Overall, there seems to be a pattern of conditions that are needed for 
the de facto state to be engaged in the system. And this pattern follows closely 
our theoretical knowledge about the field.  
The results are a slightly different when we analyse the necessary conditions. 
For representations, the presence of a powerful patron has a high consistency 
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score for the statement of necessity, but there is a logically contradictory case. 
For recognition, the consistency score was even higher and there was no 
contradiction. The importance of a patron for recognitions can be explained by 
the political nature of the act itself. Recognition is cheap; it does not include any 
costs. Moreover, recognition is not accompanied by the need to open a 
representation. Therefore, economic interests or value-based calculations do not 
matter as much. Abkhazia and South Ossetia provide examples of politically 
motivated recognitions with little economic activity or clear commitment to 
human rights.  
Furthermore, the absence of freedom is necessary for having no represen-
tations, but this is not so with the absence of recognitions or involvement in 
international organisations. Again, this could be an indicator that represen-
tations are less politically motivated. States do not want to have representations 
in countries that do not respect human rights. This can also be explained by the 
cost of running a representation, with the wealthier states generally being 
democratic. Economic conditions are more ambiguous in this regard. 
There is a difference in results when we treat economic conditions dif-
ferently, however. The disjunction of economic conditions is present in solution 
terms with all three outcome conditions, which is not the case with conjunction. 
This can be considered natural because, in using the logical OR operator, we 
have widened the possibility of de facto states having economic relations with 
the outside world. By treating economic conditions separately, we allow de 
facto states to have a niche in the world economy in respect of large export 
volumes, high levels of FDI or multiple trading partners. There is, of course, the 
threat that one particular partner, usually the patron state, imports all the goods 
from the entity and provides it with investments. The difference between the 
disjunction and conjunction of economic conditions is not so striking when 
analysing the absence of outcome. The absence of economy is part of the 
sufficient paths in all outcome conditions, when we analyse the absence of the 
latter. This can be explained by the idea that, though economy does not play an 
essential role in having representations or being recognised, its absence 
encourages confirmed states not to engage with de facto entities. As for 
necessity, the economic disjunction was necessary for having representations, 
but, although conjunction showed high consistency scores, there were issues 
with interpretation.  
The third dimension was the adding of the borderline cases of Palestine and 
Western Sahara. However, their inclusion did not have a particularly strong 
effect, although they cause some changes in sufficient paths. The main reason 
for the changes is that both Palestine and SADR have strong scores in all 
outcome conditions, except representations for the latter. There are no 
permanent representative missions in Western Sahara. Still, it enjoys a notable 
amount of recognition and is a member of the African Union. Two of the 
changes caused by borderline cases are noteworthy. First, the impact of seces-
sionism is reduced. This is because neither of the borderline cases is 
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secessionist. The second change is in the use of economic conditions. Again, 
because neither is a successful economy, the presence of economic conditions 
does not have an impact. However, the absence of economy, even taken as a 
disjunction, has an effect on the absence of outcomes. As there are high scores 
in outcomes, and low scores in economic conditions, this effect is logical.  
Overall, we can say that there is causal complexity in the conditions that lead 
to the engagement of de facto states in the international system. Additionally, 
the differences between sufficient paths to different measures of such 
engagement are relatively small. Still, some differences can be observed. The 
conditions that lead to representations also involve economic conditions and 
freedom, making this a less politically motivated form of engagement than, for 
example, recognition. States seem more calculating when opening represen-
tative offices and take into account several aspects. The political will of a 
powerful patron state, on the other hand, seems to be the driving force for 
recognition. The economic conditions logically have an increased effect when 
they are treated as a disjunction. This enables us to take into account the 
possible economic niches of de facto states. Adding the borderline cases of 
Palestine and SADR, there were no major changes in the sufficient paths, but 
the impacts of secessionism and economic conditions did change.  
The next question is: how are we to take these results? There are several 
aspects that need to be examined in this context. The first limitation, as mentioned 
above, is the small number of cases. Furthermore, this universe of cases is rather 
diverse. This makes the interpretation and especially the generalisation of the 
results more difficult. Small and diverse groups of cases give us conjunctural 
causation, but very often the causal paths include all or most of the conditions. 
There is little room for logical minimisation. Moreover, a small number of cases 
creates limited diversity, which makes our results dependent on counterfactuals. 
Still, the results we have obtained do confirm that our theoretical expectations, so 
called easy counterfactuals, hold. The conditions introduced in the literature are 
important in engagement and do act in combinations. But the critique still holds: a 
small number of diverse cases with limited diversity limits our ability to make 
broad generalisations about our findings. 
This leads us to another aspect, a methodological criticism that can be 
directed at QCA. Namely, a path can be considered sufficient if it shows at least 
one case. Of course, there are possibilities to set a threshold, but with a small 
number of cases this is not fruitful. There might be no results at all. On the one 
hand, this is a valid line of criticism and must be taken into account when 
making generalisations. On the other, one might raise a question: why not take 
only one-case-paths into account? An argument for the latter is that we can 
establish every unique path that leads to the outcome. The specific nature of a 
particular case might give us insights into how to reach a particular outcome, 
even though the case stands alone. On this argument, it makes no difference 
whether a particular path contains one or 20 cases. 
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In our analysis, due to the limited number of cases, most causal paths consist 
of only one case. And in the analysis of the presence of all outcomes, this case 
is Taiwan. There are at least two points that need to be emphasised about 
Taiwan. First, taking Taiwan as two separate cases might bias the results. 
However, the focus of the analysis is not on cases but on conditions that lead to 
outcomes. Therefore, adding Taiwan in 1980 as a separate case is justified. It is 
significantly different and can be considered a separate case. Second, both cases 
of Taiwan are represented in most causal paths that lead to the presence of 
outcome. However, this does not alter the results obtained for the absence of 
outcome, nor does it influence the necessary conditions. Hence, the afo-
rementioned importance of INUS conditions still holds.  
Another line of criticism, also connected with our cases, could be raised in 
relation to the data. Again, there are two points to be made. The first concerns 
the accuracy of the data collected. For different reasons, the data is arguable. 
Whether it is the lack of exact sources or doubts about the reliability of official 
sources for de facto states, both contribute to this contestability. Secondly, there 
is data concerning Taiwan in 1980, especially for economic conditions. Even 
though reliable, there might be concerns as to whether it is comparable with 
data from 2010. The answer lies in the set-theoretic approach, where set 
membership is important, not exact values. Therefore, small differences and 
errors in data do not matter. The same applies to certain Taiwanese figures in 
1980. These are assumed to be in current US dollars, but the set-theoretic nature 
of the whole approach evens any slight mistakes in calculation out. Minor data 
issues do not influence the results. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The main question to answer by way of a conclusion to this dissertation is the 
famous ‘So what?’ question. What and how has this dissertation contributed to 
existing knowledge about de facto states? As established in the introduction and 
carried out through the structure of the thesis, there are three major fields of 
contribution. These are conceptual, methodological and empirical. The con-
ceptualisation can be seen in two parts. First, there is the de facto state itself. As 
we saw, this subject has been over-conceptualised, with almost every author 
introducing his or her own concept and name. The second aspect is the 
international system. Although the concepts of international system, society and 
community have been widely used in analysing de facto states’ position in the 
world, this aspect has been under-conceptualised. On the methodological side, 
we adopt a formalised comparative view of the entities’ engagement with 
confirmed states, which leads to novel results. The earlier literature mostly con-
sisted of case studies or comparisons of a few de facto states. This concluding 
chapter discusses the main contribution of the thesis and summarises its main 
empirical findings. We also touch on a possible critique of the thesis and very 
briefly examine possible lines of further inquiry in the field. 
The main problem with analysing de facto states is the lack of a coherent 
theory defining the entities and providing insights into how they behave in the 
international system and how they gain acceptance. Several concepts have been 
used to define and classify de facto states. Nearly every author who writes on 
the subject has developed a concept that is slightly different from the others. 
However, they all share the major characteristics and the main debate seems to 
be about how to label these entities. We showed that there is wide agreement on 
the Montevideo criteria and the absence of recognition. Additional criteria have 
been used, such as a timeframe for existence or a formal declaration of inde-
pendence, but the core of the definition is territory, population and government 
with the capacity to enter international relations and the lack of recognition by 
confirmed states.  
This highlights several aspects of the study of de facto states. The first is the 
over-conceptualisation of the subject. As we have emphasised on several 
occasions in this thesis, the universe of cases that could be considered de facto 
states is diverse. This might be one of the reasons for the plethora of terms used 
to describe the entities and the concepts behind them. Still, some of the concepts 
are very inclusive, despite the diversity. They include not only the entities we 
have defined as de facto states, but also movements or groups that do not 
possess the qualities of a state. Others have been rather exclusive, with 
attributes of a state accompanied by, for example, a declaration of independence 
or a similar clear act that shows aspirations to statehood.  
This could be amplified by the second important aspect, the methodological 
approaches adopted by researchers. As was also mentioned in the thesis, most 
research has been conducted using case study methodology or comparative 
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studies. This contributes to the moulding of definitions to the particular cases. 
These two possible reasons for this over-conceptualisation are, of course, 
heavily connected. A diverse universe of cases makes it rather reasonable to 
treat these cases separately, which again leads to small-n analysis. The literature 
lacks comprehensive comparative studies that include, if not all, then most of 
the cases. Using a formalised comparative design, this thesis tries to fill this gap 
in the literature. 
So, the first major contribution to the literature is the systematisation of 
existing concepts and the proposal of a definition based on these concepts. One 
must admit that the working definition is very simple, but it does embrace the 
most important aspect of the de facto state: its lack of international recognition. 
To be precise, it embraces the de facto side of the term. A commonly used 
definition for the state is offered in the Montevideo convention from 1933. In a 
condition where several concepts have been proposed, a rather inclusive 
definition might be useful for determining what a de facto state is, but at the 
same time excluding non-state actors of different types. Moreover, this defi-
nition builds on two aspects. It is based on the consensus on different concepts 
by different authors. As stated, there are many different approaches, but they all 
share a common core. Our definition is that core. Secondly, our definition is built 
on a theoretical foundation of statehood and sovereignty. As for statehood, we 
have used the Montevideo criteria, a codification of the declaratory theory from 
international law. On the sovereignty side, we have employed dichotomies 
associated with the concept. These dichotomies are internal-external and 
empirical-juridical. The literature indicates several dimensions to sovereignty and 
different types of states possess these dimensions in different capacities. Regular, 
confirmed states possess all dimensions; failed states like Somalia possess 
juridical aspects, but lack the empirical institutions and capabilities. De facto 
states have the empirical attributes of the state, like functioning governments and 
borders, but lack external juridical sovereignty or international recognition.  
The second main concept used in the thesis is that of the international 
system. Even though there is a vast literature on this subject, the system is 
briefly mentioned in the analysis of de facto states. Furthermore, it is sometimes 
used interchangeably with the concepts of international society and international 
community. Additionally, these concepts are not elucidated. Mostly, they are 
considered to be just the group of confirmed states that somehow interact with 
unrecognised entities. The different aspects of the system, like structure and 
process, are generally not used in the analysis, and nor are the differences 
between the three aforementioned concepts. These are the two features of the 
international system that we address in this thesis. First, we give a brief 
overview of the three concepts. The most ambiguous of these is the inter-
national community. It was introduced as a possible name for an international 
organisation before and during the Second World War. As this was subse-
quently named the United Nations, the international community went on to have 
different meanings. Unfortunately for theory, these meanings vary to the extent 
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that every researcher using the concept means something different to the others. 
Mostly, a group of states is meant while using the term.  
The second concept used in the literature about de facto states is inter-
national society. In fact, the first major work on de facto states, Scott Pegg’s 
International Society and the De facto State, uses the concept. However, the 
concept is again under-explained and means little more than the international 
community discussed above. Unlike the latter, international society has been 
more thoroughly developed. The main work done in this field by the English 
School of international relations differentiates between international system, 
international society and world society. The school maintains that elements of 
all three simultaneously exist in the world, but that at different times different 
elements dominate. International system is mostly about power relations 
between states, and world society about relations between non-state actors. 
International society borrows from both. It is conceptualised as a society of 
states in an anarchic environment. What distinguish it from the system are 
shared norms and values between states. What distinguish it from the world 
society is its state-centric approach and anarchic environment. However, it is 
hard to establish the norms and values that govern the relations between states. 
In this thesis, we considered respect for human rights to be one of these, and 
this adds an element of the international society to our analysis. 
The international system is the most conceptualised of the three; however, in 
the literature on de facto states, it is again mostly used in the sense of a group of 
confirmed states. The effects of structure, for example, are usually not discussed 
at length. In this thesis, we give a brief overview of different systemic 
approaches from the past and a more detailed overview of the approach we 
adopt in our analysis. The former approaches were developed by authors like 
Kenneth Waltz and J. David Singer, among others. The latter approach was 
conceptualised by Barry Buzan and Richard Little in their 2000 book, Inter-
national Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International 
Relations. Buzan and Little use different elements of the system to create a 
comprehensive framework. These elements are different sectors, sources of 
explanation and units and interaction. The sectors are military-political, eco-
nomic, social-cultural and environmental. The military-political can be divided 
into two and this is what we have done in this thesis. As we are not interested in 
military interactions between de facto and confirmed states, our focus is on the 
political. The sources of explanation are structure, process and interaction 
capacity. Structure is based on Waltz’s neorealist approach; process is the 
patterns of interaction between units; and interaction capacity is the 
technological and social possibility to interact at all. Units in our analysis are 
states, including de facto states. This inclusion is possible because of the 
declaratory theory of statehood.  
We are interested in the political sector, the interaction between confirmed 
states and de facto states. Interaction creates a process; therefore, we are 
especially interested in the political process. The political process is our out-
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come condition, something we want to explain. It is the equivalent of the 
dependent variable from statistical analysis. The equivalents of independent 
variable, which we want to explain the presence or the absence of the outcome 
with, are: the structure of the political sector; interaction capacities within the 
sector; and other sectors, namely the economic and socio-cultural. Each of the 
elements is operationalised by different phenomena. Political processes are 
measured by the number of foreign representations, formal recognitions and 
involvement in international organisations. The political structure is dichoto-
mous, owing to whether an entity is secessionist or not. Interaction capacity is 
measured by the existence of a powerful patron. Economic conditions are: 
foreign direct investment (FDI); total exports; and number of trading partners. 
The socio-cultural sector is measured by Freedom House freedom scores. 
This kind of approach constitutes the first thorough systemic analysis of de 
facto states. Even though different aspects of the system have been analysed, 
there are two things to mention. First, these aspects, like having a patron or 
economic ties with the outside world, have not been analysed from the system’s 
point of view. Rather, they have been considered as properties of the de facto 
state and treated as such. Second, these aspects are viewed in isolation. Their 
effects on different outcomes are mostly analysed separately. That said, there 
are hints in the literature that different variables could have an effect on 
outcomes (be it democratisation of the de facto state or its foreign relations, for 
example), together with other variables. Our approach tries to specify combi-
nations of different conditions that lead to our outcome conditions (foreign 
representations; formal recognition; involvement in international organisations).  
To achieve our goal, we use QCA or Qualitative Comparative Analysis. This 
is an approach and method based on set-theory, formal logic and Boolean algebra. 
Its roots can also be found in Mill’s comparative designs. As an approach or 
design, QCA is meant to analyse phenomena that show a possible combination of 
conditions in their occurrence. In the analysis of de facto states, it has rarely been 
used. There is one paper on internal developments of the entities, namely, 
concerning the emergence of political parties in unrecognised states (Ishiyama & 
Batta, 2012). Their foreign relations or position in the international system have 
yet to be analysed using QCA. As mentioned above and in the thesis, there are 
suggestions of possible combinations of conditions that could determine the 
international standing of de facto states. Therefore, QCA is suitable for our 
analysis and brings a novel touch to the research on de facto states.  
As a method, QCA gives us results in two dimensions. The first is 
substantial. We have results for sufficiency and necessity. We obtain sufficient 
combinations of conditions that lead to our outcome conditions. These combi-
nations are conjunctions, created by using the logical AND operator. This 
means that a case must show a high score in all components of combinations. 
As for necessary conditions, they can be either combinations or single 
conditions. The combinations are distinct from sufficient ones because they are 
formed using the logical OR operator; they are disjunctions. This means that a 
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case has to show at least one high score. Mostly, though, necessary conditions 
are single conditions.  
The second dimension is formal, but still tested in the thesis. We test the 
assumptions of QCA, causal complexity. The latter itself consists of three dif-
ferent aspects: conjunctural causation; equifinality; and asymmetry. Conjunc-
tural causation is connected to the previous paragraph. It means that 
combinations of conditions lead to the outcome, rather than single conditions. 
Of course, it is theoretically possible that single conditions are both sufficient 
and necessary, but this situation is rare in practice. QCA can establish these 
single conditions. Equifinality means that there are multiple causal paths that 
lead to the outcome. We can establish several ways of reaching the outcome; 
there is no guarantee that only one path is sufficient. Asymmetry means that the 
path to the absence of the outcome is not a negation of the path to its presence. 
In our case, for example, the causes of a de facto state not having foreign 
representations are not direct negations of the causes of its having these 
representations. The respective combinations may differ. 
Before we turn to empirical findings, we sum up the conceptual and 
methodological elements of the dissertation. The three aspects discussed in the 
thesis are major contributions to the literature on de facto states. As there is no 
comprehensive theory of what these entities are or what qualifies as a de facto 
state, let alone how they behave, the conceptualisation is of significance. In an 
area that is over-conceptualised, with almost every author coming up with a term 
or concept of his/her own, there is a need for clarity. The idea that we propose is 
to use the concept based on a common understanding among authors and backed 
up by the literature on statehood and sovereignty. Although the concept of 
international system is as old as the academic discipline of international relations 
and has been developed in a high degree of detail, it has not been used in the 
literature on de facto states. Here, we fill this gap. We take a well-developed 
concept of the international system and fill it with data on de facto states. And, 
finally, using a formalised method – again, rare in the analysis of unrecognised 
entities – we gain insights into how they are positioned in the system. To be more 
precise, we look at the conditions which lead to more or less engagement.  
For the empirical analysis, we put forward a set of hypotheses which can be 
categorised as twofold: about causal complexity; and about the substantial 
impact of particular conditions. We try to find out which combinations of 
conditions lead to more engagement, with each condition having a different 
impact. Close economic ties with the outside world (process in the economic 
sector in the international system framework), having a powerful patron state 
(interaction capacity in the political sector) and respect for human rights and 
democratic values (cultural process) have a positive impact on engagement, 
while being a secessionist (structure of political sector) entity has a negative 
impact. As we may recall, there were three outcome conditions: foreign 
representations in the de facto state; formal recognition of these entities; and 
their involvement in international organisations. These outcomes are chosen 
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because they represent different types of engagement, based on how many sides 
participate in it. Representations need the consent of both parties and can be 
considered bilateral; formal recognition, although it usually does involve 
connections, can be considered unilateral; and involvement in international 
organisations needs the consent of at least three sides, making it multilateral.  
Because of three different outcome conditions, we perform three different 
sets of analysis. However, the diversity is not limited to this. Even though our 
definition of the de facto state is quite clear, the real world still has trouble 
fitting into it. Therefore, we have two borderline cases of Palestine and Western 
Sahara that do not have similar governmental control over their territories to 
that of other de facto states (Abkhazia, South-Ossetia; Transnistria; Nagorno-
Karabakh; Northern Cyprus; Somaliland; Kosovo; and Taiwan). Consequently, 
we perform two different analyses: one without the borderline cases, the other 
with them. Additionally, because of substantial reasons and methodological 
possibility, we treat Taiwan as two separate cases, one from 1980 and other 
from 2010. The latter is the preferred date of data for all cases (where 
available). But because of our set-theoretic approach, the slight differences that 
non-concurrent data might cause are not relevant for the results.  
The second reason for different analysis comes from the economic condi-
tions. As we may recall, the economy was measured with FDI, exports and 
number of trading partners. To achieve parity, FDI and exports are measured 
per capita. These three measures are combined into one using two different 
logical operators. We create a conjunction of economic conditions to see the 
effect of all the foreign economic activity of de facto states; and a disjunction to 
see whether some entities have a niche in their economic activity which furthers 
their engagement. And, finally, to test the asymmetry, we perform a separate 
analysis for the absence of outcome. This is to find out why some de facto states 
have no foreign representations, no formal recognition and are shunned by 
international organisations. 
The results of the empirical analysis mostly confirm our hypotheses. We 
must use the term ‘mostly’ because there is no absolute causal complexity. In 
some cases, only one path led to the outcome and in some cases, the path 
consisted of only one condition. Furthermore, the theoretical expectations were 
proven correct. The findings are summarised in more detail in the ‘Discussion’ 
section (3.5), therefore we present only some of the most important and 
interesting findings here. 
The first finding is the confirmation of causal complexity. We have shown 
that combinations of conditions rather than single conditions lead to an 
outcome. For almost all complex and intermediate solution terms, there were no 
results with a single sufficient condition. Single conditions were sufficient with 
most parsimonious solution terms, but, as emphasised regularly in this thesis, 
we do not take theoretical knowledge into account when calculating these 
solutions. Therefore, we can confirm the existence of conjunctural causality. 
The second form of causal complexity, equifinality, is less present, though. In 
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some instances, there was only one sufficient path leading to the outcome. The 
third component, asymmetry, was also confirmed. However, our theoretical 
expectations were symmetrical; that is, if a patron has positive impact on the 
presence of, for example, representations, then no patron has positive impact on 
the absence of representations. But the lack of asymmetry results from the 
content of combinations. For the absence of any outcome, there were no exact 
negations of combinations that were sufficient for the presence of that outcome. 
Basically, the combinations for absence and presence of any outcome were not 
mirror images of one another.  
The second finding is that all component parts of our concept of the 
international system have an effect on the analysed political processes. Of 
course, some were more prominent than others, but all featured. One of 
secessionism or powerful patron tends to be part of all sufficient combinations, 
but freedom and economy are also present. Economy leads us to our third major 
finding. When taken as a conjunction – i.e. a de facto state must show a high 
score in all components of the economic condition – the importance of economy 
is rather minor. When taken as a disjunction, which allows a de facto state to 
have a high score in only one of the components, the impact of economy is 
notably increased. This development is logical, as none of the de facto states, 
with the exception of Taiwan, is an economic powerhouse. It also indicates that 
if de facto states want more engagement, the reasonable strategy would be, at 
least to start with, to discover some economic niche and try to occupy it.  
The fourth major finding, the importance of single conditions, follows. As 
our sufficient paths show quite complex combinations, our analysis of necessary 
conditions demonstrates the impact of single conditions. Here, we establish 
some INUS conditions: that is, conditions which are Insufficient but Necessary 
while being part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient combination. A case in point 
is the absence of freedom for having no representations with both versions of 
the economic condition. The notion of asymmetry also holds in this case, 
because the presence of freedom is not necessary for representations to be 
present. A substantial interpretation of this would be that, although a de facto 
state does not have to be democratic to have representations, the absence of 
freedom can lead to having no representations. Those de facto states that have 
representations can be democratic or not, but those that do not have 
representations are not democratic. One major point can be made based on our 
analysis of necessary conditions. Again, all four conditions have a role to play. 
Each condition was in some form present at least in one outcome or the absence 
of it. This emphasises the complex nature of the engagement of de facto states. 
Even though we are dealing with single conditions at the moment, the analysis 
of unrecognised entities in the international system must focus on interactions 
between these conditions. When every single condition matters to some extent, 
combinations of these conditions give us better insight into how outcomes are 
achieved. Furthermore, our conditions are the result of operationalisation of the 
component parts of the international system. This means that full systemic 
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analysis is very useful in establishing the behaviour of de facto states in their 
relations with the outside world. All components of the system are important; 
therefore, they should be analysed as a whole. 
The fifth main conclusion concerns borderline cases. Their inclusion did not 
cause major differences in results. As outlined in the ‘Discussion’ section (3.5), 
the main impacts were the decreased importance of secession and economy, 
because neither of our borderline cases is secessionist and nor do they have 
viable economies.  
In the ‘Discussion’ section (3.5), we also briefly outline the main lines of 
criticism of the thesis and its contribution. The major problems with this work 
are connected to the cases. They can be seen as twofold. First, there are 
problems with data. Getting accurate data from de facto states is, in some cases 
at least, difficult. Cases like Taiwan, on the other hand, are simple. Secondly, 
the small number of cases limits the power to make generalisations. This is 
amplified by the diverse nature of the cases. The second line of criticism is 
aimed at the chosen method. It does have its limitations, but as a wider 
approach, it is suitable for the analysis of de facto states.  
Finally, we suggest some possibilities for further research in the field of de 
facto states and their engagement. Work has been done on internal develop-
ments of the entities and on particular aspects of their foreign relations. How-
ever, and developing the main theme of this particular work, more emphasis 
should be placed on the analysis of the combinations of possible variables that 
affect de facto states’ foreign relations. Here, we have presented one possibility 
of how to analyse combinations of conditions. However, our analysis is general 
and we do not study particular cases in depth. We have established some 
sufficient combinations. The next step would be to focus on cases and see how 
these combinations work in the particular setting of a de facto state. Therefore, a 
more in depth analysis of the interactions of conditions in a particular de facto 
state could be useful.  
Secondly, the concept of the international system should be more integrated 
into the research on de facto states. Again, a more in depth analysis would be 
welcome because of the general nature of this thesis. More historical cases 
could also be involved. There are, of course, problems in doing this kind of 
work, mainly because acquiring the relevant data is notoriously difficult. The 
framework of the international system devised by Buzan and Little that we use 
here is very well equipped for historical inquiry.  
The third, and probably the most important, possible route for further 
analysis is the conceptualisation of the de facto state itself. Ultimately, it does 
not matter which term we use to label these entities. The important point is to 
arrive at some consensual definition and to frame the universe of cases. At 
present, the academic universe of de facto states is overstocked with different 
concepts and labels. It is essential that some sort of common concept is 
established. Unless we reach a common understanding of what the de facto state 
is, research in the field will be scattered and no coherent theory can be devised. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
De facto riigid rahvusvahelises süsteemis.  
(Mitte-)formaalse kaasamise tingimused 
Käesolev doktoriväitekiri käsitleb tunnustamata riikide – de facto riikide – 
positsiooni rahvusvahelises süsteemis. Kuna antud valdkonnas puudub ühtne 
teooria, mis tegeleks de facto riikide olemusega ningnende kaasamisega 
rahvusvahelisse ellu, siis leiab ka väitekirjas kajastamist mitu erinevat 
tunnustamata riike puudutavat aspekti. Väitekiri algab rahvusvahelise süsteemi 
kontseptualiseerimisest. De facto riike käsitlevas kirjanduses kasutatakse palju 
rahvusvahelise süsteemi, ühiskonna või kogukonna mõistet neid täpsemalt 
avamata. Antud töös võetakse aluseks Barry Buzan’i ja Richard Little’i käsitlus 
rahvusvahelisest süsteemist. Järgnevalt kontseptualiseeritakse töös de facto riik 
lähtuvaltasjakohasestteaduskirjandusest ning suveräänsuse teooriast. Kontsept-
siooni põhjal luuakse ka töödefinitsioon. Järgneb juhtumite kirjeldus, millega 
illustreeritakse nende sobivust töödefinitsiooniga. Enne analüüsini jõudmist 
operatsionaliseeritakse rahvusvahelise süsteemi komponendid ning antakse 
ülevaade kasutatavast meetodist – fsQCA. Töö viimase osa moodustab analüüs, 
mille käigus leitakse tingimused, mis viivad de facto riikide suurema kaasa-
miseni rahvusvahelises süsteemis. Analüüsi läbiviimiseks on töös püstitatud 
kolm hüpoteesi: 
 De facto riikide positsiooni rahvusvahelises süsteemis määravad erinevad 
‘rajad’ (path). Need ‘rajad’ on piisavad (sufficient) erinevate tulemuste – 
välisesindused de facto riigis; nende ametlik tunnustamine; ja nende kaasa-
mine rahvusvahelistesse organisatsioonidesse – saavutamiseks.  
 Need ‘rajad’ on erinevate tegurite (condition) kombinatsioonid. 
 Iga konkreetne tegur omab kas positiivset või negatiivset mõju tulemuse 
saavutamisele: 
 Majanduslikud tegurid omavad positiivset mõju; 
 Võimsa patrooni olemasolu omab positiivset mõju; 
 Inimõiguste järgimine de facto riigi poolt omab positiivset mõju; 
 Setsessioon omab negatiivset mõju. 
 
Hüpoteeside kinnitamise või ümberlükkamise jälgimiseks tuleb kõigepealt välja 
tuua töös kasutatavad kontseptsioonid. Alustame rahvusvahelisest süsteemist, 
millele järgneb de facto riik. 
De facto riike käsitlevas kirjanduses kasutatakse tihti termineid rahvus-
vaheline süsteem, ühiskond või kogukond. Samas on nende terminite sisu jää-
nud lahti seletamata, puudu on kontseptualiseerimisest. Alustades viimasest, 
rahvusvahelisest kogukonnast (international community), siis sel juhul on tege-
mist kõige ala-kontseptualiseeritud mõistega. Võib väita, et see küllaltki 
populaarne ning ka mitteteaduslikus kirjanduses ja meedias kasutatav termin 
tähendab parajasti seda, mida konkreetne autor ise selle all mõtleb. Väga 
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üldiselt on rahvusvaheliseks kogukonnaks kõik riigid. Rahvusvaheline ühiskond 
(international society) on kontseptualiseeritud rahvusvaheliste suhete Inglise 
koolkonna poolt ning tähendab mingite normide ja reeglite olemasolu üldiselt 
anarhilises keskkonnas. Rahvusvaheline süsteem on kirjanduses paljukasutatud 
termin. Käesolev väitekiri kasutab süsteemikäsitlust, mille lõid Buzan ja Little 
(2000) ning täidab selle käsitluse ka teguritega, mida analüüsis kasutatakse.  
Buzan’i ja Little’i süsteemikäsitlus on äärmiselt mitmetahuline ning sisaldab 
endas viite elementi – erinevad sektorid, erinevad seletusallikad, erinevad 
uurimistasandid, läbikäimine ja ühikud. Alustades lihtsamatest, ühikuteks on 
riigid ning läbikäimine on igasugune suhtlus nende riikide vahel. Erinevad uuri-
mistasandid ulatuvad indiviidist kuni süsteemini hõlmates kõike, mis sinna 
vahele jääb. Tuntuimad on vahest riigid ja regioonid. Antud uurimuse tasandiks 
on süsteem. See teeb käesoleva lähenemise ka uudseks, sest nagu eespool 
mainitud, põhjalikku süsteemset käsitlust de facto riikide kohta ei ole. Ning 
selle süsteemse käsitluse tuum peitub kahes ülejäänud Buzan’i ja Litte’i 
elemendis – sektorid ning seletusallikad.  
Buzan ja Little eristavad viite sektorit – sõjaline, poliitiline, majanduslik, 
sotsiaal-kultuuriline ja keskkonna-alane. Esimesed kaks võib ühendada ka 
sõjalis-poliitiliseks ning lisaks võib arutleda ka juriidilise sektori üle. Siin töös 
kasutame kolmesektorit väljatoodud viiest jättes kõrvale sõjalise ja keskkonna-
alase sektori. Rahvusvaheline süsteem on erinevates sektorites ajalooliselt välja 
kujunenud erineva kiirusega. Kõigepealt kujunes välja sotsiaal-kultuuriline 
süsteem, millele järgnes majanduslike suhete loomine ning seejärel tuli sõjalis-
poliitiline korraldus. Sektorid mõjutavad üksteist. Antud töö fookuses on 
poliitiline sektor, kuidas de facto riigid on teisteehk siis tunnustatud riikide 
poolt süsteemis vastu võetud. Seega üheks nn sõltumatute muutujate allikaks on 
majanduslik sektor ning sotsiaal-kultuuriline sektor. 
Igas sektoris on kolm seletusallikat – protsess, struktuur ja suhtlusvõimekus. 
Alustades jällegi lihtsamini arusaadavast, protsess on läbikäimise mustrid. 
Lihtsustatult võib öelda, et protsess seletab, kuidas riigid üksteisega läbi käivad. 
Struktuuri käsitlevad Buzan ja Little anarhilisena. Samas on võimalik väita, et 
selles anarhias on mingid kokkulepitud reeglid, millede järgi riigid käituvad. 
Suhtlusvõimekus tähendab võimalusi teiste riikidega suhtlemiseks. Ajalooliselt 
on olulisel kohal olnud tehnoloogiline võimekus – selleks, et sõita teisele 
kontinendile on vaja ookeanikõlbulikke laevu. Tänapäeval geograafilised 
piirangud rolli ei mängi, seega ei ole suhtlusvõimekus enam takistuseks. 
Käesolevas töös täidame me Buzan’i ja Little’i süsteemi indikaatoritega, 
mida hilisemas analüüsis kasutame. Meie uuritav tingimus (nn sõltuv muutuja) 
on poliitiline protsess, kuidas tunnustatud riigid suhtlevad de facto riikidega. 
Selle mõõtmiseks oleme kasutanud kolme indikaatorit – de facto riikide for-
maalne tunnustamine, seal asuvad välisesindused ning nende kaasamine rahvus-
vahelistesse organisatsioonidesse. Need kolm indikaatorit katavad kolme 
võimalust, kuidas riigid üldse käituda saavad – unilateraalne, bilateraalne ja 
multilateraalne. Nagu eespool öeldud, mõjutavad poliitilist sektorit ka teised 
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sektorid. Samas oleme me huvitatud poliitlisest protsessist, mitte struktuurist 
ning suhtlusvõimekusest. Viimased kaks omakorda mõjutavad protsessi. Seega 
on meil kokku neli tegurit, mis poliitilisele protsessile mõju avaldavad ning nad 
on täidetud indikaatoritega, mis ka eelnevalt hüpoteesides ära toodud: 
 Majanduslikud protsessid – de facto riigi kogueksport; otsesed välisinves-
teeringud (FDI) neisse riikidesse ning kaubanduspartnerite arv; 
 Sotsiaal-kultuurilised protsessid – inimõiguste olukord de facto riikides; 
 Poliitiline struktuur – setsessioon; 
 Poliitiline suhtlusvõimekus – tugeva patrooni olemasolu. 
 
Majanduslikud protsessid on küllaltki selged. Tegemist on välismajanduslike 
näitajatega. Kuna neid on kokku kolm, siis analüüsis luuakse neist üks tegur. 
Sotsiaal-kultuuriliste protsesside seostamine inimõigustega tuleneb sellest, et 
üldiselt leitakse nagu oleksid demokraatlikel de facto riikidel suuremad võima-
lused rahvusvaheliseks suhtluseks. Inimõiguste kaitse on sotsiaalne norm, mis 
teeb tunnustatud riigid vastuvõtlikumaks. Poliitilise struktuuri juures tuleb 
märkida, et setsessiooni suhtutakse negatiivselt. Tegemist on ühe mainitud 
normiga anarhilises keskkonnas. Ning suhtlusvõimekuse juures aitab de facto 
riigil välismaailmaga suhelda patroon. Kuna tehnilisi piiranguid suhtlusele ei 
ole, siis tugev patroon on justkui aknaks maailma. Rolli mängibki patrooni 
tugevus. 
Olles paika pannud struktuuri, kuidas de facto riigid võiksid rahvusvahelisse 
süsteemi sobituda, tuleb kindlaks teha juhtumite universum – mis asi de facto 
riik üldse on? Alustame defineerimist laiemast küsimusest – kas me saame de 
facto riiki üldse riigiks pidada? Vastuse sellele saame rahvusvahelisest õigusest. 
Riigi tunnused on määratletud 1933.aasta Montevideo konventsioonis ning 
hõlmavad endas territooriumi, püsivat rahvastikku, valitsust ja võimet astuda 
rahvusvahelistesse suhetesse. Siit kerkib tunnustamise probleem. Õigusteaduses 
on sellel kaks lähenemist – konstitutiivne ja deklaratiivne teooria. Esimene 
leiab, et tunnustamine on riigi definitsiooni osaks, teine arvab, et ei ole. 
Viimane seisukoht on võetud ka Montevideo konventsioonis. Lähtudes deklara-
tiivsest teoorias saame me de facto riike riikidena käsitleda.  
Sellele järgneb küsimus – kuidas me saame neid teistest riikidest eristada? 
Siinkohal kasutame suveräänsuse käsitlust. Suveräänsuse juures aitavad meid 
kaks dihhotoomiat: juriidiline-empiiriline ning sisemine-välimine. Nende põhjal 
saab luua neli suveräänsuse komponenti: 
 Juriidiline sisemine: riigi (põhi)seaduslik kord; 
 Juriidiline välimine: rahvusvaheline tunnustamine; 
 Empiiriline sisemine: korra tagamine siseriiklikult; 
 Empiiriline välimine: sõltumatus välistest jõududest. 
 
Sellise jaotuse põhjal saame väita, et de facto riik on riik, millel on olemas 
mõlemad empiirilised ja mõlemad sisemised komponendid. Seega eristab de 
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facto riike teistest rahvusvahelise tunnustuse puudumine. Sarnast seisukohta 
toetab ka de facto riikide alane kirjandus.  
De facto riike, või täpsemalt üksusi, mida antud töös nimetatakse de facto 
riikideks, on kirjeldatud paljude erinevate terminitega erinevate autorite poolt. 
Mõned üldtuntumad on veel ‘tunnustamata riik’, ‘riik riigis’, ‘kvaasi-riik’, 
‘pseudo-riik’ ja ‘vaidlustatav riik’. Olulisemad autorid, kes on püüdnud neid 
üksusi defineerida on Pegg (1998), Lynch (2004), Bartmann (2004), Kolossov 
ja O’Loughlin (1999), King (2001), Spears (2004), Kolstø (2006), Geldenhuys 
(2010) ja Caspersen (2012). Need autorid toovad välja erinevaid kriteeriumi, 
mille järgi de facto riiki defineerida. Mõned neist kriteeriumitest kattuvad, 
mõned mitte. Kriteeriumid, millede suhtes valitseb konsensus on Montevideo 
konventsioonis sätestatud – territoorium, rahvastik, valitsus ja võime astuda 
rahvusvahelistesse suhetesse – ning rahvusvahelise tunnustuse puudumine. 
Mõningad kriteeriumid, mille suhets konsensus puudub on näiteks iseseisvus-
deklaratsioon või minimaalne aeg, mil üksus on iseseisvalt eksisteerinud. Võttes 
arvesse eeltoodud suveräänsuse käsitluse ning erialases kirjanduses konsensuse 
leidnud kriteeriume, loome siinkohal de facto riigi töödefinitsiooni, mille järgi 
selliseks üksuseks on: 
 Kõigile Montevideo konventsioonis sätestatud riigi tunnustele vastav üksus, 
millel puudub rahvusvaheline tunnustus. 
 
Definitsioon on küllaltki lai ning võimaldab kaasata võimalikult palju juhtu-
meid. Käesolevas töös on juhtumiteks Abhaasia, Lõuna-Osseetia, Mägi-Kara-
bahhia, Transnistria, Põhja-Küpros, Somaalimaa, Kosovo, Taivan, Palestiina ja 
Lääne-Sahara. Selle valiku juures tuleb täpsustada kahte aspekti. Esiteks, 
Palestiina ja Lääne-Sahara on käsitletud kui piiripealsed juhtumid, kuna nende 
kontroll oma territooriumi üle on vaieldav. Seetõttu viime läbi kaks analüüsi, 
üks, mis ei sisalda nimetatud juhtumeid ja üks, mis sisaldab. Teiseks, Taivani 
on käsitletud kui kahte erinevat juhtumit, üks Taivan 1980 ja teine 2010. 
Võimaluse selleks annab kasutatav meetod, mis ei käsitle juhtumite muutusi 
ajas. Kui on võimalik piisav eristamine, ning Taivani puhul on, siis võib nii-
moodi talitada.  
Enne meetodi juurde asumist vaatame veel üle analüüsitavad tingimused ja 
nende operatsionaliseerimise. Tulemina (outcome condition) vaatleme me 
kolme tingimust – rahvusvaheline tunnustamine, välisesindused ja osalemine 
rahvusvahelistes organisatsioonides. Esimese kahe mõõtmine on küllaltki 
lihtne – kui palju riike on de facto riiki tunnustanud ning kui paljud on seal 
mingis ulatuses välisesinduse avanud. Organisatsioonidega on veidi keerulisem, 
mõõtmiseks kasutame skaalat, mis põhineb Kegley ja Blantoni (2010) kahe-
mõõtmelisel käsitlusel, samuti on arvesse võetud, kas de facto riik on täis- või 
vaatlejaliige. Majanduslikud tingimused on mõõdetud USA dollarites (eksport 
ja FDI) ning partnerite arvus. Inimõiguste tingimus on mõõdetud Freedom 
House’i hinnangutega. Setsessioon on dihhotoomne tingimus, see kas on või ei 
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ole. Ning patrooni tugevus on mõõdetud Correlates of War projekti välja-
töötatud CINC indeksi abil. 
Kõik need mõõdikud on analüüsitud kasutades meetodit Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis – QCA, mille juured asuvad hulgateoorias, formaalses loogi-
kas ja Boole’i algebras. Täpsemalt selle ühte versiooni, hägushulkade (fuzzy set) 
QCA ehk fsQCA. Meetod võimaldab meil leida piisavad ‘rajad’, mis eel-
datavasti on tingimuste kombinatsioonid. Samuti saame me teada, millised 
individuaalsed tingimused on vajalikud tulemi saavutamiseks. Selleks on kõige-
pealt vaja läbi viia kaks operatsiooni andmetega. Vähendamaks juhtumitest 
tühjade kombinatsioonide (limited diversity) teket oleme majanduslikud tingi-
mused koondanud üheks tingimuseks, seda samas kahel viisil. Kõigepealt 
võtame majandust tervikuna (konjunktsioon), hiljem kombinatsioonina, kus iga 
üksik tingimus võib suurt mõju avaldada (disjunktsioon). Teine operatsioon on 
kalibreerimine, mis annab meie mõõdikutele hulga-väärtuse. See annab igale 
tingimusele väärtuse vahemikus 0–1, olles samas mitte ordinaalne ega intervall-
skaala. Tegemist on hulga-väärtustega, kus olulisteks ankrupunktideks on 
täielik hulka kuulumine (‘1’), täielik hulka mittekuulumine (‘0’) ning keskpunkt 
(‘0,5’), mis näitab võrdset hulka kuulumist ja mittekuulumist. 
Kokku viime me läbi 12 erinevat analüüsi, mille põhjustavad kolm erine-
vustegruppi. Kõigepealt on meil kolm tulemit (tunnustamine, esindused ja 
organisatsioonid), seejärel kaks erinevat majandust (konjunktsioon ja disjunkt-
sioon) ning lõpetuseks kaks juhtumitehulka (ilma piiripealsete juhtumiteta ja 
koos nendega). See annab meile võimaluse mitte ainult teada saada piisavaid ja 
vajalikke tingimusi ja nende kombinatsioone, vaid ka võrrelda erinevate tule-
mite põhjuseid, majandusliku niššistumise eripärasid või Palestiina ja Lääne-
Sahara mõju tulemustele. Analüüs annab meile ka kolm erinevat tulemust – 
kõige kompleksema, keskmise ja kõige kitsama. Nende vahe on tühjade 
kombinatsioonide kasutamises. Kõige kompleksem ei tee seda üldse, tulemused 
antakse ainult andmete põhjal. Kuna andmed on reeglina piiratud siis keskmine 
ja kitsam tulemus võtavad ka tühje kombinatsioone arvesse. Samas ei tohi nad 
minna vastuollu sellega, mida andmed ütlevad. Lisaks sellele eristab keskmist 
kitsamast teoreetiliste suundadega arvestamine, mis meie puhul on välja toodud 
kolmandas hüpoteesis. 
Analüüsi tulemuseks on viis suuremat leidu, mida siinkohal ära tuua. Esiteks 
on suuremas osas tõestatud hüpoteeside paikapidavus. Enamus tulemusi andsid 
meile erinevad kombinatsioonid, mis tulemiteni viisid. Samuti leidis kinnitust 
ka asümmeetria, kuna tulemite puudumiseni ei viinud nende olemasolule täpselt 
vastupidised rajad. Esimest nähtust – sama tulemi võib saavutada erinevaid teid 
pidi – nimetatakse ekvifinaalsuseks. Küll mitte kõigil 12-st juhtumist aga siiski 
enamusel ekvifinaalsus esines. Seega me saame väita, et erinevad de facto riigid 
võivad rahvusvahelise aktsepteerimiseni jõuda erinevaid teid pidi. Teine nähtus 
– need rajad on tingimuste kombinatsioonid, mitte üksikud tingimused – on 
konjunktsioon-põhjuslikkus. Ka see leidis analüüsis kinnitust, kuna enamus 
tulemusi olid kombinatsioonid. Vaid kõige kitsamate tulemuste puhul oli 
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põhjuslikkus taandatav üksikute tingimusteni, kuid, nagu eespool märgitud 
arvestab see tulemus ka tühje kombinatsioone. Tuleb ka lisada, et konjunkt-
sioon-põhjuslikkus esines tihedamini kui ekvifinaalsus, mistõttu kombinat-
sioonide väite suhtes saame me kindlamad olla kui erinevate radade suhtes. 
Teine suurem tulemus oleks, et kõik analüüsitud rahvusvahelise süsteemi 
komponendid omasid tulemite saavutamiseks mingit rolli. Loomulikult olid 
mõned olulisemad kui teised. Nimelt on setsessioon ja selle puudumine ning 
võimas patroon ja selle puudumine mõnevõrra olulisemad kui inimõigustest 
kinnipidamine või majandus. Samas esinesid ka viimased kas osana mõnest 
piisavast kombinatsioonist või olid iseseisvalt vajalikud tingimused. 
Kolmas suurem leid on seotud majanduslike tingimustega. Mäletatavasti 
tegime majanduslike tingimustega kaks erinevat analüüsi, kus käsitlesime neid 
tingimusi vastavalt konjunktsiooni ja disjunktsioonina. Majandus-konjunktsioon 
ei oma suurt mõju. Põhjuseks tuleb siin tuua konjunktsiooni loogiline olemus. 
Meil oli kolm majanduslikku mõõdet – eksport, FDI ja partnerite arv –ning 
nende ühendamine konjunktsiooni abil tähendab seda, et saamaks kõrget hulga-
väärtust peab see olema kõrge ka igas elemendis individuaalselt. De facto 
riikide puhul on selle saavutamine keeruline, nende integreeritus maailma-
majandusse pole laialdane. Disjunktsiooni puhul piisab aga kõrgest hulga-
väärtusest ühes elemendis. See annab meile võimaluse analüüsida de facto 
riikide majanduslikku integreeritust kui viimane on endale mõne nišši leidnud. 
Näiteks loonud mõne sektori, mis toodab eksporditavat kaupa. Või suutnud 
endale leida suurema hulga kaubanduspartnereid. Majanduslikud tingimused 
disjunktsioonina omasid analüüsis selgelt tugevamat mõju. 
Neljas suurem leid on seotud individuaalsete tingimustega. Kuigi töö suurem 
fookus on kombinatsioonidel, siis individuaalsed tingimused osutusid vaja-
likeks, mitte piisavateks. Mõningatel juhtudel saime me välja tuua INUS 
(inglise keeles itself Insufficient but Necessary while being part of an 
Unnecessary but Sufficient combination) tingimused. Üheks näiteks on inim-
õiguste puudumine analüüsis, kus tulemiks oli välisesinduste puudumine. 
Siinkohal kehtib ka asümmeetria, kuna inimõiguste järgimine ei ole vajalik 
välisesinduste olemasoluks. Viies leid hõlmas piiripealseid juhtumeid ning selle 
tulemuseks oli nende vähene mõju analüüsile. Nende lisamine andmestiku tõi 
küll kaasa mõningaid muudatusi, kuid need ei olnud märkimisväärselt suured. 
Lõpetuseks võtame kokku käesoleva töö olulisema panuse – mõned vastused 
kuulsale ‘Mis siis?’ küsimusele. Alustame süsteemist. Antud töö on esimene 
rahvusvahelise süsteemi käsitlust ja de facto riike siduv lähenemine. Ning selle 
olulisus peegeldub eeskätt süsteemi komponentide mõjus de facto riikide 
kaasamisele. Mõju avaldub eeskätt kahes aspektis. Esiteks kombinatsioonid. Me 
nägime, et üksikud süsteemi komponendid eraldivõetuna nii suurt tähendust ei 
oma, vaadeldes neid aga kombinatsioonidena saame me selgema pildi. Teiseks, 
kõik süsteemi komponendid mängisid mingisugust rolli. See kinnitab lisaks, et 
me ei saa vaadelda süsteemi osiseid isolatsioonis, kuna mainitud kombinat-
sioonid hõlmavad kõiki süsteemi komponente. Käesolev töö annab võimaluse 
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näha seoseid süsteemi elementide vahel ning kuidas nad mõjutavad käitumist de 
facto riikide suhtes.  
Teine oluline panus on de facto riigi enda käsitlus. Nagu tööst ilmneb on 
valdkond ülekontseptualiseeritud, on palju erinevaid lähenemisi, mis reeglina 
kannavad ka erinevat nimetust. Selline olukord on takistuseks koherentse 
teooria väljatöötamisele, mis käsitleks tunnustamata üksusi ning nende rolli 
maailmapoliitikas. Antud töö pakub välja teoreetiliselt põhjendatud kontsept-
siooni, mis koosneb elementides, mille puhul on täheldatav ka konsensus eriala-
kirjanduses.  
Kolmas olulisem panus peitub metodoloogias. Üldiselt uuritakse de facto 
riike kas juhtumianalüüsina või formaliseerimata võrdlustena. Juhtumite vähe-
suse tõttu on ka kvantitatiivsete meetodite kasutamine piiratud, kuigi on ilmu-
nud uurimusi, mis tegelevad de facto riikide sisemiste arengutega ning kasu-
tavad ka statistikat. Käesolev töö on teadaolevat esmakordne QCA kasutamine 
de facto riikide rahvusvahelise positsiooni uurimises. Nagu selgub, on selline 
lähenemine viljakas ning annab väga huvitavaid tulemusi. Käesolev töö panus-
tab seega ka de facto uurimise metodoloogilisse rikkusesse. 
Ning viimane panus oleks töös toodud tulemused ise. Me saame teada, milli-
sed tingimused viivad milliste tulemusteni või nende tulemuste puudumiseni 
ning selle pinnalt saab läbi viia edasisi täpsemaid, konkreetse juhtumi põhiseid 
uuringuid. Antud töö annab selleks üldistava ja võrdleva raamistiku. 
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7 Ministri of Foreign Affairs (MoFA-Taiwan) 
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assume that the percentage is similar today. 
9 State Planning Organization (SPO, 2011) 2009 
10 State Planning Organization (SPO, 2011), 2009 
11 Public Information Office (Foreign Representations in the TRNC, 2009) 
12  OIC (OIC, 2011)  
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14 World Bank (WB, 2012) 
15 World Bank (WB, 2012) 
16 Ministri of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo (MFA, 2012) 
17 Ministri of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo (MFA, 2012) 
18 Government of Abkhazia (2011)  
19 Bank of Abkhazia (2011), using exchange rate of one dollar for 30.4769 
Russian roubles (the official exchange rate of the Bank of Russia on 
December 31st 2010). 
20 www.200stran.ru (200 Stran: Abkhazia, 2011) 
21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia (MFA website) 
22  Taiwan’s 1980 economic data is assumed to be in current values, even 
though the sources do not explicitly state so. The assumption is made 
because the sources give comparable data with later dates. 
23 Foreign investment data is calculated from the figure Copper (1981) gave for 
the first eight months of 1980. This was 313.5 million dollars until Sep-
tember 1980, therefore we have treated it as a two thirds figure. Based on 
that the amount, the figure for a full year would be around 470.25 million 
dollars 
24 Encyclopedia of the Nations (2012)  
25 Encyclopedia of the Nations (2012) 
26 Taiwan in 1980: Entering a New Decade (Copper, 1981). 
27 Taiwan in 1980: Entering a New Decade (Copper, 1981). 
28 The Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2013)  
29 World Bank,(WB, 2012), 2009 
30 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS, 2012)  
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31 Ministry of National Economy (MNE, 2004) 
32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA-Palestine, 2013) 
33 League of Arab States (LAS, 2012) 
34 National Statistics Service (2011), calculated using exchange rate of 
Transnistrian Rouble for one dollar: 11.15 roubles 
35 Ministry of Economics (2011)  
36 Ministry of Economics (2011) 
37 OpenDemocracy (Kalikh, 2009) 
38 Statistical Service of Nagorno-Karabakh  (NSS, 2011) 
39 Statistical Service of Nagorno-Karabakh (NSS, 2011) 
40 Statistical Service of Nagorno-Karabakh (NSS, 2011) 
41 International Crisis Group (ICG, 2010)  
42 International Crisis Group (ICG, 2010) 
43 International Crisis Group (ICG, 2010) 
44 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA-RUS) 
45 Data about foreign investments is rare and incomplete and taken from news 
about investments. There are stories about 5 million dollar Saudi investment 
(BNO, 2009); some German investment, reportedly in excess of 250–300 
million dollars for factories and power plant (afrolNews, 2006); 40 million 
dollar (BBC, 2012) and other (Somalilandpress, 2010) British investment. 
As there is no concrete data and some of these investments are spread over 
several years, we take a figure of 50 million dollars of FDI a year 
46 Calculated based on data from the Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, 
Industry and Agriculture annual report for 2010 (SLCCIA, 2011)  
47 Bederwanaag News Online (BNO, 2009) 
48 Ethiopia (Qarannews, 2009) and Denmark (MoFAoD, 2012) 
49 There is no data for economy but some economic activity is taking place  
(Bhatia, 2001). Therefore, all indicators are considered to be one. 
50 Embajada de la RASD en Argelia (SADR, 2006)  
51 African Union (AU, 2012)  
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